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PREFACE 
The present dissertation is in the field of aesthetics. I have 
derived great benefit from several authors, in particular from Wittgenstein, 
whose influence is apparent above all in Chapter Seven, and from Kant, whose 
views have inspired the theory of the aesthetic attitude that is defended in 
Chapter Nine. Other debts to published work are aclcnowledged as far as 
possible in footnotes in the text. 
I am also indebted to mlf supervisors, Dr. M.K. Tanner, and Professor 
G.E.M. Anscombe, for guidance and suggestions; to Dr. J .E;J. Altham, and 
Miss Hide Ishiguro, for several helpful discussions, and especially to 
Dr. M.J. Budd who patiently criticised an earlier draft, and suggested many 
improvements. ~ greatest ~ebt is to vr. John Casey, who has read and 
criticised this work at every stage, and m~e substantial suggestions that 
have refined the argument to an incalculable extent. 
I declare that this dissertation is entirely mw own work, and includes 
nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration. 
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SUmtn!gY' of Dissertation : Art and Imagination 
~ intention is to show that, starting from an empiricist philosopqy 
of mind, it is possible to give a g,ystematic account of aesthetic experience. 
I argue that empiricism involves a certain theor,y of meaning and truth, one 
problem is to show how this theor,y is compatible with the activity of 
aesthetio judgment. I investigate and reject two attempts to delimit the 
realm of the aesthetio: one in terms of the individuality of the aesthetio 
object, and the other in terms of 'aesthetic properties'. I go on to argue 
that aesthetic descriptions must not be thought to ascribe properties to 
their objects, and I show how the suggestion that they are non-descriptive 
need not conflict with the empiricist view of meaning. The problem is then 
seen to lie with the analysis of the tacceptance-conditions' of aesthetic 
descriptions. I counter certain idealist objections to this approach, and 
then present a theory of imagination, in terms of which the acceptance-
conditions ~f aesthetic judgments may be described. This theor,y attempts 
to explain how the element of thought in aesthetic appreciation may become 
inseparable from an experience of its object, and how the aesthetic emotions 
are both like and unlike their equivalents in life. The first part concludes 
with an analysis of the general conditions of aesthetic experience. 
to show that aesthetic experience can be described in terms of certain 
'formal i properties, independently of its material object. 
I try 
In the second part 1 am concerned to show that this empiricist theory 
of aesthetics does not, like most empiricist theories, make nonsense of our 
appreciation of art. First, I attempt to show that 'understanding' art is 
not merely a cognitive process, but involves certain experiences that can be 
accounted for in terms of the previous theory. I then analyse the concepts 
of representation and expression, and in the course of this analYSis I 
attempt to refute what I take to be the most serious rival analysis of our 
appreciation of art - the semantic theory. 
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PART I 
THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE 
CHAPl'ER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of the present work is to sketch a theory of aesthetic 
judgment and appreciation in terms of an empiricist philosophy of mind. 
For philosophers of an idealist cast aesthetics has never detached itself 
from the philosopny of mind: such philosophers have produced theories of 
thought, feeling and imagination which give a central and intelligible 
place to the activities of aesthetic judgment and appreciation. 
Empiricists, on the other hand, have found it difficult to account for these 
activities except by reducing their importance in a w~ that few will find 
acceptable. Aesthetics becomes, for such philosophers as Hutcheson and 
Hume, a matter of "sentiment": of liking this thing rather than that. 
Taste is an isolated and inexplicable segment of human ps,ychology, and it 
is simply a curious but philosophically uninteresting fact, that human 
beings enjoy some things (such as tragedies, strawberries and fine weather) 
and recoil from others. Having no philosophy of thought and feeling that 
could make our experience of art intelligible, it seemed natural to such 
philosophers that aesthetic appreciation should find no place in the 
intellectual part of human mentality. Thus Hutcheson was happy to say 
that "the origin of our perceptions of beauty and harmony is justly called 
a • sense' because it involves no intellectual element, no reflection on 
principles and causes.,,1 
Modern analytical philosophy has inherited the weaknesses of its 
empiricist origins. There have been few works of philosophical aesthetics 
in this century that cast any light on the topic, and many of those that 
do (Croce's Aesthetic, for example, and Collingwood's Philosophr of Art) 
are explicitly idealist in all except the most extreme opinions of that 
1 An Ingui;y into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, 5ec.1, 
Par.13. 
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school. It is clear that, for all its rejection of the sceptical and 
Cartesian presuppositions of traditional empiricism, analytical philosophy 
has more in common with the thought of Locke, Hume, Berkeley and Thomas 
Reid than it has with that of Hegel, Fichte or Croce. It is no longer 
possible to accept the philosophy of mind that made Croce's account of 
aesthetic judgment plausible: and yet the rival account of human mental 
processes that derives from Byle and Wittgenstein gives no clear picture 
of the place which aesthetics can occupy. In the following chapters I 
wish to suggest how this lacuna might possibly be filled. 
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Philosophical aesthetics seems to divide into two parts: first there 
is the study of aesthetic appreciation, the aesthetic attitude, taste, the 
aesthetic emotions, and so on. In other words there is the philosophical 
analysis of an area of human experience, the area which is involved in our 
responses to the objects of aesthetic interest. It is a philosophical 
question how far it is possible to give a description of these attitudes 
and preferences that is not trivial, and how far it is possible to set them 
apart as an autonomous segment of mental activity. Secondly philosophers 
attempt to analyse our judgments about the objects of aesthetic feeling and 
appreciation. We make value judgments about these objects, and we describe 
them in various ways which seem to have a peculiar relation to their 
aesthetic significance. We must discover what these descriptions and 
evaluations mean, and how they might be supported if they can be supported 
at all. 
Immediately we seem to have made a large assumption. Is it really so 
obvious that we can describe aesthetic judgment and aesthetic appreciation 
independently? It will be one of mlf contentions that we cannot. 
Certainly it would be a rash philosopher who claimed that ethics divides in 
a similar way - into the study of moral attitudes and feelings on the one 
hand, and the study of moral judgments on the other. For there are strong 
arguments for s~ing that we cannot understand moral judgments except in the 
context of certain attitudes and feelings, and that we cannot understand 
these attitudes and feelings until we have a firm grasp of their expression 
in moral judgments. To understand the one is to understand the other. 
But to establish the precise connections between judgment and 
appreciation in aesthetics is difficult - more difficult even than it is 
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in ethics. One source of difficulty is the obscurity of such heavily 
theoretical notions as 'aesthetic appreciation' and 'aesthetic experience': 
yet it is on an analysis of these notions that an empiricist aesthetic must 
be founded. Moreover, certain far-reaching assumptions have to be made 
about the concept of meaning if aesthetic judgment is to be explained at 
all. That there is ~ connection between the meaning of our utterances 
and our mental states is undeniable; but in the case of aesthetic experience 
the connection proves hard to describe. The following investigations will 
therefore involve a considerable excursus into philosophical psychology, 
together with a discussion of meaning and truth. Only by these roundabout 
methods can an empiricist theory of mind be brought into relation with the 
problems of aesthetics. 
It will be asked "What place has art in such an investigation? Where 
does the concept of art fit in vdth those of aesthetic experience and 
aesthetic judgIrent?" Certainly it would be foolish to treat aesthetics in 
such a way that it becomes an irrelevant fact that the principa~ objects of 
aesthetic judgment and appreciation are works of art. It is precisely this 
that has made empiricist aesthetics unacceptable. No reader of Hegel can 
fail to admire the brilliance and surety Vii th which he argued for the 
central place of art in human experience, and with which he derived from 
purely philosophical premises a theory of the nature and limits of all the 
several art-forms. Nonetheless it is not certain that the empiricist 
assumption that art and the appreciation of art can be independently 
described has really been refuted. It ma;y still be true I therefore, that 
it is a contingent fact in some sense that art is the principle object of 
aesthetic experience. If Kant is important in the history of aesthetics 
it is partly because he was the first philosopher to attempt to give a 
systematic account of aesthetic appreciation, without describing its 
material object, and without lapsing into 'Sentimentalism' . It will 
become clear that a great amount hangs on the question whether Kant's 
enterprise can be carried through. It is characteristic of empiricism 
to regard mental processes as intrinsically divisible into separate 
categories - the cognitive, the conative and the affective, for example. 
For idealism these are at most only mutually dependent aspects of a single 
process,1 and the empiricist 1s assimilation of t he ' aest hetic ' to the 
'affective ' is simply a refusal to acknowledge that all mental activity 
is equally cognitive. Aesthetic experience is a form of knowledge, and 
is to be defined in t erms of its object. The experience and its objects 
4 
are so intimately connected, the idealist will s~, as to cohere completely, 
forming an autonomous sphere of mental activity. Thus Croce ( and following 
him Collingwood) argued that the connection between art and aesthetic 
appreciation is logically necessary: art is essentially the expression of 
experience, and appreciation essentially the understanding of the expressive 
forms of art . In what follOWS I wish to show t hat the Kantian approach to 
aest hetics can be not only resuscitated, but also given a firm analytical 
basis. 
Before beginning I shall describe certain philosophical presuppositions 
of the arguments in later chapters, and indicate briefly why t hese pre-
suppositions are near to the tenets of empiricism. Any serious philosophy 
of mind must enable us to answer questions of the form, "What is thought 1 " ? 
"What i s belief 1" , IIWhat is sensation 1", "What are the moral emotions ?", , 
"What is aesthetic experience ?", and so on. I shall assume that answers 
1 John Anderson, "Mind as Feeling" , i n Studies in Empirical Philosoph.y. 
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to questions such as these involve analysis of the meaning of 'thought', 
'belief', 'sensation' , and similar terms. That is, I assume one of the 
principle doctrines of modern analytical philosophy. However , not all 
explanations of the meaning of 'thought ' , 'belief' and 'sensation ' are 
philosophically adequate; we do not wish to know just ~ facts about the 
usage of these terms. I shall assume that, apart from certain very 
important exceptions that I shall discuss in. Chapter Five, the interesting 
features of the meaning of a term, those features that a philosopher is 
concerned to discover, are the features that govern the truth and falsehood 
of sentences in which the term occurs. We are interested in the meaning 
of terms only because we are interested in the truth-conditions of sentences. 
For only if we know the conditions under which it is true to s~ of someone 
that he is thinking (for example) do we know what is important about the 
meaning of 'thought'. If we know these conditions then we are in a 
position to s~ ~ we have a term with this meaning a we have learned 
something about the concept of thought. We can point to relations and 
coherences among the truth-conditions that make the concept of thought 
intelligible. It is partly because philosophical arguments are about truth-
conditions that they are not just verbal quibbles. 
Now an important tenet of the kind of analytical empiricism that I shall 
assume is thisa we suppose that there is a central category of sentences, 
including the majority of present-tense singular declarative sentences, that 
are essentially tied to truth-conditions, in that no account can be given of 
the meaning of one of these sentences, or of what it is to understand one of 
these sentences, that does not refer to the conditions for its truth • 
.; 
There are, indeed, other sentences the meaning of which does not have to be 
explained in this wsya one could even imagine a language in which only 
sentences of this kind could be formed. 1 But it is central to our language, 
1 Cf. the language of commands discussed at the beginning of the 
Philosophical Investigations. 
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and indeeo. to any language in which information is to be transmitted, that 
there exists this central category of declarative sentences, the meaning 
of which derives from the conditions for their truth. And gi ving sen se 
to sentences of this class is a condition of giving sense to any sentence 
whatsoever. 
It is for this reason that a philosophical inquiry into the meaning of 
terms will tend to concentrate on their use in present-tense declarative 
sentences - we wish to know under what conditions it is true to say of 
someone that he is now in pain, and so on. The hope is that an understand-
ing of certain general features ot' the language - rules governing the 
introduction of tenses, connectives, moods and so on - will enable us to 
derive the meaning of the sentences that remain. The empiricist will 
argue that this privileged class of sentences has the important place that 
it has because these sentences are intimately connected with the foundations 
of our knowledge. It is with these sentences that t he formal idea ot' a 
truth-condition is given epistemological content. 
But to make the empiricist's viewpoint intelligible, we need to make 
a distinction between two notions of a truth-condition. There is a sense 
in which almost any system of signs can be assigned a truth-condition for 
each of its sentences. It is sufficient that for each sentence's' 
another sentence 's" should be round such that's' is true it' and only if 
L , ' , 
'6 ' . "1 . We could think of's' and's" as sentences in two isomorphic but 
uninterpreted 1 anguages. Or we could think of's" as some arbitrary 
sentence introduced into the language for precisely this purpose (a sentence 
that has no sense apart from the sense given to it b,y its equivalence to 
's'). '; In the limiting case t S8' and • s .. might even be taken as identical. 
Thus, provided. it makes sense to ~ 's is true', then the sentence 'Si 
has, in this very minimal sense, a truth-condition, namely the circumstance 
that s. But phi~osophers who argue whether the sentence 'a is good' has 
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truth-conditions, do not mean to deny that 'a is good' is true if and only 
if a is good, nor do they mean to deny that 'a is good' is true if and 
only if p, where 'p' stands for some other sentenoe - suoh'.as 'a is 
desirable', 'a is a fit objeot of preferenoe', and so on - that presents the 
same philosophioal diffioulties. 
Furthermore, this 'formal' notion of a truth-oondition oan be 
strengthened without yielding a~ substantial oonolusions. For a language 
oan be oollated with a semantio theor,y, so that ever.y sentenoe in the 
language is assigned a truth-oondition in the theor.y. If we oan oonstruot 
a semantio model for some language or system of signs, then this enables 
us to assign truth-oondi tions reoursively to the sentenoes of the language, 
in a w~ that is no longer trivial. But this assignation of truth-oonditions 
will st,ill not give us the means of understanding the original language - not 
unless we i'irst understand the semantio theory with whioh it is oollated. 
And to understand the theor,y will equally involve the ability to assign 
truth-oonditions to its sentenoes. 
We need, therefore, a stronger, less formal notion of a truth-oondition, 
if our understanding of language is to be explained; a notion that enables 
us to step outside the oirole of language and attaoh a sentenoe direotly 
to the state Ol:' affairs that guarantees its truth. It is not the fact 
that's' is true if and only if s whioh gives to's' a truth-oondition in 
the strong sense we wish to indioate. It is rather the faot that there is 
some state of affairs whioh guarantees the truth of's', and whioh oan be 
identified not just b,y the use of equivalent sentenoes but also direotly, as 
it were, b,y ostension. In other words the idea of a truth-oondition is 
filled out, or given oontent, in terms of the observable states of affairs 
that make sentenoes true. It is an essential tenet of empirioism that the 
formal notion of a truth-oondition oan only be filled out in this W~t by 
referring to states of affairs that oould be looated by ostension. For 
an idealist, ostension is itself a language , the notion of a truth-oondition 
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is ~rreduciblY formal, and the test of truth is therefore coherence within 
a theory. 
This suggests wqy it is that a central class of sentences - present-
tense singular declaratives - has such importance for a philosophical 
enquiry of the kind we shall be engaged in. These sentences are important 
partly because they are the 'primitive' sentences of the language, containing 
only predicates and referring expressions. They acquire this importance in 
terms of a merely formal idea of 'truth-condition', and will thus receive 
special treatment even in a semantic theory. They are the sentences whose 
truth-conditions must be explicated piecemeal; the end-points of a semantic 
invest igation. But such sentences are also important because they can be 
given truth-conditions in the stronger sense: they can be connected with the 
observable states of affairs which make them true. It is by reference to 
these states of affairs that their meaning is taught, and without some such 
relation to ostensive situations the most important primitive signs of the 
language (predicates and referring expressions) could never be learned or 
used consistently. It follows from this that the meaning of these primitive 
sentences is connected with the observ.able states of affairs that make them 
true - these states of affairs are essentially involved in the teaching and 
learning of the sentences in question. A ' truth-condition' ot' IS' is 
therefore connected to the established use of's', and hence to the meaning 
of ' st; it can therefore be distinguished from mere evidence for the truth 
of t st. Uf course, a truth-condition of's' will also refer to a state of 
affairs that is evidence for the truth of's '; but it is evidence that is 
connected with IS' in a particular wqy, such that were it to cease to be 
~ 
evidence we would be forced to conclude that the meaning of's' had changed. 
Now language-learning is dependent on a certain natural understanding 
of the situations with which sentences are correlated: there is no ~ priori 
determination of what mqy be taken for granted. The child' s future practice 
is the c~it3rion of what he has understood, but at no point is practise 
logically determined by what has gone before. It would seem to follow 
that we cannot derive f rom the merely ostensive connection of a sentence 
with truth-conditions a description of conditions that are both necessar,y 
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and sufficient for its truth. The necessary conditions will subsist as a 
vaguely understood and unarticulated background to the teaching situation , 
while sufficient conditions could only be stated if we had. some means of 
describing what it is about the situation that we have located by ostension. 
And this is to suppose an understanding of other sentences presenting 
precisely the problems of' those we are trying to explain. However, the 
impossibility of stating necessary and sufficient conditions doe s not imply 
that such conditions do not exist: on the contrar,y, the argument seems to 
suggest that they do exist, and that it is they that determine the sentence's 
meaning. 
The connection of present-tense declarative sentences with truth-
conditions, in the strong sense, perhaps accounts for the significance of 
Wittgenstein's notion of a 'criterion'. I take it that a criterion of 
intelligence, say , is a fact or feature which , if present in someone, 
necessarily gives a reason for describing him as intelligent - this is part 
of what we mean by intelligence so that, were this fact or feature to cease 
to give a reason for the judgment, the concept of intelligence would thereby 
have changed. This definition is, as it stands, not very satist'actory, for 
the notion of a reason is contextual - what is a reason in one context m~ 
not be a reason in another. For example it could be that having horns is 
a criterion for something's being a cow: but in other circumstances it might 
be p~t of' the reason for s~ing of something that it is a goat and hence 
not a cow. S<1 we must add that a criterion is a l ogical reason: it i s a 
necessary truth that , in the absence of any reason to the contrar,y, the 
presence of a criterion is a reason for the truth of the corresponding 
judgment. 
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Now it follows from this that a criterion of ! is ~ a condition 
governing the truth of ,Et!). The criteria which define the meaning of the 
terms employed in present-tense declarative sentences also give the 
conditions under which these sentences will be true. (These criteria are 
generally neither necessary nor sUfficient conditions, though both necessary 
and sufficient conditions are related to them asymptotically) . 
Wittgenstein thought that the presence of criteria in anything must be 
detectable: they therefore serve to close the gap between epistemology and 
logic. Hence to discover the criteria for the application oi' a predicate 
is to discover what is philosophically interesting about it. 
The problems of aesthetics will be answered in a way satisfactory to 
empiricism if the notions that trouble us - such as 'aesthetic experience', 
and 'the aesthetic attitude' - are elucidated in terms of their criteria, 
the observable states of affairs that warrant their application. But this 
brings us to a final assumption that may seem to make the empiricist 
programme impossi-ole to carry through. This is the assumption that 
criteria must be pU'blicly observable facts or features I aesthetic experience, 
and the aesthetic attitude must therefore be elucidated primarily in terms 
of their expression. It might be objected that we cannot possibly prove 
anything by approaching the subject in such a roundabout way. ourely, it 
will be argued, the important point is the experience or attitude itself, 
and this is something independent ot' its expression, an inner process 
discoverable by introspection alone. If we wish to knOw the essential 
nature of aesthetic experience, it will be said, we should embark on a 
phenomenological investigation, discovering what the experience is in i tselt' , 
its tnoematic structure t as thls is revealed to phenomenological study.1 
The plausibility of such a view is reflected in the fact that the most 
1 See, for example, E.Husserl, Ideas. 
influential and ambitious works on aesthetics outside the i dealist 
tradi tion have been works of phenomenology, ·such as S art re ' s two treatises 
on imagination, Mikel Dufrenne ' s admirable Phenomenologie de l ' experience 
Esthetigue, and Roman Ingarden's Das Literarische Kuntswerk. 
Phenomenology attempts to clarify the notion of aesthetic experience 
by means of a ' phenomenological reduction' of the experience itself. 
But although the experience is supposedly ' reduced', and hence separated 
both from its material object and from its outward expression, there can 
be no coherent description of what it is reduced 1£. The supposed 
phenomenological descriptions of experience, when they are not simply 
disguised references to public expression, are elaborate metaphors that 
tell us nothing definite about the experiences to which they refer. 
Indeed t if we assume the t r uth of Wi ttgenstein ' s famous argument against 
the possibility of reference to ' private objects ' (ob jects statements 
about which are only contingently connected with statements about what is 
publicly observ.able), then this is exactly what we must expect. The 
'noematic' structure of experience is no more than a metaphorical 
translation of the fact that experience is essentially constitut ed by 
outward circumstances. 
Certainly aesthetic experience has 'intentionality', and involves a 
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particular mode of apprehension of its object. But there is no reason why 
this feature should not be explained in terms of criteria that are 
applicable equally to the first-person end the third-person case. Indeed, 
I hope to make various suggestions which will show how these criteria 
could be produced. I shall assume that no meaning can be attached to a 
term of a public language - such as ' experience ' - except by referring to 
publicly observable criteria for its application. 1 Since it is impossible 
to refer to 'private objects', it follovre that the truth-conditions of all 
1 V.L.Wittgenste n, Philosophical Investigations , no.293. 
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sentences - even those about experienoes and other mental states - must be 
given in terms of publicly observable states of affairs. To put this 
point another w~: there are no faots about mental states which are not 
faots that I oan YJnow and observe in another as well as in nwself. 
Phenomenology in the tradition of Husserl attempts a study in depth of the 
first-person oase, independently of the oriteria that must be invoked in 
giving the meaning of any psyohological term. But as Wittgenstein's 
disoussion makes clear, we must not attempt to anmver suoh questions as 
'What is the aesthetic experienoe ?' by looking inwards. Our knowledge 
of our own experiences is immediate, based on nothing. It therefore rests 
on no features of aesthetio experiences whereby Vie reoognise them for what 
they are. It is necessary therefore that the noematio observation of 
experience tells us nothing about it. The only facts about experienoe 
are facts about the experience of others. If we attempt to describe 
aesthetic experiences in our own oase alone, if we attempt to discover 
features of our experiences that are not publicly observable, and yet on 
the basis o~ which we supposedly classify them into kinds, then we simply 
characterise our experiences by means of elaborate metaphors, or through 
the intermediary of some special technical language (such as that invented 
by Husserl) whose field of reference can never be defined. 
In the following inquiry, therefore, I shall refer to phenomenology 
only where it provides a convenient method of summarising faots that might 
equally be stated in terms of what is publicly observable. I shall borrow 
from phenomenology the term 'aesthetic object', but I shall use it only in 
a material sense , to refer to the item (whether work of art or not) that is 
the m~terial object of aesthetic interest. However, this does not mean 
that I shall be disagreeing with those phenomenologists (such as Ingarden 
and Dufrenne) who have argued that the work of art and the 'aesthetic 
object ' are distinct. In the sense in which they intended this assertion 
it is entirely true. The phenomenologist' s distinction will correspond at 
12 
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least in part to a distinction I shall make between the work of art and its 
aesthetic character. 
This brings us to the end of the unargued assumptions that will 
dictate the method of ensuing chapters. It may be that these assumptions 
are not as obvious to some as they are to the author; and it may be that 
they express only part of the truth. However, this should not deter the 
reader, since questionable assumptions must be made in every treatise on 
aesthetics, which is only a branch of philosophy and not philosophy 
itself. Furthermore, it will not be without interest, even to a 
philosopher who imagines that all experience is in part at least 
i rremediably ' private ' to see how far the public and observable aspect 
of aesthetic experience can be described. 
CHAPrER TWO 
THE INDIVIDUALITY OF THE AESTHETIC OBJECT 
There is a tradition in aesthetic philosopqy, which perhaps derives 
from Kant's Critique of Judgment, that seeks to define the concepts of 
aesthetic judgment and appreciation in terms of a certain uniqueness that 
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is attributed to their object. In viewing something aesthetically, it is 
said, I am viewing it as it is in itself, divorced from any interest I might 
have in it, and from all comparison with other things. I see the object 
of ~ appreciation as an isolated, unique occurrence, and to the extent that 
I appreciate it aesthetically I neither bring it under concepts nor relate 
it to any practical end. Associated with this view is a theory of the 
aesthetic attitude which has dominated aesthetics in one form or another 
until the present d~. This is the theory which seeks to define the 
aesthetic attitude by contrasting it with scientific (conceptual) attitudes 
on the one hand, and with moral (practical) attitudes on the other. In the 
present chapter I wish to show that this purely negative characterisation of 
the aesthetic attitude fails to achieve its end. 
Clearly the theory involves two separate views. First there is a 
contrast between aesthetic and scientific (or cognitive) activity. When I 
appreciate an aesthetic object, it is said, row interest is not in the 
comparison between it and objects of a similar kind: I have no concern to 
derive universal laws about the objects of appreciation. Kant went further, 
insisting that in aesthetic judgment the object is not brought under concepts 
at all. Hence ~the faculty of appreciation is quite distinct from that of 
the pure understanding, and involves a sort of mental leap in which the 
individuality of an object is seized and made present to thought. This part 
of the theory survives in an altered form in the philosophies of Sant~ana 
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and Bergson, in the expressionism of Croce and Collingwood, with its 
celebrsted contrast between intuition and conception, and in the empiricist 
philosophies of FraIl and Dewey. Of course, for the expressionist the 
object of appreciation is not the individuality of the work of art so much 
as the individuality of what is expressed by it, but since neither Croce 
nor Collingwood give a criterion of identity for what is expressed which is 
not also a criterion for the identity of its expression, their theor,y in 
effect amounts to no more than a resuscitation of the Kantian standpoint. 
In fact it is no exaggeration to say that all the dogmas of aesthetic 
philosopqy in the romantic tradition are presaged in Kant's great work. 
The second part of the theory is the postulation of a contrast between 
aesthetic and practical attitudes. Kant said that I approach the aesthetic 
object with ~ interests in abeyance. I do not judge it as something which 
will serve as a means to some end which is external to it, nor do I show any 
concern for its moral or emotional value. ~ attitude to it is one of 
1 disinterested, impassive contemplation, whose main ingredient is pleasure. 
, 
This aspect of the theory has received perhaps even more support than the 
other. Schopenhauer, for example, thought that a man could regard anything 
aesthetically, so long as he regarded it in independence of his own will -
that is, irrespective of any use to which he might put it . Regarding it 
thus a man could come to see the 'Idea' which the object expressed, and in 
this knowledge, Schopenhauer thought, aesthetic appreciation consisted. 2 Of 
a piece with such a view is the popular theory of art as a kind of 'play' 
activity~ whose creation and appreciation are divorced from the normal 
urgencies of practical and moral life. 'With the agreeable, the good, the 
perf~ct,' said Schiller, 'man is merely in earnest, but with beauty he plays.,3 
1 I .Kant , Critique of Judgment , Bk.I. 
2 A.Schopenhauer , The World as Will and Representation, Bk.III, sections 34-
~. 
3 F.Schiller , Letters on Aesthetic Education, p.101. 
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In so far as there has been aQy non-Freudian ps,ychology of aesthetic interest 
it has been founded on this intuition that the aesthetic and the practical 
are utterly divorced. Konrad Lange attempted to develop a psychology of 
art through the study of Pl~,1 while the English ps.ychologist Eullough 
postulated as the fundamental ingredient of aesthetic appreciation a kind of 
mental 'distancing' from all practical concerns. The observer sets the 
aesthetic objects at a distance from himself and from his own needs and 
. h 2 w~s es. 
It must not be thought that all thinkers who have held this view have 
also thought, like Kant. that it entai ls the utter irrelevance of emotion to 
the appreciation of art. On the contrary the theory of empat~, as it 
derived from the work of the German psychologist Lipps, is still a theory of 
the distinction between what is practical and what is aesthetic. In taking 
up an aesthetic attitude, according to Lipps and his followers, one is 
projecting one ' s feeling into the objeot, treating it as a vehicle for the 
expression of one's own emotion, and this necessitates an isolation from 
practioal interests of the kind Kant referred to. 3 Thus, pace Kant, it is 
possible to hold a theory of aesthetic judgment which recognises the place of 
emotion in appreciation , without renouncing the distinction between the 
aesthetic and the practical. Such a view was indeed held by Schopenhauer's 
diSCiple, Richard Wagner, "(The mind) thus attains to a ' will-less' - i.e. 
aesthetic - contemplation of the world; and these external objects, 
contemplated apart from the will, are exactly the ideal images which the 
artist in a manner fixes and reproduces. The sympathy with the external 
world which is inherent in this contemplation is developed in powerful natures 
1 
2 
3 
Kon~ad Lange, "Illusion and Play in Art" , reprinted in Melvin Rader (ed.), 
A Modern Book of Aesthetics. 
Edward Bullough, "Psychical Distance", in Rader, .ill. 
Theordor Lipps, "Empat~, Inner Imitation and Sense-Feelings", in Rader, 
cit. 
to a permanent forgetfulness of the original personal will, that is to a 
sympat~y with external things for their own sake, and no longer in oonneotion 
1 
with any personal interest." 
Assooiated with the distinotion between aesthetic and praotioal 
§ttitudes is a more specifio distinotion, between what is aesthetio and 
what is moral. In faot writers in the tradition of Kanti&l thought about 
aesthetics have tended to oonoentrate on this distinotion, partly, I think, 
beoause it is thought that aesthetio and moral attitudes are so olose that 
if a distinotion oan be made between them the task of defining the aesthetio 
attitude is near fulfilment. It is argued that they are both attitudes of 
assessment, that they both oonoern ideals and that they both set standards 
for men in general to observe. Therefore it should be possible to define 
the aesthetio qy finding the partioular features in which it is distinguished 
from the moral. This has been attempted even recently by Hampshire and 
Strawson2 whose views I disouss below. 
First ,~owever, there is a point of method which will arise whenever the 
attempt is made to found a theory of the nature of aesthetio judgment or 
appreoiation. It will be said that any philosophioal theory of the nature 
of the aesthetio must inevitably have a remote and abstraot quality, due to 
the faot that the notion it olaims to disouss is absent from our oommon 
thought. There is no ordin~J pre-theoretioal oonoept of the aesthetio. 
We do not, in oommon thought and speeoh, divide human mental life into those 
areas in whioh aesthetio appreoiation plays a part and those in whioh it does 
not. Terms like 'aesthetio' and 'appreoiation' are teohnical terms, which 
are perhaps given sense within the oontext of a philosophical theory, but 
whioh 6an only be employed outside such a theory in an arbitrary way, to 
denote activities and attitudes which may well have very little in oommon. 
1 
2 
Letter to Liszt, June 7th, 1855. 
Stuart Hampshire, "Logio and Appreciation", in W.Elton (ed.), Aesthetios 
and Language, and P. F.Strawson, "Aesthetio Appraisal and Works of Art", in 
The Oxford Review, 1966. 
w~ must we assume that our attitudes and feelings towards music are in any 
w~ comparable to our attitudes and feelings when reading a poem, or 
standing fascinated before a landscape Of It seems that, before the 
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investigation has really begun,we have already classed together, by a 
philosopher ' s sleight of hand, a bewildering multitude of mental items, as 
though ultimately they must exhibit a common structure. But why must they 'f 
What is there to explain that demands a unitary account of all these 
feelings and activities? 
One suggestion is that, unless we can give a unitary account, we will be 
unable to explain why we describe and evaluate so many different things 
(pieces of' music, poems, pictures, landscapes, people) in such similar Wa::/S. 
There is a language of appraisal which seems to be common to all the 
philosopher ' s examples of ' aesthetic appreciation', and perhaps this entitles 
us to assume that a particular kind of preference is ev.inced in each of them. 
We speak of works of art as ' beautiful ' , ' fine ' , and 'moving'; we refer to a 
man ' s taste in paintings, music, landscapes and interior decoration; we 
criticise the" execution of pieces of music , of paintings, of poems and so on 
in the same language, by referring to what it is right or not right to do, to 
what goes, or fits, and so on. This roughly uniform activity of aesthetic 
appraisal might seem to suggest an underlying attitude in common to its 
instances. 
This view mst surely have been taken for granted by Kant, who laid as 
great an emphasis on the concept of the beautiful as he did, in another 
context, on such concepts as law, !~eedom, good, out of which he supposed 
the notion of morality to be constructed . It has been the habit among 
philosophers to follow !Cant in this, and this has lead to a great many 
attempts to delimit what is aesthetic in terms of an analys1s of the concept 
of aesthetic appraisal, since this is where ordinary language seems to give 
most grounds for the supposition that aesthetics is indeed a unity. We might 
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compare the attempt in recent philosophy to describe the moral area of human 
experience in terms of a peculiar kind of evaluation which is supposed to be 
characteristic of it, an enterprise which has several times been called in 
doubt, but which continues to attract a great deal of philosophical thought. 
We might reasonably suspect that neither in aesthetics nor in ethics 
can the fundamentals be revealed through an analYSis of the concept 01' 
evaluation, even though this concept is of prime importance in both. For 
evaluation is a linguistic activity, and it needs to be shown that the 
attitudes and states of mind involved in aest hetic s and in ethics mUst 
indeed issue in linguistic activities of the appropriate kind. :3urely, it 
might be argued, this cannot -be established by concentrating on evaluation 
alone: an independent investigation, falling more properly within the 
province of philosophical psychology, is required. 
However the emphasis on evaluation gains support from the fact that, 
difficult as it is to find agreed criteria of relevance governing our 
interest in art, it is at least accepted that art has some kind of autono~, 
" -
which is to say that we appreciate art not as a means to some end, but as an 
end in itself. Even if there are examples of works of art - buildings, 
marches and jars - that have characteristic functions, in treating them~ 
works of art we do not judge them simply as means to the fulfilment of these 
functions. It, this intuition is widespread, then perhaps the basis of the 
aesthetic can be explored by uniting it with the view that there is some one 
unitary activity of aesthetic appraisal. Ot' course, we are still some way 
from showing that aesthetic appreCiation and judgment involve the attribution 
of a uniqueness (in all the various senses derived from Kant) to their 
object ; and that it is this alone which distinguishes aesthetic from moral 
and scientific attitudes. But we will have shown, at least , that there is 
a notion ot' aesthetic appreciation that can be derived from ordinary ways ot' 
thought and which nonetheless shows some similarity with the philosopher's 
theoretical construction. 
Confirmat i on of this second intuition - that the aesthetic object is 
not treated as a means, that a proper appreciation of art (for example ) 
must grant it a measure of autono~ - can be found among the commonplaces 
of modern critical thought. Someone who reads Homer simply in order to 
discover the elements of Ancient Greek theology, and who thereqy treats 
Homer's works as a means for conveying information, is said to be to that 
extent uninterested in the poetry as poetry. In other words, he does not 
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appreciate it as it is made to be appreciated: he may be blind to its nature 
as an aesthetic Object. Similarly it is customary to argue that 
pornograpQ1 cannot , except exceptionally, be art. singe the aims of pornog~ 
rapQy and the aims of art are incompatible. 1 PornographY is essentially a 
means to the stimulation of sexual feeling, whereas art is the means to the 
stimulation of nothing at all. The arguments for aesthetic autonomy can be 
carried further. It is said, for example, that the Italian peasant who 
adorns the statue of a virgin cannot, "to the extent that he treats the statue 
as an object oi' religious veneration, appreCiate it from an aesthetic point 
of view. For to ,the extent that his interest is religious he must treat its 
immediate object as a surrogate for something else. He sees through the 
statue, to what it represents and is interested in it only in so tar as it 
calls to mind a right conception ot' the Virgin. The statue serves the 
peasant as a means for the transmission of a religious thought: it can have 
value as such a means to the extent that it succeeds in inspiring the thought, 
irrespective of whether it has any further value as a work of art. It 
follows that the question of good or bad taste need not arise, and the 
presence of an adored St.Dominic in plastic beside an overlooked ~irgin by 
Sansovino is not in itseli' a sign of the corruption of aesthetic judgment. 
This way ot' thinking - which opens the way to the expressionist view that 
representation is in itself alien "to the aims of art - is again one of the 
mainstays of romanticism. Chateaubriand , i'or example, took great pleasure 
1 For example, S.Alexander, Beauty and Other Forms of Value, ch. VII. 
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in confessing that. "une Madonne coiffee d ' une couronne gothique, vetue d ' une 
robe de 80ie bleue, garnie d ' une grange d ' argent , m' inspi~e plus de devotion 
qu' une Vierge de Raphael. " 1 
This argument for autono~ m~ be taken so far as to begin to sound 
absurd. Thus it might be argued with Kant, 2 and with many modern 
philosophers, that aesthetic interest cannot be interest in an object as a 
means to the evocation of emotion and hence that to treat .a play, for 
example, as though it were a vehicle for arousing pity and terror is to 
fall into the error of the heterono~ of aesthetic judgment. The play is 
not a means for arousing dramatic emotions, and hence to the extent that 
one ' s enjoyment of a play consists in the experience of these emotions it is 
not genuinely aesthetic - for the play might equally have been replaced by 
some other object of similar feelings. Thus the defence of autono~ can 
lead to a blanket condemnation of emotion in art. In fact, it can lead to 
a theory that aesthetic appreciation is nothing more nor less than totally 
disinterested contemplation, about which nothing more can be said than that 
" 
its object has certain formal properties. Alternatively, if it is still 
admitted that there is something that might justifiably be called the 
' experience ' of art, this experience is itself made autonomous, impossible 
to assimilate to any of the normal categories of emotion or thought , having 
nothing in common with anything that might be felt in any other situation. 3 
So that, if art is, in some minimal sense, a means for the arousal of 
aesthetic experience, it is still a means that cannot be replaced by any 
other, and hence the experience itself can rightly be thought of as involving 
an interest in its object for its own sake. The work of art is still not 
a mean~ to the production of anything that is identifiable apart from it. 
1 Memoires d'Outre-Tombe, 1,4. 
2 Cit., bk.I, section 13. 
3 v. A.Schopenhauer, cit. 
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This, in brief, is the Crocean version of autonornw, which carries with it 
a masterly, but erroneous, condemnation of the popular prejudice which can 
be described as an 'estetica del simpatico' and which is supposed everywhere 
to replace the true refinement of taste. 
Clearly, for aesthetic theory to have advanced on so slight a basis to 
such an extreme point of obscuri~y and dogmatism, something very question-
able must have been taken for granted. Some may wish to say that the 
assumption that aesthetic interest is not interest in something as a means 
is simply a dogma, inspired like so much else by the romantic movement , with 
its excessive emphasis on creativity and personal expre s sion. One can point 
to examples of societies and civilisations where the whole idea of art as an 
end in itself seems without an application. Surely , the prime purpose of 
what we now call art in ancient .l5gypt was to create an ambience of awe, to 
cast a sort of spell that would give permanence to the acts and desires of 
1 Pharoahs who might otherwise have been forgotten. Is this not a prime 
example of a society in which art and the appreciation of art cannot have 
the structure" that the philos opher claims is essential to them? In other 
words, it can be argued , and to a certain extent persuasively, that the 
supposed intuition of an autonomous character in aesthetic appreciation is 
nothing more than the reflection of a transient historical bias in favour of 
one sort of attitude to art , which has no more right to be clas sed as ~ 
mode of aesthetic appreciation than any other. 
But this argument is perhaps not as important as it appears. For what 
is of interest is that we should be able to classify ~ mental state as 
aesthetic appreciation , and that we should be able to analyse it so as to 
show its differences from and r esemblances wit h , t'or example , practical and 
moral attitudes. And whether or not other civilisations would have made the 
1 
Cf. Collingwood's diagnosis of this attitude - andfts contemporary 
equivalents - in his study of 'maSic ' art', Principles of Art, pp.69-77. 
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classification in the same way is not strictly relevant to our purpose. 
For our purpose is to produce a theory that vdll create some semblance of 
order among our present ways of talking about, and experiencing aesthetic 
objects. We are not analysing a pre-oxisting and self-sufficient notion 
of the aesthetic that will enable us to say with any certainty that some 
other civilisation, or some other period of history, appreciated objects 
aesthetically, but nonetheless in an unfamiliar way. We need some theory 
before we shall ever be able to gauge the importance of this fact, if it is 
indeed a fact. 
A far more direct diagnosis of the aesthetician's confusion is this. 
no adequate analysis has been given of what it is to be interested in 
something as a means, or as it is in itself. We do not know fully which 
distinction is being invoked. And yet that there 1& a distinction is, I 
think, something that we do not doubt. Perhaps, then, we should combine 
our two intuitions, first that appreciation of art is not appreciation 01' 
it as a means to any independent end, and secondly that there is in some 
sense a distinct activity of ae.sthetic appraisal, and use them to clarify 
each other. That is, perhaps we should argue that the best way of de:t'ining 
in what J!.!S!.. aesthetic appreciation is appreciation 01' an object "as it is in 
itself" is through an analysis of the procedure of aesthetic appraisal. 
Perhaps we have put too much emphasis on the distinction between means antl 
ends, as though there were a clear difference between a man who regards 
something only with a view to what he can~ with it, and another who regards 
it on the contrary as a source of interest in itself, and as though this 
difference could be deseribed independently of any description we might be 
prepared to offer of aesthetic appraisal. 
-I 
This suggestion might be supported in the following way: when I evaluate 
or assess the merits of something, then I evaluate it with respect to some 
interest that I suppose it to satisfy. If I am interested in something as a 
means then at least I can infer that rnlf interest is directed to some separately 
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identifiable end towards which the object in question may contribute. For 
example, if I am interested in a car in order to travel in comfort to the 
Highlands, then this purpose is the ultimate determining factor of ~ 
interest in the car, and clearly I shall assess the car ' s merits on the basis 
of this purpose that I have. I shall judge it to be a good car for ~ 
pUI'pose to the extent that it is comfortable, reliable, able to ascend steep 
hills, and so on. I shall not judge it to be good for my purpose because 
of its shape or speed, except to the extent that I regard these qualities as 
themselves contributing something that is integral to the purpose that I have. 
In other words, my purpose defines criteria of relevance, which enable me to 
set aside those features of the object of ~ interest which are relevant to 
its assessment from those which are not. And since the features which are 
relevant to the assessment of the car need not be identifying features (for 
any purpose that is truly distinct from the car itself) it is clear that 
different cars m~ yet be identical with regard to their merits as means to 
my particular end. 
"-
But if I have no end separately identifiable from the object of my 
interest - if there is no purpose with respect to which I am evaluating an 
object - then surely there can be no criteria of relevance of this kind, no 
criteria that will enable me to say that ~ features of an object will be 
relevant to its assessment, others will not. So that, if interest in a work 
of art is not interest in it as a means, it seems to follow that there can be 
no criteria of relevance that will enable us to s~ that a work of art ' s 
merits depend on this feature rather than that, or which will enable us to 
produce any formula as to what features a work of art must possess if it is 
to be wholly successful from the aesthetic point of view. We thus arrive at 
the views that every feature of a work of art is relevant to our assessment 
of it, and that there can be no rules for the assessment of works of art. 
In other words, whatever aesthetic appraisal is, it must involve just that 
kind of interest in the unigueness of an object which Kant and Croce, in 
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their several ways, attempted to describe. 
We seem then to have achieved a partial characterisation of the 
aesthetic att itude. It is a kind of spectator interest, whose object is 
the uniqueness or individuality of some work of art or other object of 
aesthetic interest. It issues, therefore, in a particular mode of 
evaluation of its object, in which t he idea of a feature rel evant to 
assessment can have no place. This nest of doctrines in fact originates 
in the same pair of seemingly undeniable intuitions, and their mutual 
coherence can only seem to confirm the view that this is what aesthetic 
appreciation is like. It is scarcely surprising that the doctrines occur 
more or less unchanged in several of the articles reprinted in Elton ' s 
collection Aesthetics and Language, one of the main sources of analytical 
ae sthet ics. The question is how far this theory gives an adequate or 
complete characterisation of a separate realm of mental life, and how far tt 
enables us to place art and the experience of art in relation to t he other 
phenomena with which it is normally compared and contrasted. 
It is important to separate the question of the uniqueness of the work 
of art - which,as I have outlined it, is a theory about the appreciation of 
1 
art - from questions about the identity of the work of art. The uniqueness 
that is conferred on an object by its criteria of individuation and identity 
is implied in all our references to it, and if works of art have conditions 
of identity which confer uniqueness, then this simply means that they can 
change in no respect without ceasing to be the same works of art. Whether 
or not this is true is, it seems to me, a question of little interest in 
aesthetics. The question is not whether works of art do have such strong 
cri teri,a of identity, but rather whether every change in a work of art is 
necessarily a cnange in its aesthetic character. If a work of art does 
change in some respect, then the important question is not how it is to be 
1 Cf. Ruby Meager, "The Uniqueness of the Work of Art", in C.Barrett , ed. 
Collected Papers on Aesthetics. 
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identified through the change in question (whether it must be identified as 
the same or as another work of art) but rather how our aesthetic interest 
will be affected by this change. 
The uniqueness of the work of art is not t therefore, a product of 
restrictions that might be placed, for whatever reason, on the criteria 
for the identity of works of art. It is not an outcome of the fact that 
1 2 
works of art are, say, essentially types and not tokens, or megatypes t 
or whether or not they are distinct fram their tconcretizationt,3 or can be 
identified in terms of some adequate notation.4 It is, rather an outcome 
of the fact that, in a certain state of mind, which we are referring to as 
aesthetic appreciation, the object is appreciated for its uniquenessl the 
object is not regarded as replaceable by another that will 'do just as well.' 
In other words, there need be no special problem about the identity of works 
of art. We are under no logical obligation to stipulate, for example, that 
all the features of a work that we appreciate asethetically must for that 
reason be defining features. 5 It is to Kant ' s credit that, unlike many 
more recent philosophers ~ he saw that the supposed uniqueness of the aesthetic 
object could not be objectified as an attribute of it, but must be analysed 
as a formal element in the state of mind that is directed to it. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Cf. the articles in Elton, cit., and Str~wsop, £11. 
v. C.L.Stevenson, 'On "What is a Poem? "t , Phil. Rev., 1957. 
v. R.Ingarden, Da~ Literarische Kunt~{erk, pp.354-381. 
v. N.Goodman, Languages of Art. 
Cf. Strawson, cit., who argues that it is a "clear tautology that there 
couldn't be two different works of art which were indistinguishable in 
all the respect s relevant to their aesthetic appraisal •••• the criterion 
of identity of a work of art is the totality of the features which are 
rel~vant to its aesthetic appraisal " tp.11). 
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It might be said that our appreciation of Vlorks of art is such as to 
impose the need f or a special criterion of identity; for example, we should 
only identify a painting wit h a physical object if we really appreciated 
it as such , otherwise our concept of a work of art and our concept of an 
object of aesthetic interest would fall asunder. But this argument seems 
to be wrong. Against those philosophers who argue t hat all works of art 
are essentially types, for example , one need only point to examples . 
Buildings have whatever aesthet i c character they have as physical objects: 
to institute a system of limited reproduction of Borromini ' s delightful 
church at the Quattro Fontane could only serve to alter its character as an 
object of appreciat ion. Hence it coul d not be our way of appreciat ing the 
building that dictates that it should possess the i dentity of a type and not 
that of a physical object. Of course, we could imagine a situation - the 
perfect reproduction of buildings and paintings - where works of art 
previously identified as physical objects would have to be redescribed as 
1 types. But this is simply to imagine a situation in which some physical 
ob jects have been so perfectly reproduced as to become mere tokens of 
universal types, in which case the grounds for making a distinction between 
building - or painting-identity, s~ , and physical-object-identity collapse. 
The conclusion is , I think , that we should identify works of art in the way 
dictated b,y the respective media of art. Some works (paintings, sculptures 
and so on) will be physical objects; others (poems and novels) will be types; 
others (musical works) will have the more complicated kind of identity 
conferred by a notational scheme. In every case the question of identity 
and the question of uniqueness are distinct . 
We~need, t hen, to discuss aesthetic appraisal independently of its 
supposed contribut ion to the identity-conditions of a work of art. This is 
2 done by Hampshire, and, following him, Straws on , who attempt to derive a more 
1 Cf. Strawson, ~., p.10. 
2 Cit. 
28 
useful relation between aesthetic appraisal and 'uniqueness ' through a 
consideration of the kinds of reason that can be adduced in support of 
aesthetic appraisals. It is argued that, independently of how the objects 
of aesthetic appraisal are identified, it is impossible for aesthetic 
appraisal to have the logical structure of moral appraisal. In particular 
-there cannot be reasons in favour of aesthetic judgments in the sense of 
statements referring to properties whose presence always counts one way in 
determining an evaluation. There cannot be what Strawson calls 'merit-
conferring properties' , properties such that I can meaningfully say that 
the fact that a work of art has such a property is a reason, irrespective 
of any other property it may have, for calling it good, bad , or whatever. 
In other words, cfitici srn, or aesthetic appraisal, must lack the 
r~asoned structure of moral argunent, for the simple reason that it is 
concerned to assess the merits of the particular case, the work of art in 
itself , as a unique and unrepeatable performance. There is no meaning or 
value to the work of art other than its individual e~istence - here value 
and existence coincide. In morality, on the other hand, we are con.cerned 
with what can be repeated; we wish to guide our conduct according to 
reasoned rules . Hence it is essential that moral assessment of individual 
actions display this reasoned structure, referring to features that might 
be shared qy more actions than one. Morally speaking, our acts must have a 
significance that goes beyond their individual being; meaning and existence 
can no longer coincide. Thus we find Strawson arguing that works of art 
have a kind of uniqueness over and above that c'orif.e,rred qy their identi ty-
condition due to the fact that for them the ordinary (that is to say, 
practical) distinction between individuals and merit-conferring properties 
breaks down. F th . t f' t· · t 1 or ere ~ no mer1 -con err1ng proper 1es 1n ar • 
1 
Strawson, £11. , p.12. 
This is an interesting suggestion, open to several interpretations. 
At first one might suspect the argument of trying t o embody in a logical 
axiom a purely evaluative requirement, the requirement, namelY 1 that works 
of art should be ·original, and that at least part of their value should 
arise out of their originality. This is plainly not a view that has 
always been held, nor is it a view that would now be held with the 
dogmatism of a Schoenberg or a Mallarme . Clearly originality is one 
quality among many that might be appreciated in art, and a love of the 
familiar and the readily comprehensible is not to that extent devoid of 
aesthetic motivation. However, there are certain facts which seem to 
confirm the idea that there are no merit-conferring properties in art. 
Cannot one work of art be of great value and interest partly on account of 
some feature that, in another work, creates dullness and disorder? 
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( Compare the effect of the repeated diminished harmony in Brahms ' Intermezzo 
no.6 op.128 with its effect in the recitatives in DeI' Freischutz, or the 
effect of the ' drunken soldier.y ' in Yeats ' ' Travelling to Byzantium' with 
their effect in the first chapter of Salammbo, etc. ) . But then this alone 
can scarcely be regarded as a distinguishing mark of aesthetic reasoning -
one action might be morally good and another morally bad, where one and the 
same feature which counts for the goodness of one counts for the badness of 
the other. For example, an action that brings about the pleasure of an old 
man might be good in circumstances that show the pleasure to be truly wortr~, 
but bad if the circumstances show it to be depraved. Such examples, familiar 
from moral philosophy, can be multiplied indefinitely. Often the only clear 
guarantee that we have identified a "merit-conferring property" of an action, 
in the sense of a feature the presence of which alwa.ys counts towards the 
merit of an action, resides in the fact that we have described the feature in 
its total context. But then we have not succeeded in d~scribing it 
independently of the action itself. 
It will be replied that there could be features of actions which really 
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~ count one way in deciding their merit, although these features would not 
be simple ' first~order features ' ( such as causing the happiness of an old. 
man, involving the taking of money from a cash register) but rather ' second-
order features', features whose presence can only be discovered b,y a certain 
amount of interpretation of the action. These features would be those 
whose value was laid dovm by a moral code (or, on a naturalist view of ethics , 
whose value is discovered by a moral code) , or which play a particularly 
decisive part in moral thought. The traditional virtues would naturally 
belong to this ·; class of features. It makes sense to say (whether or not 
it is in some sense necessarily true) that it is always a reason for the 
merit of an action that it is courageous, benevolent, honest, noble or kind. 
Whether an action possesses such a feature is not discoverable by direct 
observation of its structure or consequences . But nonetheless the names 
of these features are not also complete descriptions of the actions which 
possess them. 
Again, however, the point is not established. For there are also two 
orders of description applicable to the objects of aesthetic judgment,1 and 
it makes perfectly good sense to say that the presence of a property on t he 
second level is always a reason for calling a work of art good. (In so far 
as it ever makes perfect sense to say that the presence of any feature is 
always a reason, while not a sufficient condition, for describing an object 
in a certain way.) For example , we describe works of art not only in terms 
of their metrical or harmonic structure, their slovmess , loudness, brightness 1 
or literal meaning, but also in terms of more tentative and context-dependent 
interpretations, in which we speak of them as tragic, moving, balanced, 
evocat~ve, sincere, sad, refined, noble, sentimental and so on. This second 
vocabular,y is very similar to the vocabulary of moral virtue, and seems at 
first sight to play a similar role in aesthetic thought and judgment. So 
1 ef. R.Hoffman, "Aesthetic Argument - Interpretative and Evaluative" , 
Phi!. Q. 1961. 
why do we not admit that it is a vocabular.y referring to the tmerit-
conferring properties ' which works of art are supposed not to have? 
Although it is true that we may have to invoke the whole context before we 
can determine whether a work of art is sentimental or profound, t he names 
of t he~e features are nonetheless not a total description of the works of 
art which possess them. 
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It is interesting to note in this connection that Strawson dismisses 
the 'aesthetic features' (such as those just referred to) as constituting 
part of a largely figurative vocabulary of aesthetic praise and dispraise -
they are named by evaluative words, and so themselves convey evaluations; 
they do not provide genuine reasons for these evaluations. 1 But it is very 
unclear what is meant by saying that the second-order, aesthetic, descriptions 
of a work of art are evaluat~ve - clearly it cannot be meant to deny that a 
work of art can be sad, noble, sincere, or whatever, and yet nonetheless a 
failure , just as an action can be benevolent, noble and honest without being 
Clearly it is very difficult to force any contrast here with second-
order descrip~ions in moral discourse. If there are added arguments for 
saying that the language of moral virtue is more truly descriptive than its 
aesthetic counterpart, then not only do they need to be produced, but it 
would also be very difficult to know what interpretation to put on the fact 
that they could be produced, if it is a fact. 
It seems then that it would be wiser to abandon the attempt to make a 
distinction between aesthetic and moral assessment in terms of the kind of 
uniqueness attributed by the former. The conclusions offered by the attempt 
are too vague to be of much use without some independent theory about the 
nature ~f aesthetic interest. Clearly aesthetic and moral assessment do 
differ, and they differ most of all in the kinds of reason that can sensibly 
be given in support of them. But this kind of reason cannot r eally be 
1 Qii., pp.11 and 13. 
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described until we have some independent description of what aesthetic and 
moral assessment are severally for. For example, if we could describe 
aesthetic attitudes, and contrast them vdth moral attitudes, conclusions will 
immediately follow as to the nature of reasons which will support the one and 
not the other, or as to the logical nature of the evaluative speech-acts 
which, on one plausible theory of the nature of ' assessment ' , will express 
or convey them. 
There emerges from the above discussion a hint as to how we might 
formulate an alternative approach to the problem. Some moral philosophers 
have suggested that morality can be characterised not in terms of the logic 
of moral assessment but rather in terms of what moral judgments and assess-
1 
ments are about. Morality is to be characterised in terms of the 
characteristic objects of moral interest. In a simil ar way , it might be 
argued that aesthetic appreciation is to be characterised in terms of its 
objects and not in terms of the evaluative procedures that give expression 
to it. 
But what are these objects? We find that the preceding discussion 
contains a possible answers Just as the objects of practical interest are 
the practical or utilitarian features of a thing, and just as the objects of 
moral interest are the virtues, vices and moral properties generally of a 
thing, so the objects of aesthetic interest are the 'aesthetic' qualities of 
a thing - the features named by the 'second-order ' descriptions of which I 
gave examples above. 
This suggestion is, on the face of it, highly persuasive. It gives us 
an immediate means of characterising aesthetic interest and appreciation -
they are simply interest in, and appreciation of, certain features. 
Aesthetic judgment is, except in t he exceptional case of overall evaluation 
or assessment , the simple cognitive procedure of judging that an object has 
certain asethetic features ~ and taste is the faculty of being able to discern 
1 
G.J. Warnock, The Ob,ject of Morality. 
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those features. And it is clear that there are features which do seem to 
receive considerable mention when aesthetic judgment is in the offing -
criticism abounds in reference to the sadness, nobility, grandeur and tragic 
quality of works of art, and these references are associated immediately 
with the mode of eValuation whose consistency of expression was one of our 
few pre-theoretical intuit ions about the nature of aesthetic interest. 
True, this suggestion does not easily make room for the notion of the 
uniqueness of the aesthetic object, but as we have seen, this notion cannot 
be successfully elucidated as it stands, either through the notion of 
identHy, or through that of aesthetic assessment. Besides, it will be 
argued, once we have made the distinction between the aesthetic character 
of an object and its character as a part of the ordinary physical world, we 
can see that the idea of ' uniqueness ' involves an illegitimate slide from 
one to the other. If there are aesthetic features, in terms of which 
aesthetic interest can be described , then these features collectively make 
up the aesthetic character of an object. And clearly if it is in terms of 
these features that aesthetic interest must be described, no aesthetic 
assessment can count as an assessment of the whole aesthetic character of an 
object unless it takes each one of them into account. Moreover an aesthetic 
character is a universal, and not a particular. So interest in it must be 
interest in its uniqueness. But this of course does nothing to establish 
the uniqueness in any sense of the work of art; it is a trivial consequence of 
the fact that the object of aesthetic judgment is a character, composed of 
features in terms of which the notion of aesthetic judgment must be defined. 
By parity of reasoning the object of moral judgment also has its own special 
kind oZ uniqueness, the uniqueness attributable to the identity of its moral 
character in terms of features which themselves serve to define when a 
judgment is truly moral. 
The suggestion can also make room for a sharp contrast between aesthetic 
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and practical attitudes. For the 'aesthetic' features commonly referred to 
are in some sense intrinsic features of an object - that is, they do not 
belong to it on account of any end which it may serve. A piece of music 
is not sad because it can be used to evoke sadness , or noble because it can 
be used to create an atmosphere of authority. This seems to provide some 
confirmation for the view that an adequate theory of the distinction between 
what is aesthetic and what is not can be arrived at by listing the features 
which are the characteristic objects of aesthetic judgment. Since this 
possibility has been seriously considered by several recent philosophers, it 
is worthwhile spending some time investigating it. In fact it is one of 
the most persuasive examples of a cognitive theory of aesthetic appreciation, 
and for this reason, if for no other, will provide a valuable introduction 
to the analysis of aesthetic appreciation that I shall produce in Chapter 
Nine. 
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CHAP1'ER THREE 
AESTHEl'IC FEATURES 
The suggestion that aesthetic interest and evaluation should be defined 
in terms of the features in which both are grounded is familiar1 and it is 
a small step to the idea that these features can be set apart as a roughly 
independent class of aesthetic features. The idea is in fact far from 
new - Croce, i'or example, gave a list of aesthetic features (including all 
the expressionist's repertoire, viz. unity, simplicity, originality, vivacity 
and concretion), arguing that they are inseparable from the aesthetic nature 
of whatever possesses them, being themselves merely modes of expression. 2 
The idea appears again in the common view that it is essential to works of 
art that they should possess representational and expressive features. But 
perhaps its most interesting manifestation is in the theor,y of aesthetic 
perception, a theor,y which derives from Hutcheson, and which has been one of 
the mainst~s of empiricism for at least two centuries. This is the theor,y 
that to appreciate an object aesthetically is to 'perceive' its aesthetic 
features, aesthetic features being precisely those that it needs aesthetic 
perception (or 'taste') to discern. The most recent and most interesting 
form of this theor,y ia due to Sibley, whose views I shall discuss in the 
present chapter. 
In order to avoid confusion I shall distinguish features from properties. 
B.1 'feature' I mean whatever is, or seems to be, attributed by a predicate. 
In other words, if !X is Y' makes sense, then, whenever X is Y, X possesses 
the feature of Y-ness. But it does not follow from this that Y-ness is also 
a property: it is only a property if the sentence 'X is Y' has realistic 
1 
2 
See for example, J.O.Urmson, "What makes a situation aesthetic?", 
A.S.S. V., 1953. 
Estetica, p.75. 
36 
truth-conditions. In other words, the idea of a feature is grammatical, 
whereas that of a property is semantic. This distinction is of great 
importance, and I shall elaborate it in detail in the next chapter. For 
the present I shall use the term 'feature' as a convenience only. there is 
a feature for every predicate. Thus it is a feature of a man that he is 
good, or irritating, or beautiful, even though, in the realistic sense, 
goodness, irritatingness and beauty m~ not be properties at all. 
How do we identify aesthetic features ? 1 Sibley argues that there is 
no adequate pre-theoretical answer to this question. Nonetheless we have 
the idea that some properties of an aesthetic object can be discerned by 
anyone with normal eyes, ears and intelligence, whereas others can be 
discerned only with the additional help of taste, perceptiveness, or 
judgment. This difference corresponds to the distinction we wish to draw, 
although in order to identify aesthetic features in advance of aqy theor.y, 
we must simply list the predicates that attribute them. Among these 
predicates we find a great variety, as the following arbitrary list will 
show, and the existence of this variety throws into relief the difficulties 
of giving a unitary account of their logic. 
First there are predicates whose primary use is in aesthetic judgment, 
predicates like 'beautiful', 'graceful', 'elegant', 'ugly', and the 'dainty' 
and 'dump,y' which Austin for some reason prefers to them. 2 These terms 
occur primarily in judgments of aesthetic value. Seeundly there are 
descriptions referring to the formal or technical accomplishment of a work 
of art; these involve such terms as 'balanced', 'well-made', 'economical', 
'rough', 'undisciplined'. This class is only doubtfully described as 
'formal'; it is a notorious fact that any description of the 'form' or 
accomplishment df a work of art can be interpreted unchanged as a description 
1 
2 
"Aesthetic Concepts", Phil. Rev., 1959, and "Aesthetic and Non-aesthetic", 
Phil. Rev., 1965. 
J .L.Austin, "A plea for excuses", in Philosophical Papers, p.183. 
of its 'content'. For example, when I say that emotion is allowed to rurl 
riot in Schoenberg' s later music, it is not clear whether I am attributing 
a quality to the musical form, or to the emotion that the form expresses. 
Indeed it is doubtful that there is any real distinction between form and 
content that could clarif,y this judgment. 
is entirely ad hoc. 
The class of 'formal' features 
Thirdly, many aesthetic descriptions employ predicates that are 
normally used to describe the mental and emotional life of human beings. 
We describe works of art as sad, joyful, melancholy, agitated, erotic, 
sincere, vulgar, intelligent, mature, and so on. Almost any mental 
predicate can be applied to a work of art and some (e.g. 'sad') can be 
applied to aesthetic objects generally, Fourthly, aesthetic descriptions 
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can refer to the expressive features of works of art. Works of art are 
often said to express emotion, thought, attitude, character, in fact, 
anything that can be expressed at all. For example, Watteau's Embarcation 
a gythere can be said to express the transcience of human joys, Shakespeare's 
Measure for Measure to express the essence of Christian charity. 
Closely connected with expression terms are the terms known philosoph-
ically as 'affective'l terms that seem to be used to express or project 
particular human responses which they also indicate b,y name - examples 
include 'moving', 'exciting', 'evo,Cative', 'nauseous', 'tedious', 'enjoyable', 
and 'adorable'. We must also include among aesthetic descriptions several 
kinds of comparison. For example, I may describe a writer's style as 
bloated or masculine, a colour as warm or cold, a piece of music as 
architectural. Examples can be found by the score. When it is said that 
this use of terms is purely 'figurative' or 'metaphorical' it must not be 
thought that any problem has been solved. There is a philosophical question 
about the nature of metaphor and about its distinction, if any, from simile, 
which is as intransigent as any problem about the nature of aesthetic 
judgment. 
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Finally there are various descriptions of a work of art in terms of what 
it represents, in terms of its truthfulness, or its overall character or 
genre (whether it is tragic, comic, ironical, or what) which cannot easily 
be fitted into these classes, but which have an important role nonetheless 
in aesthetic judgment. 
This bewildering list of examples must be extended to include any 
description which can be used (whether or not it normally is used) to refer 
to an aesthetic feature - a feature that it needs 'taste' or 'perceptiveness' 
to discern, and which can be mentioned (according to the intuition of the 
last chapter) as part of the reason for an aesthetic assessment. The list 
is so large that it might seem at first absurd to attempt to use it as a 
definition of aesthetic judgment. For one thing, since it includes the 
categories of comparison and metaphor, it will be impossible to avoid the 
conclusion that any and ever,y object has an aesthetic character of indefinite 
complexity. But whether or not this is really an objection to the theor,y 
is a question that can scarcely be settled in the abstract. For the theor,y 
states that we can do no better than to distinguish an aesthetic interest as 
an interest in the aesthetic features of an object - an interest in the 
features of objects attributed by descriptions, such as those above, in their 
aesthetic use. Aesthetic appreciation is the gaining of knowledge about 
these features. 
This theor,y need not appear implausible. It is worth mentioning the 
fact that we very often do judge whether a man's interest is an object is 
primarily aesthetic, on the basis of the descriptions he would be prepared 
to give of its object. It is not absurd to suppose that these descriptions 
refer to properties of the object. For example, someone who condemns the 
actions of others not as cowardly, brutal, evil or corrupt but rather as 
tedious, inelegant, depressing or vulgar has a consciousness of them that we 
would describe as at least partly aesthetic. His aesthetic interest has 
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pervaded the sphere of moral judgment, and this is revealed in the features 
of actions that most awaken his praise or blame. 
This, of course, like all our pre-theoretical intuitions in aesthetics, 
is open to as maQY interpretations as there have been theories. Nonethe-
less it will show, I hope, that the theory under discussion is far from 
absurd, and fails, if it does so, for a far deeper reason than its inability 
to conform to common intuition. The central problem is to discover whether 
there is any unitar.y logic characterising the aesthetic use of terms. 
Without this unitary logic the concept of aesthetic appreciation, defined 
merely in terms of an open and indefinite class of features, will be an 
arbitrar,y and uninteresting notion, with no ultimate ground, and no special 
place in the phi10sopqy of mind. Here we might compare Strawson ' s thesis 
1 
about the concept of a person. There are supposedly two ways of 
describing a man, two different modes of description, each with a separate 
logic and a separate points one uses fP-predicates ' and the other uses 
'M-predicate s ' • One describes a man as a centre of consciousness, the other 
describes him as a physical thing. Whether or not this distinction between 
~ and P- predicates is a genuine distinction, we can at least imagine 
something similar in aesthetics. We could argue that there are two Wa;!S of 
describing an object, one, using A-predicates, describing it as an aesthetic 
object, the other, using M-predicates, describing it as a physical thing {or 
event, or process or type or whatever).2 The category of the aesthetic will 
not be explained, after all, b,y sa;!ing that an aesthetic interest is simply 
interest in some arbitrar,y set of features, unless it can be shown how these 
1 
2 
Individuals , ch.3. 
If we take this line then we have grounds for distinguishing the identity 
of a work of art from the identity of its embodiment, although not 
conclusive grounds. In fact, the idea of a separate concept of work-of-
art-identity seems to require the notion of an aesthetic feature to give 
it content. Hence the argument given by Strawson for distinguishing works 
of art by their identity-criterion can only have weight in conjunction 
with a view that negates the remainder of his theory - v. the discussion 
of the last chapter , esp. p.26 , n.5. 
features form a coherent set, and how something oou1d be evaluated in 
respeot of them. 
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Now it is one of the main contentions of Sib1ey ' s two artio1es that 
there is a distinguishing logic of aesthetio desoription. Although he 
does not actually use the terms ' oriterion ' , it is part of Sib1ey ' s view 
that there are no criteria, in Wittgenstein's sense, for the application 
of terms in their aesthetic use. Although aesthetic features depend on 
non-aesthetic features, so that a painting might be delicate, s~, ~ 
account of its pale colours and slender shapes, they are not 'conditioned' 
( as Sib1ey puts it) qy non-aesthetic features. Sib1ey t s arguments for 
this conclusion are reminiscent of Hampshire ' s and Strawson ' s arguments 
against the possibility of merit-conferring properties in art, and indeed 
are accompanied b,y a similar attempt at describing the uniqueness of the 
work of art in terms of the relevance of all its features to a certain 
kind of judgment . (That is, Sibley argues that at least some aesthetic 
features depend on the totality of the non-aesthetic features of the object 
that possesses them.) He asserts that ~ reason given for a work's 
being, say, sad, could be given for some other works being boring or staid, 
and any two works could be sad for quite different, and often conflicting, 
reasons. Therefore 'reason t in aesthetic judgment cannot mean anything 
like 'criterion' as I have used it - aesthetic reasons are not truth-
conditions. Of course, t reason ' does not usually mean 'criterion' in non-
aesthetic argument; it is Sib1ey ' s contention that there simply ~ no 
criteria for aesthetic descriptions. 
nowhere near to establishing this. 
Unfortunately Sibley's arguments come 
It is not the fact of counting one w~ 
that m~es a reason refer to a criterion, or truth-condition, as is clear in 
the light of the argument of Chapter One. For example, many predicates 
that attribute mental states share criteria& one and the same feature can be 
both a criterion of sadness and a criterion of anger. Whether it is a 
reason for any particular judgment can only depend on the context. 
Sibley has another argument, which is that there are no sufficient 
conditions in terms of non-aesthetic features for the truth of any 
aesthetic description. No list of non-aesthetic features can entail an 
aesthetic judgment. 1 But again it is difficult to see how this assertion 
could be proved. For it is open to someone to argue that at least the 
list of features which constitutes the complete, phenomenal, "first-order" 
description of the work of art must entail the presence of whatever 
aesthetic features it has. For if aesthetic features are truly dependent 
then any other work of art with the same first-order properties must also 
have the same aesthetic features. It m~ be replied that this gives us 
no rule for the re-application of aqy aesthetic term and this absence of 
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rules is alone sufficient to define the contrast between aesthetic and non-
aesthetic terms. But once again there seems to be no distinction between 
aesthetic and certain indubitably non-aesthetic descriptions - for example 
certain descriptions of action in terms of mental concepts. Often we can 
describe or point to a sequence of behaviour that would be sufficient for 
attributing some mental state (such as sadness) to a man. Hence we have 
sufficient conditions for s~ing that the behaviour in question is redolent 
of sadness: its being so is the basis for our judgment that the man himself 
is sad. But here, as in the case of aesthetic description, we cannot 
convert the supposed sufficient condition into a rule that isolates more 
than the individual case - a recurrence of these actions, or this behaviour, 
even as the behaviour of another man, would be a recurrence of the same 
actions or the same behaviour. So we must concede that the use of emotion 
terms tp refer to works of art is not for this reason different from their 
use to describe the actions and feelings of people. 
1 On Sibley's view this assertion is strictly false, since he argues some 
non-aesthetic descriptions entail the falsehood of some aesthetic 
descriptions, and hence the truth of their converse descriptions. To get 
round this difficulty it is necessary to deny that aesthetic descriptions 
are really descriptions. 
Sibley does not, then, produce any proof of his view that there are 
no criteria for the application of aesthetic terms. This is partly, I 
believe, because it would be very hard to imagine what a general proof 
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would look like. Just as no-one has yet succeeded in demonstratins that 
there is a naturalistic fallacy in ethics, or a logical gap between 
description and evaluation, so no-one is likely to succeed in demonstrating 
that there is a similar gap between non-aesthetic and aesthetic descriptions. 
For while it may follow from the truth of some theor.y about the meaning of 
moral or aesthetic judgments that they are logically independent of 
ordinary descriptions, the plausibility of the theory hangs on whether such 
intuitions as we have about meaning and synonyrqy confirm this lack of any 
logical relation. And notoriously people's intuitions differ. 
The comparison with moral judgments in fact helps us to clarif.y the 
notion of an aesthetic feature. It will be quite properly objected that 
the sharp distinction between aesthetic and non-aesthetic, first-order and 
second-order, features which has been assumed by the theor,y is grotesquely 
absolute, like the comparable distinction in ethics between 'brute' facts 
and moral values. Just as the naturalist in ethics will argue that the 
creation of this artificial dichoto~ provides the only reason so far given 
for the dogma that there is a logical gap between description and evaluation, 
so will the opponent of the idea of an aesthetic feature argue that the 
seemingly 'unconditioned' character of these features arises purely out of 
the crude classification of features into exclusive types. It sounds 
plausible to say that features of a poem such as its length, rQythm and 
rhyme-scheme cannot be criteria of profundity. But is it so plausible to 
say tha~ subtlet~ of rQythm, development of rQyme, the control of thought, 
are just as far removed from the aesthetic judgment ? They seem to stand 
between the plain 'first-order' features and the aesthetic features which 
depend on them, as the complexities of 'institutional fact' stand between 
1 brute facts and values. We should not therefore expect to find any 
proof of the logical autono~ of aesthetic description by attempting to 
show that aesthetic descriptions lack criteria. For this can never be 
shown. And if it is merely hYpothesised, then we need a complete and 
plausible theory of the meaning of aesthetic judgments that will explain 
independently everything that needs to be explained about them. It is 
the failure to provide such a theory of meaning that has prevented the 
formation of a genuine alternative to ethical naturalism. Simply to 
insist that aesthetic features are not conditioned by non-aesthetic 
features is to utter a pointless protest against a likely hypothesis. 
It is a theory which we can do nothing with. 
The kind of argument that is brought against the naturalist in ethics 
can be brought against the view that there are criteria for aesthetic 
43 
judgment, but with just as slight a degree of success. It could be argued 
for example, that someone can acknowledge and accept a complete description 
of a work of art, show complete understanding of the terms used to 
attribute an 'aesthetic character on the basis of this description, and yet 
still dissent from any particular attribution, no matter how closely he 
studies the work. But this amounts to no more than the assertion that 
there are no sufficient conditions of aesthetic judgment. It is certainly 
not a proof, relying as it does on an intuition about what it is to 
'understand' an aesthetic judgment that could as easily be denied. Besides, 
what is meant qy a complete description of a work of art ? Similarly if 
someone merely argued that there are no criteria for aesthetic judgment -
since a man c~ dissent from any reason for an attribution of some aesthetic 
term w~thout thereby showing that he fails to understand the term - this 
still amount s to no more than an assertion of what may, indeed, be a 
consistent and tenable position, but which needs to be proved qy some other 
means. 
1 G.E.M.Anscombe, "Brute facts", Analysis, 1958. 
ch.8. 
J.R.Searle, Speech Acts, 
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Nonetheless Sibley m~ be right in his view that aesthetic judgments 
have no criteria. But we must bear in mind that the view is at best an 
hypothesis, which can only be made plausible qy what we build on it. 
Sibley uses his theory as a basis for a theory of aesthetic judgment which 
is very reminiscent of the ethical intuitionism that Moore derived from 
his 'discovery' of the naturalistic fallacy in ethics. Moore concluded 
that moral features such as goodness must be like colours, simple 
properties answering to a basic classification of objects in terms of 
experience. He invented a special faculty - intuition - whereby these 
supposedly simple properties could be discerned. Sibley likewise goes on 
to argue that aesthetic features are discerned by a single perceptual 
faculty - which he calls 'aesthetic perception' or 'taste'. The one 
difference is that for Sibley aesthetic properties are not, strictly 
speaking, 'simple' properties, but what he calls 'emergent' properties: 
they always depend in some way on other properties, although the relation 
between them and these other properties is not a logical one. As examples 
of emergent ~roperties we might consider aspects, and Gestalt configurations 
generally. 
However, the notion of a merely emergent property is conceptually 
confused. A merely emergent property cannot really be called a property 
at all. We are told that emergent properties depend on others in some w~, 
but in no particular W~I all that can be said about this relation of 
dependence is that, seeing the first-order properties on which an emergent 
property depends, someone with the right perceptual capacity (taste, in the 
case of aesthetic judgments) will come to 'see' the emergent property in 
the object. This is analytically true (or almost so), for it is really 
~ 
an explanation 9f what it is to possess this perceptual capacity. The 
capacity could not be identified in any other w~ - s~, in terms of a 
sense-organ, or a particular sensation which would need to be identified 
itself by reference to some part of the body. Thus judgments in support 
d 
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of aesthetic descriptions which refer to first-order features are 
instances of what Sibley calls 'perceptual proof'. Criticism is a 
matter of judiciously referring to the first-order features which another 
might have missed, or attached a wrong importance to, and then hoping 
that the emergent property will become apparent to him also. (This is 
not in fact a complete distortion of what happens in criticism.) No 
amount of reasoning can bring knowledge of an aesthetic feature, howevera 
its dependence on other features is not logical. In the last resort one 
can only look and see if it is there. Nonetheless aesthetic properties 
~ dependent, so that not to have noticed one might simply be a matter of 
not having noticed some first-order feature on which it depends. It is 
for this reason that one has to 'see for oneself' in the appreciation of 
art I if you do not perceive aright, then there is no process of reasoning 
that can oblige you to change your mind or be counted irrational, even 
though there ~ reasons, whose validity you rust also learn to '~' in 
the particular case. 
, 
The notion of an emergent property is confused, for the following 
reasonl In the case of aspects (which are one kind of emergent property) 
different emergent 'properties' can depend on precisely the ~ set of 
first-order properties. (In the ambiguous figure, the duck aspect and the 
rabbit aspect are not the ~ aspect, even though they depend on the same 
observable shapes). Extending this observation to criticism we come at 
once to the conclusion that incompatible critical judgments can be (even if 
they perhaps never are) entirely based on the same set of first-order 
features of a work of art. Sibley obscures this difficulty by s~ing that, 
wherea~ one painting might be delicate on account of some first-order 
features, another painting might be insipid on account of the same first-
order features. But of course in this case there will be other first-order 
features in the two cases which could make the decisive difference between 
them. However we can easily think of examples of so-called aesthetic 
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'perception' in which we see the same set of first-order properties in a 
work of art as giving rise first to ~ aesthetic character, and then to 
another, where there are no further first-order features that will enable 
us to choose between the two aesthetic characters. 
Suppose then that I recognise in a work of art the first-order 
features A - Z. On the basis of this I come to 'see' the emergent 
feature f6. Someone points out to me various other contexts in which A - Z 
occur, and as a result I can no longer see the emergent feature ~, but ~ 
instead (where ~ and ~ are incompatible, in the w~ that it is,s~, 
impossible for something to be truly sad and truly joyful at once). What 
has happened here ? I have not come to notice any other first-order 
feature, nor have I come to ignore any one of A - Z. ~ has exactly the 
same relation of dependence as ~ was supposed to have had. In what sense, 
then, are ~ or ~ dependent on A - Z if there is no way in which A - Z 
determine either ~ or ~ uniquely? And in what sense can fJ and ~ be 
observable properties if, purely on the basis of someone reasoning about 
A - Z, I come to see ~ where once I saw~, and this is supposed to be all 
there is to the seeing of either? Clearly, aesthetic features, like 
aspects, are not like the featur es normally called properties - the 
comparison with aspects will in fact form the basis of a rival theor.y of 
aesthetic description in later chapters. 
The point can readily be illustrated by an example. Consider the 
following passage from Paradise Lost: 
t he at her shape 
If shape it might be called that shape had none 
Distinguishable, in member joint or limb; 
Or substance might be called that shadow seemed, 
For each seemed either; olack he stood as night; 
b~erce as ten furies; terrible as Hell; 
And shook a deadly dart. What seemed his head 
The likeness of a Kingly crown had on •••• 
'l'here is an undeniable obscurity ot' imagery in this passage, combined 
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with a strict regularity of iambic rhythm. Someone might point to further 
features - the numerous qualifying descriptions, none of which serve to 
add any visual detail, other than the final two; the use of rather common 
phrases such as 'fierce as ten furies', 'black as night', 'deadly dart'; 
the repetition of the same idea in 'rrember" 'joint' and 'limb', and so on -
and argue that there 'emerges' from these non-aesthetic features a dead and 
rhetorical aesthetic quality. But it is equally possible to re-describe 
the passage, mentioning the same set of non-aesthetic features, SO that 
the reader comes to take them in quite another w~. It is possible, for 
example, to argue that the "comnon" phrases are used deliberately, in 
order to prevent the details they refer to from standing out above the 
obscurity of the overall impression; that the repetition involved in 
'member, joint or limb' serves to obliterate what might otherwise have been 
too tangible and concrete a detail; that the uncertainty and obscurity are 
carried forward with the same regular and determined iambic rhythm, so that 
when the imagery at last ',becomes ;concrete in the reference to a Kingly 
crown, this serves only to confirm the terror and confusion latent in what 
has gone before. It is as though the only detail of the scene that could 
be grasped is the detail which confer power and majesty on the object of 
terror. Clearly someone could argue in this w~, and eventually persuade 
the reader to 'see' in the very same first-order features that seemed 
responsible for a deadness of effect the proper sublimity which Burke chose 
1 this passage as exemplifying. 
Exactly what has happened in the course of this 'perceptual proof' is 
difficult to assess - any positive account of it will depend on a theor,r of 
aspect, perception in general, and must await a later chapter. But it does 
suggest that the notion of a merely emergent property whose presence can 
only be detected by a kind of perception, is confused. There is a further 
1 Edmund Burke, An Enguiq into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and 
the Beautiful. 
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argument for the same conclusion which, although less general (applying 
only to certain terms in their aesthetic use) is more powerful. Consider 
the application of an emotion term - such as ' sad ' - to a work of art 
(or, for that matter, to an event, or a letter, or anything that cannot 
literally be in the emotional state of sadness). To understand the word 
' sad' is to know how to apply it to people in order to describe their 
emotional state. The criteria for the application of the term ' sad' 
concern the gestures, expressions and utterances of people on the basis 
of which I describe them as sad, and to grasp the concept of sadness is to 
know how to apply it on the basis of these criteria. When we apply the 
concept to art , however, it is arguable that these criteria are not , or 
need not be, present. Does this mean that the term 'sad' is ambiguous? 
To say that the term ' sad' in its aesthetic use names a perceptual 
property which is emergent but which has no criteria is to say in effect 
that it is ambiguous between Hs aesthetio and non-aesthetic uses. For 
the basis of its ascription in each use is not the same. In the one 
~ 
case the term denotes an emergent perceptual property, in the other use 
it denotes a property determined by established criteria. It follows 
that a man could understand one use without understanding the other. 
However, this does not seem to be possible. The use to refer to an 
emotional state is primar,y, and anyone who did not understand this use 
of the term ' sad' - did not understand what the emotion of sadness was -
would not know what he was talking about in attributing sadness to a work 
of art. 
This point is confirmed by the following consideration: Suppose that 
there is some agreement among adults trained in the appreciation of art as 
~ 
to which works of art are sad. The very idea of an observable property 
seems to require that, at the ver,y least, such an agreement is possible, 
if not actual. 1 Suppose, then, that I classify all works of art as sad 
or not sade I classify them into two groups, with perhaps a third group 
in between where the question whether or not they are sad is undecidable. 
Now suppose also that someone else carries out the same classification, 
without consulting me, and groups works of art together in exactly the 
same way as I do ~self. And suppose, finally, that both he and I agree 
in our application of the term' sad' to people (its use to d.enote an 
emotional state). That is, we agree about the normal sense of the term 
and use it according to the same criteria. Imagine, then, that while 1 
call the two categories 'sad' and 'not sad', ~ refuses to apply these 
terms. He s~s, for example, that it is nonsense to call works of art 
sad, he does not know what to call the property in virtue of which he has 
made the classification that he has made, but certainly it would be wrong 
to call it sadness - works of art cannot have states of mind. Despite 
this, if the aesthetic feature in question is an observable emergent 
property,we must say that the man has perceived the sadness of the works 
of art in question, just as someone who used the term 'hot' to name the 
property of redness, would count as perceiving the redness of things, 
provided only that he made the right classification on the basis of his 
visual experience. 
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But it is ver,y odd to say that the man in question has seen the sadness 
of the works of art that he classifies together. He has not seen that what 
it is they all have in common is sadness, one wants to say, for he has not 
seen the vital connection that exists between these works and the emotional 
state. It is a strange fact that he has classified these works of art 
together, a fact which could be a reason for saying that he has seen their 
sadness but not,pace the theor,y of aesthetic perception, a sufficient 
reason. For he must in some way make the connection between these works of 
1 F.N .Sibley &: M.K.Tanner, "Objectivity and Aesthetics", A.S.S. V., 1968. 
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art and the sadness of people. 
It is easy to see that this connection must not be broken. For it 
could be a reason for sa;ying that Henry is s6.d tha.t ·~he ,- c.booses, "s.~, 'sad 
works of literature to read aloud to his family, or sad pieces of music to 
play at the piano. And if the sadness of music and the sadness of men are 
quite different properties, then Jacques, in As you like it, is simply 
deceived in thinking that he 
, •••• can suck melancholy out of a song 
As a weazel sucks eggs ••• '. 
Besides, there are many non-aesthetic uses of 'sad' where what is sad is not 
a person, nor any kind of sentient being: it might be an event. If we sB'3' 
that here too we have a different concept of sadness then a very important 
connection is broken - that between the sadness of lamentable occurrences 
and the sadness of people. But if we say that we have one and the same 
concept of sadness here then we are pressed to admit that we employ the same 
concept of sadness when referring to the representational arts too. For 
otherwise Stephen Dedalus's torment at school, which is sad in the WB'3' that 
any living person's torment at school might be sad, would nonetheless have to 
be sad in a quite different way from that in which the opening part of ~ 
Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man is sad. 
Similarly, if we do not say that a piece of music is sad in a wa;y that 
marks some kind of relationship between the music and a certain emotional 
state, the whole point of making the judgment seems to vanish. Unless in 
sa;ying that the music is sad we are relating it not only to other works of 
art but also to certain situations outside the context of aesthetic judgment, 
the pojnt of making the judgment seems to disappear. Suddenly it becomes 
a peculiar fact. that we should be interested in the sadness of music, and 
certain kinds of response to this sadness become quite incomprehensible. 
And yet it is plain that if aSked to explain what we mean by calling the 
music sad, we would naturally point to more commonplace manifestations of 
s 
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sadness. It would never be enough to go on referring to parallels with 
other works. Think of the case of a man who only ascribed sadness to works 
of art, who showed no ability to employ the concept of sadness in talking 
of people (inoluding himself ) , or other sentient beings. We should Sa;{ 
that he did not wlderstand what is meant in saying that a pieoe of musio is 
sad. 
A similar difficulty arises when we examine the problem of how we learn 
to apply aesthetic descriptions. Aesthetic descriptions are like colou~ 
preeicates in this - that we learn their use from samples and examples: 
there could be no rules that were not vaouous or at any rate too cumbersome 
to learn from. But the learning of oolour words and the learning of the 
aesthetic use of, say, emotion terms, are different in this: in the latter 
oase the very examples which would serve to teach us the use of ' sad ' and 
so on in the description of works of art might later, all of them and 
without exception, be judged Qy us as not cases of sadness at all, or at 
1 least as not truly sad. Note that precisely the same thing happens with 
ethical terms - a faot whose signifioance cannot be overlooked. To argue 
that aesthetic properties are peroeptual features of a thing is to be 
involved in giving a special kind of explanation of how it is that one can 
learn from these examples to apply a concept which later one refuses to 
apply to them. For it is supposedly not the case that one learns to apply 
the term in question believing certain things to be the oase about the 
examples which are in fact not the case but which become, nonetheless, the 
criteria to which the term ' s meaning is bound. Nor is it supposed to be 
the case that one is applying a concept by extension of its use in other 
1 Note that there are certain senses which also change and mature - the 
sense of ta~te for example. I may not at first be able to tell Spanish 
Burgundy and Vosne Roman~e apart, and only later be able to do so. But 
here we do not apply to the wines on the basis of their taste the 
descriptions ( t Spanish Burgundy' and 'Vosne Romanee') whioh classify 
them separately. Nonetheless it is presumably the flexibility in the 
action of taste that leads to the term ' taste ' being borrowed to refer to 
aesthetic judgment. 
d 
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contexts, and is thereby susceptible to a sYstematic misguidedness (as 
when one applies a metaphor consistently but inappositely). We rust say 
that aesthetic perceptiveness is itself liable to mature, so that in early 
years judgments issuing from it are discounted and only later can the 
notion of the objectivity of such judgments make sense. 
In fact it is possible to conceive of the case where, before a certain 
age , people's colour sense, say, is in a state of development, so that they 
have to be taught the meaning of the word ' brown ' by being referred to 
things which are in fact not brown but, as they too will come to see in 
time, green. 1 This would not affect the objectivity of the final 
judgment that brown things are really brown - for example, there oould be 
universal agreement among adult observers. But there is an important fact 
about this process of development in the case of aesthetics which a theory 
of aesthetic perception could not deal with. Looking at a story I now 
think sentimental and once thought terribly sad (Paul et Virginie) I can 
quite truly say to II\Yself "Yes, I see why I thought it was sad", where 
this judgment would be defended by pointing to features of the work and 
also, significantly, to II\Y attitudes and general grasp of emotion concepts 
at the time. This does not seem based an an empirical generalisation about 
my reasons for s~ing that things were sad, and with the connection of these 
reasons with remembered judgment s of' sadness, although if aesthetic features 
are merely emergent properties then there can be no other basis f or my 
present judgment. I might have been unable to give reasons, initially, for 
II\Y judgment that certain stories were sad, and may now have forgotten all II\Y 
callow attempts at literary discussion. And the judgment of a work of art 
that o~e has not seen before that it is sentimental, whereas several years 
ago one might have thought it sad, would have to go as follows' "This work 
contains features X, Y, Z, which as a matter of fact are the reason 
for its being sentimental. It also contains features A, B, C, which 
1 Sibley , "Objectivity and Aesthetics" , m . ,: . 
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together with X ( s~ ) were very often in the past the reason I would give 
for mw judgment that a work was sad (I saw the work as sad on the basis of 
the possession of those features). " The explanation of why I took those 
features as sad-making would be another matter. The trouble with this 
account is that it does not allow for the case where the features 
mentioned tA, B, e, X) are not identical with any set of features which 
at the particular past time ~ given as reasons: only on a theory of 
aesthetic description as governed by criteria in the normal w~ could we then 
construe the present work as ' sad for R.S. at age 14t (as an empirical 
truth), and even then there would be cases which could not be covered 
without referring to our use of such concepts outside the aesthetic context. 
But it seems to me both meaningful and true to s~ that five years ago I 
would have found the opening parts of Finnegan ' s Wake frivolous and 
mechanical, whereas I now see, reading them for the first time, that they 
are imaginative, subtle and full of feeling. 
It seems then that the idea of aesthetic features as merely emergent 
properties fa1ls to the ground, and with it the concept of aesthetic 
perception. The theory of aesthetic perception is, however 1 only one 
among a number of closely related views, all of which attempt to account for 
the activity of aesthetic judgment and appreciation in purely cognitive 
terms. The aesthetic attitude is construed as an interest in certain 
features, and aesthetic perception as nothing more than the gaining of 
knowledge about those features. However, it should be recognised at once 
that it is not because it entails that appreciation is primarily cognitive 
that the theory of aesthetic perception fails. It fails Py creating too 
sharp a divorce between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic use of terms, 
~ 
so that, ultimately, it leaves itself with no explanation of the meaning of 
aesthetic jUdgments. 
The creation of this sharp divorce between the meaning of terms in 
aesthetic judgment and their meaning in other contexts is in fact 
54 
characteristic of the tradition in aesthetic thought described in 
Chapter Two. For there are many philosophers who have spoken of the 
work of art as a special kind of entity, distinct from any material object 
in which it might be, as it were, incarnate. Works of art cannot be 
described in the terms appropriate to material objects. Even though 
they express, sqy, there is no independent description available of what 
they express (in terms of attitude, thought, or feeling). Thus when we 
speak of the expressive qualities of works of art we do not mean to refer 
to some ordinary property - that of expressing or giving voice to some 
identifiable feeling - which we 'Could find in other things besides works 
of art. We are referring to a unique feature of the work of art itself, 
a feature which can only belong to works of art, and only to that work of 
art. This w~ of thinking is characteristic of many aestheticians besides 
Croce and Collingwood, and the idea of an 'aesthetic feature' is perhaps 
its most recent embodiment. It is interesting to note that Croce insists 
explicitly on the fact that terms used in describing the aesthetic quality 
of works of art are used in a quite distinct sense. Here, for example, is 
what he has to say about the notion of sincerity as it is employed in 
criticisml 
In the end, sincerity, imposed on the artist as a duty (this law 
of ethics, so it is said, which is at the same time a law of 
aesthetiCS) rests on another double meaning. On the one hand we 
mqy mean by sincerity the moral duty of not deceiving our neighbour; 
in this case it is foreign to the artist. For the artist deceives 
no-one, since he gives form to what lies already in his spirit, and 
would only deceive should he betray his artistic duty by failing to 
achieve his task according to its intrinsic necessity. If lies and 
deceit are in his spirit, the form which he gives to these, precisely 
because it is aesthetic, cannot be deceit or lies •••• On the other 
hand, we mqy mean by sincerity the fullness and truth of expression; 
and it is clear that this second meaning has no relation to the 
~thical concept. The law, pronounced as both ethical and aesthetic, 
thus reveals itself, in this case, as nothing but a word used in 
common between ethics and aesthetics. 1 
Croce's acceptance of this crucial ambiguity is symptomatic of his whole 
approach to the notion of expression - his insistent divorcing of this 
1 
Esterica, p.60. 
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concept along with all that goes with it, from more common notions of 
expression, meaning, and representation. 
In the next chapter I shall return to the question how this kind of 
crucial ambiguity might be avoided, and what are the consequences for the 
notion of an aesthetic feature if we do try to avoid it. It is clear 
that, unless we do avoid it, the point and meaning of critical judgments 
will be extremely difficult to explain. Art will become an entirely 
autonomous and unrelated section of human activity, whose significance and 
value will be impossible to assess. This consequence is unacceptable -
but note that it is not simply the consequence of i!!lY. cognitive theory. 
It is only a consequence of theories like that of aesthetic perception, 
which construe what we are aware of in. aesthetic appreciation (the 
aesthetic character of an object) as something unrelated to what we are 
aware of in ordinary moral and practical attention. 
On the other hand, there is no doubt that the aesthetic perception 
theor,y is led into this paradoxical consequence by its attempt to 
separate the aesthetic (from the moral, the practical, or whatever) by a 
simple logical criterion. But without this simple logical criterion, the 
~dea of an aesthetic feature ceases to be of help in the attempt to define 
the nature of aesthetic interest. It becomes difficult to see how 
attention to the aesthetic features of something can become the distinctive 
mark of aesthetic, rather than moral or practical, appreciation. For if 
a term like 'sad' means the ~ when applied to a work of art (to describe 
its aesthetic character) and when applied to a human being (to describe his 
emotional state), then how can an aesthetic interest be defined as an 
interest in such features as the sadness of things, when such features are 
precisely the kinds of thing towards which our ordinary moral and practical 
interests are directed ? Perhaps one can still mark off a group of 
featU2'es which predominates as the objects of aesthetic interest, but 
without a logical distinction of the kind proposed by the theor.y of 
,I, 
l 
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aesthetic perception, there will be no rationale for our ' m!U'~ing off these 
features as the objects of a separate attitude. The import ance of such a 
concept of the aesthetic attitude will be totally obscure. 
Moreover, once we abandon the theory of aesthetic perception, the 
notion of an aesthetic feature, as whatever it referred to by an aesthetic 
description, becomes extremely problematic. For if the word 'sad' cannot 
be applied to works of art on the basis of criteria other than those 
governing its normal use, and if it is not on the other hand applied to a 
perceptual propert,y, then in what sense is it applied to a property at all ? 
The property is neither perceptual, nor based in what is perceived. Can we 
speak of it, therefore, as a genuine property? This is the question that 
we must go on to answer. 
The attempt to explain aesthetic experience in terms of the features 
towards which it is directed must, then, be abandoned. Whether or not any 
conclusions can be drawn from a more plausible analysis of aesthetic 
description remains to be seen. But we have to admit that both attempts 
at explaining the notion of aesthetic experience so far considered - in terms 
of the assessment to which it gives rise, and in terms of the features towards 
which it is directed (the grounds of aesthetic assessment) - are inadequate. 
In fact, I shall argue that aesthetic experience is neither wholly cognitive, 
as the theory of aesthetic perception supposes, nor secondary to the 
assessment that accompanies it. On the contrar.y, aesthetic description and 
aesthetic assessment are expressions of, and not prior to, the experience, 
which must be independently described. 
,t\ 
l 
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CHAPl'ER FOUR 
THE NATURE OF AESTHETIC DESCRIFTION 
In the last chapter it was shown that the idea of an aesthetic feature 
could not be used to define the nature and limits of aesthetic experience. 
It might still be argued, however, that there is a common and coherent 
activity of aesthetic description, and that the existence of this activity 
is at least relevant to aesthetic interest. We must therefore examine more 
closely the nature of aesthetic description, in order to see whether the 
category of the aesthetic may usefully be described in terms of it. 
The principle objection to the idea of an aesthetic property was thisl 
either terms denoting aesthetic properties have the same meaning as they have 
when used in their normal contexts, in which case, how can we distinguish 
aesthetic properties as a separate class ? Or else they have a different 
meaning, in which case, what is the point of naming aesthetic properties as 
we do? We found that terms used in aesthetic description must have their 
normal meanings. But there are two powerful objections that make it 
difficult to interpret this conclusion. First, there is Quine's familiar 
objection, that in the case of general terms, the distinction between 
ambiguity and increased generality cannot be drawn in the simple way that 
1 has been assumed. Secondly there is the objection that, although there 
are in fact real criteria of ambiguity, they result in the opposite conclusion 
from the one we have arrived at. 
The point of Quine's objection is that it is only in the context of a 
theory of meaning that the distinction between ambiguity and generality can 
be defined. But how do we set up a theory of meaning without first having 
1 W.V.Quine, Word and Object, p.130. 
,l., 
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criteria for sameness and difference of the entities - meanings - with which 
the theory has to' deal ? There is, I think, no general answer to this form 
of scepticism. We must concentrate on the particular case, where ambiguity 
and generality can be distinguished only when we have already taken for 
granted a knowledge of the meaning of other terms. I shall attempt to 
show how synony~ and ambiguity can be discovered in a language by piecemeal 
examination, without reference to any theory that must ultimately be invoked 
to explain them. 
But can we maintain that terms like ' sad ' are not ambiguous between 
their aesthetic and their non-aesthetic uses ? Quine argues that we can 
produce necessary, but not sufficient, conditions of ambiguity. It is a 
necessary condition for the ambiguity of a general term, ~ , that its 
application should yield a sentence (,~ is ~,) which is, for some ~ , both 
clearly true and clearly false at once. It may be clearly true that John 
is fair (just) , and at the same time clearly false that he is fair (blond). 
We can se~ at once that the term 'sad'.satisfies this necessary 
condition. It is clearly true that Mozart' s Masonic Funeral Music is sad, 
and also clearly false that a piece of music could be any such thing. 
Moreover, Sommers has recently proposed a sufficient condition of ambiguity,1 
and the two uses of the term 'sad' also satisf,y this condition. According 
to Sommers, when two predicates P and Q are such that P is (logically) 
predicable of a thing ~ and a thing £, but not of a thi ng..£, and Q is 
predicable of .12 and..£ but not of ~, then, if ~, E. and ..£ exist, either P is 
ambiguous or Q is ambiguous. Applying this to our case, take P as "is sad", 
Q as "is tall " , and~, E., and..£ respectively as this tree, this man, and this 
melody. 
, 
The result is that either ' sad' is ambiguous, or ' tall' is 
ambiguous, and it is not difficult to see which we should choose. 
1 Fred Somrners , "Type sand Ont 01 ogy" , in Phil. Rev. 1963 , and "Predica bi 1 i ty" , 
in Max Black (ed.), Philosophy in America. 
h 
I, 
/. 
59 
Sommers ' concept of predicability is, I think, obscure, and unlikely 
to withstand the assaults of Quinean scepticism. Nonetheless we are left 
with a sense that, either Quina is ri ght and the distinction we have been 
attempting to draw is without a basis, or else Sommers is right, and the 
term ' sad ' is after all ambiguous. We must therefore show that piecemeal 
investigation gives support to neit her point of view. 
Both Quine and Sommers tend to ignore the ways in which the use of a 
term m~ be extended on the basis of a meaning that it already has. 
Ambiguity is always to some extent a matter of degree, and it will often be 
difficult to say whether a new use of some term is independent of the old 
use or merely an extension of it. (This is indeed the case for the example 
that Quine chooses - ' hard ' , as applied to a question and to a chair). But 
we must keep in mind the conceptual comnection that exists between meaning 
and underst anding. We then find that we are often able to decide whether 
two uses of a word are sufficiently independent to create an ambiguity. 
Take the example of ' fair ' . The criteria of fairness divide naturally into 
two groups, which have little or nothing to do with each other, and out of 
which sufficient conditions for something ' s being fair cannot be formed by 
taking some (but not all) criteria from one group and adding to them more 
criteria from the other group. The two sets of criteria are logically 
independent in that each provides totally adequate rules for the particular 
use of ' fair ' in question: hence one can fully understand one use without 
understanding the other. There is therefore nothing in the meaning of 
' fair ' itself t hat forbids its replacement by two heteromorphic terms. 
This is not to s~ that there is no chain of conceptual connections between 
the two uses. 
~ 
For example, we might t race the transformation of the word 
' fair ' through the, following series: fair skin, fair maid, fair prospect, 
fair weather, fair chance, fair question, fair verdict, fair judge. To 
make such connections is to give ( in part) a lexicographical explanation tas 
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opposed to a logical explanation) of why we have the same term. 
It is not always true t hat the several uses of a term are logically 
independent in this w~. For example, take the word "duck" used of decoy 
ducks and live ducks: we would not say that the word ' duck ' was ambiguous 
because it can have these two uses. Nor, pace Quine, would we say that the 
class of ducks has been extended by the invention of decoy ducks, for the 
simple reason that a decoy duck is not a duck, i.e. because his ' necessary 
condition' of ambiguity applies. Our reason for saying that "duck" has only 
one meaning here is that one use is parasitic on the other, and could not be 
understood independently. It is only if I understand what ducks are that I 
can understand the appl ication of the term ' duck ' to a decoy. 
This example does not yet meet Sommers ' requirement for ambiguity, but 
there are other examples of extended uses that do. One way of extending 
the meaning of a term is through analogy, or 'shared features ' . To use a 
term analogically is to use it in the absence of some of its criteria, but in 
the presence of others ( or in the presence of ' symptoms ' normally connected 
with the criteria of the term). And it seems unlikely that any such 
extension of a term ~ could lead to its being applied to something of which 
the properties of ~ things were not also generally predicable. But analogy 
is not the only method of extension. 
1 
Austin draws attention to Ar~stotle ' s discussion of paronymw: 
A very simple case indeed is one often mentioned by Aristotle: 
the adjective 'healthy': when I talk of a healthy body and again 
of a healthy complexion, of healthy exercise: the word is not 
just being used ' equivocally '. Aristotle would s~ that it is 
being used ' paronymously ' . In this case t here is what we may 
call a primarx nuclear sense of ' heal thy': the sense irl which 
~ 'healthy' is used of a healthy body: I call this nuclear because 
it is 'contained as a part ' in the other two sense, which may be 
set out as 'productive of healthy bodies' and ' resulting from 
healthy bodies. ' 1 
J .L.Austin, "The Meaning of a Word", in Philosophical Papers, 2nd edn., 
p·71. 
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Now there are predicates that are predicable of bodies and not of exercise: 
'healthy', therefore, satisfies Sommers ' criterion. But to call the term 
' healthy ' ambiguous for this reason is simply to ignore the very important 
fact that paronymous uses are derivative, and can only be understood when one 
has first understood the primary meaning of the term. 
Here is a case, then, of a term that can be seen, despite Quine ' s 
general scepticism, to be unambiguous, and which also fulfils Sommers' 
supposed criterion of ambiguity. And the example is close to the one that 
we have been considering: the term ' sad ' applied to music. Can we, then, 
eest here, and construe aesthetic description as a species of parony~? On 
this account, aesthetic features would still be observable properties of a 
work of art, like the healthiness of a young face, or the sadness of a 
gesture. And the theory of aesthetic perception would be quite superfluous 
as an explanation of this fact. 
Here is a suggestion: I call a gesture sad because it is a symptom of 
sadness (parony~). I call the music sad because it resembles such a 
gesture (analogy). Thus Suzanne Langer argues that works of art share a 
certain formal structure with human emotion, and hence come to be named after 
the emotions that the imitate: 
" •••• there are certain aspects of the so-called 'inner life I -
physical and mental - which have formal properties similar to 
those of music - patterns of motion and rest, of tension and 
release, of agreement and disagreement, preparation, fulfilment, 
excitation, sudden change, etc. 1 
This theory is a descendant of Aristotle's, according to which music acquires 
its moral and emotional character through the 'imitation ' of human behaviour 
and states of mind. 2 
It is clear, I think, that this theory gives us no indication of the 
1 S.K.Langer, Philosop~y in a New Ke1, p.193. 
2 Politics 1340a ff. 
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general sense of aesthetic descriptions - how can a landscape-picture 
imitate the formal properties of human feeling? - and in any case leaves 
us guessing as to why we take the so-called ' sadness' of music as seriously 
as we do. But we find t hat other paronymous accounts of the meaning of 
aesthetic descriptions fail to produce a more satisf.ying theor,y. For 
example, ' It is sad t cleaxly does not mean ' It makes me sad ' , any more than 
' It is good' means ' I approve of it'. This wqy of maintaining a connection 
with the central use of the term ' sad' falls immediately into the paradoxes 
familial' in the refutation of ethical subjectivism. More important l y, 
' It is sad ' does not mean 'It makes people sad', or ' It tends to make people 
sad' • Songs and poems too weak or sentimental to be truly sad have had a 
saddening effect on many people. (This is whY we wish to sqythat ' taste ' 
is involved in the perception of aesthetic features . )1 
We soon discover, then, that, while there is a range of cases over 
which analogy and parony~ provide a fairly adequate explanation of 
aesthetic description, there are also many cases where neither seem appropriate. 
Now I have given no reason as yet to suppose that there must be only ~ w~ in 
which terms are employed aesthetically; it may seem that we have already 
arrived at a partial account of aesthetic description. But we can hardly rest 
satisfied with this account, since it seems to fall short precisely at the 
point in which description becomes aest hetic, i.e. in which it becomes tied to 
aesthetic appreciation in a non-trivial way. 
In this respect it seems more promising to argue that aesthetic 
descriptions are essentially normative. when I ca.ll a piece of music sad this 
is IL~e calling it exciting or depressing. I am not saying anything about 
what people do feel, but I ~ saying something about what it would be natural 
or appropriate to feel. 
1 Cf. David Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste " , in Essa.ys . 
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Now certainly we can speak of sadness as justified, or made appropriate 
by its object, and the importance of this f act - that emotions can be made 
appropriate by their objects - is enormous. But what is it that I am 
saying is appropriate when I call the music sad ? We find no irrmediate 
answer. The appropriate response is rarely sadness itself: only in special 
circumstances is anyone saddened by a work of art. Besides, it seems odd to 
talk of the appropriate response in a case like this. 
I shall assume, however , that this sceptical rejoinder can be refuted. 
I shall assume that we could in principle identify something - an emotion , 
a response, a feeling, an experience or whatever - that we might wish t o s~ 
is involved in every appropriate reaction to the sadness of a work of art. 
Can it be that, in calling a poem sad we are saying that this experience or 
response is appropriate to it ? Plausible though such a theory might 
initially seem, we can see at once that it must inevitably make room for 
another, more simple - namely, the theory that aesthetic description does 
not assert that a certain state of mind is justified but rather gives direct 
expression to the state of mind itself. Hence the function of aesthetic 
d . t· . t . '1 d . t' 1 escrlp lon 18 no , prlmarl y, escrlp lve. The normative view has 
mislocated the speech-act involved when terms are used in an aesthetic sense. 
It m~ be that I must have some notion of what it is to justify a response if 
I am to engage in the activity of criticism as we know it. But it is not 
necessary to argue that I am therefore s~ying that a response is justified 
when I call a piece of music or a poem sad. Such a theory leaves us with 
the task of explaining what it is to regard a response as justified, and this, 
as we shall see, is a needless complication. Moreover it fails to explain 
why Vie fe;el no hesitation in proceeding with the aesthetic use of ' sad I: it 
seems the most natural thing in the world to extend the use of the term in 
this way, and we do it quite unthinkinglyo It is conceivable that this 
1 This suggestion has been made by Ruby Meager, "Aesthetic Concepts", 
B.J .A., 1970. 

descriptive use ? We find an answer to this question once we see that it 
is not only individual words that acquire extended uses (through analogy, 
or parony~, or some other ' figurative ' device). Our words as a whole can 
be used in a new w~ without a change of meaning. This might occur when I 
descri be a dream: here the normal referential function of ~ words is, as it 
were, held in abeyance, but if what I s~ is to be understood then the words 
must have their normal meanings. Consider also the following passage from 
Wittgenstein: 
Given the two ideas ' fat ' and ' lean', would you be rather 
inclined to s~ that Wednesday was fat and Tuesday lean, or 
the other w~ round? (I incline to choose the former ) . Now 
have "fat " and "lean" some different meaning here from their 
usual one? - they have a different use . - So ought I really 
to have used different words? Cert ainly not that . - I want to 
use these words (with their familiar meanings ) ~. - Now, I 
say nothing about the causes of this phenomenon. They might 
be associations from ~ childhood. But that is a hypothesis. 
Whatever the explanation, - the inclination is t here. 
Asked "What do you really mean here by ' fat ' and ' lean ' ? " -
I could only explain the meanings in the usual way. I could 1!2.i 
point to the examples of Tuesd~ and Wednesd~. 1 
This brings out forcefully, I think, the point that words m~ be used with 
their standard meanings but out of context, not because they are being used 
to describe some de facto relation with t he central case, but because the 
point of using these words at all is here entirely different. To understand 
this use of terms is not to know a new meaning, nor even a par onymous 
meaning, for the individual terms. It is rather to "see the point " of the 
description. Now Wittgenstein ' s example has much in common with certain 
kinds of aesthetic description - descriptions of the ' warmth ' of a colour 
scheme, of the ' weight ' of certain visual effects (stained-glass, for 
example ) , of the ' heaviness ' of a musical style, of the ' baroque ' quality 
of a literary embellishment. And clearly there is a continuum from this kind 
of description to the suggestive comparisons of criticism, as exemplified in 
1 Philosophical Investigations, p.216. 
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Baudelaire's description of Chopin ' s music as ' un brillant oiseau voltigeant 
1 
sur ; les Q,orreurs d 'un gouffre t • Clearly all these judgments could be 
supported by analogies, but it would be peremptory to suggest that there was 
nothing more to their meaning than that. They do not need an analogical 
basis, and this fact arises from the peculiar purpose involved in describing 
an aesthetic object in this way. Thus any explanation that I might give of 
such a judgment will proceed well beyond observable analogies: in describing 
a Brahms rhapsody as 'fat t I might point to a fulsome, exaggerated quality 
in the melodic line, to a ' tone ' or ' feelin g ' in the music, as though the 
piano were greedily swallowing clusters of undiscriminated notes - and so on. 
Although we may often not be able to say (as in Wittgenstein ' s example) 
exactly how we are using words when we use them non-descriptively, this need 
not always be the case. At tbe beginning of the Categories , Aristotle 
points t o a parilcularly interesting non-standard use of words. This use is 
exemplified when I gesture to a picture and say ' That is a man ' . If we 
take the ' that t as here referring to the picture t then the predication again 
satisfies Sommers' condition for ambiguity. We would of course wish to 
deny that the term ' that ' refers to the picture: one is not predicating ' is 
a man ' of the picture but rather of the thing in the picture. But there is 
in fact no way of distinguishing this species of 'pseudo-predication ' on the 
basis of Sommers ' account of predicability. For we have no means of 
deciding in advance that a seeming act of predication is real ly of this kind 
or not. The only thing that will tell us is a study of the conditions for 
the acceptance of the judgment - what it is to agree to it, accept it, see 
its point. It is this that determines the non-referential character of the 
ostensive '~that'. The same goes for aesthetic description. When I sa::! of 
the music ' This is sad ' , there is nothing yet to tell us that the predication 
is genuine, and hence nothing that will determine whether or not some property 
is attributed by this description to the music. 
1 
"Eu' D I . gene e acro~x, Obituary Notice " . 
1 The comparison of aesthetic features with aspects is a fruitful one. 
We can already see how neatly and effectively it solves the problems from 
which this chapter began. First, we find that we can reconstruct the 
argument of the last chapter to show that aspects, like aesthetic features, 
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cannot be simple properties I even though, lll<e simple properties, they do not 
have criteria for their presence that can be stated in other terms. Imagine 
9. man who , sorting through a heap of pictures , happens always to put the 
pictures of ducks to one side. And yet the word ' duck' seems to him to 
have no application to what he sees when looking at the pictures. If asked 
to explain his behaviour he might reply that he feels that these pictures 
belong together , although he does not know why, or else that they look the 
same in a certain respect (a respect which has nothing to do with ducks, 
al though it does correspond to a certain shape on the canvas). There is, I 
think, no contradiction in this supposition. It is as implausible to argue 
that this man has seen the duck-aspect of the pictures as it is to argue that 
the man who classifies sad songs together, while refusing to describe them as 
' sad ', has noticed the sadness that belongs to them. We might support this 
contention once again by referring to the phenomenon - clearly ruled out b.y 
the logic of simple properties - of the ambiguous aspect . Suppose an object 
has the aspect of both a rabbit and a duck. A man who ' sees ' the duck might 
consciously reproduce all the features that are responsible for this aspect: 
from which it follows that he reproduces the rabbit as well. Thus we seem 
to have the situation, which certainly could not arise in the case of a 
simple property, where a man may infallibly (and not just by chance) reproduce 
an aspect ~ b.y reproducing only what he sees , and yet not ' see ' the aspect 
itself. 
Secondly, we can demonstrate that the term ' man ' must have the same 
meaning when used to describe an aspect and when used to refer to a man. 
1 See also, D. M.Levin, "More Aspects to the concept of 'Aesthetic Aspects ''' , 
J.Phil., 1968; John Casey, The Language of Criticism, ch.1, p.2Bff. 
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Thus the two contrasting problems presented by Quine and Sommers are 
immediately evaded. For it is precisely the disposition to apply the 
term ' man' in its normal sense to the picture that is our criterion for 
saying that someone has seen the aspect that the picture has. The 
'use of words' involved is not the normal use - but that is beside the 
point. 
Thirdly , we see that the 'use of words ' in question is not a 
figurative use: to see an aspect is not to notice an analogy , even though 
it is no doubt true that, when I see a man in a picture, the lines in the 
picture bear some resemblance to the shape of a man. This is a point that 
I shall explore in detail in Chapter Seven. 
Finally, we can see how there is an important sense in which aspects 
are not properties (as indeed Wittgenstein said they were not). For there 
are, or need be, no criteria for the application of a term to an object when 
that term is used to describe its aspect. Terms used in this sense are 
terms whose criteria and meaning derive from some other use. And yet it 
follows from the arguments above that these t erms must have the same meaning 
when describing aspects as they normally have: hence they cannot have other 
criteria for their application in this secondary use. It follows thatl in 
their use to describe aspects r terms need have n£ criteria for their 
application. Generalised to cover the use of such terms as 'sad' in 
aesthetic judgment~ this argument would provide the needed proof that 
aesthetic descriptions are divorced from truth-conditions in the strong 
sense : aesthetic features are not properties. 1 
1 This is a proof, which depends on the fact that terms used in aesthetic 
description have another, more central, employment. The argument could 
not be extended to cover those terms for which this is not true, and I 
shall therefore return to these at a later stage. .Nor could it be 
extended to ethics, without some considerable further argument , to provide 
a proof that there is a ' naturalistic :I:'allacy', or that there is no 
derivation of an 'ought ' from an 'is'. 
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It is worthwhile here to forestall an objection that m~ already have 
occurred to the reader. I have assumed that if the aspect-description 
is a description of anything it is a description of the £icture. But 
surely, it will be said, the aspect-description is the description of' an 
aspect, which may be 'in' the picture in some sense, but which is not 
identical with the pictw.'e nor with any part of it. Therefore the aspect-
description is a genuine description, although what it describes (the 
aspect) is not a physical thing. But this objection only makes the same 
point in a different way. For the question was whether aspects are 
properties of the items which 'possess' them, and the argument seems to 
establish that they are not. The objection does no more than propose the 
aspect itself as a bearer of properties, which is simply to beg the question. 
In any case, if we are to say this, then vie must be prepared to give criteria 
of identity for the thing to which the 'properties ' of aspects are 
attributed, and this will prove to be impossible. For if aspects are 
objects at all, then they belong to the class of 'intentional objects' for 
which criteria of identity cannot be specified. 1 
In other words, there is a striking formal analogy between the 
description of the aspect of a thing, and the description of its aesthetic 
character; indeed, even the theory of aesthetic perception brackets the two 
together f treating aspects and aesthetic features as alike ' emergent' 
characteristics of an object. 2 But we have seen that the formal analogy 
points aw~ from the perceptual theory to the ' affective ' theory: it suggests 
that we should attempt to describe aesthetic description not in terms of a 
property of its object but in terms of some response or experience that it 
1 
2 
~ 
See G .E.M. Anscombe, "The Intentionality of Sensation fl , in R.J . Butler 
(ed.) , Analytical PhilosophY , Series 2. 
F.Sibley ~ ill. 
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expresses. The theory of aesthetic perception takes as its starting 
point the intuition that , in matters of aesthetic judgment , you have to see 
for yourself - another cannot make your aesthetic judgments for you - and 
it emphasises the fact that we use a perceptual verb ( ' to see ') in expressing 
this opinion. But the theory is unable to explain w~ you also have to 
see for yourself: and the explanation of this is by no means straightforward. 
If ~ is a visual property (s~) then it is not true that I have to see ~ for 
~self in order to know that an object possesses it: there are circumstances 
where the opinion of others can give me a logically conclusive reason for 
saying that ~ is there, as indeed a blind man can have knowledge of colours . 
In a.esthetics you have to see for yourself preci sely because what you have to 
' see ' is not a property: your knowledge that an aesthetic feature is ' in ' the 
object is given by the ~ criteria that show that you 'see ' it. To see 
the sadness in the music and to know that the music is sad are one and the 
same thing. To agree in the judgment that the music is sad is not to agree 
in a belief, but in something more like a response or an experience; in a 
mental state that is - unlike belief - logically tied to the immediate 
circumstances of its arousal. ' The music is sad ' is only superficially, 
therefore, of propositional form: what you know when you know that the music 
is sad CMJnot be elucidated by referring to the conditions for a proposition ' s 
truth. 
We can now state the affective theory more precisely, by borrowing an 
idea from Hare . The central premise of Hare ' s theory of pr escriptivism1 
is that the meaning of a judgment is governed by the conditions for its 
acceptance: by what it is to accept a judgment of that kind. The hope was 
that the conditions for the acceptance of moral judgment could be shovm to 
~ 
be importantly different from the conditions for the acceptance of ordinary 
description. The ' intimate connection ' that exists between a judgment and 
1 R.M.Hare, ci t. 
a mental state, for which I have until now used the term ' expression ' , can 
be redescribed as the relation of a sentence to its acceptance-condition. 
this 
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And only if/mental stat e is a belief can acceptance-conditions bring truth-
conditions in their train. In the case of ' descriptive ' uses of language 
meaning and justification go hand in hand - we find out the meaning of a 
sentence by finding the conditions for its use, and these conditions will 
become the truth-conditions of the judgment that the sentence is used to 
express. To justify a judgment is to justify its acceptance: in this case 
to justify the belief in which acceptance of the judgment consists. But 
the belief that we justif.y is the belief in the truth of that judgment and 
can be fully identified in terms of the judgment itself. Thl:l truth of the 
judgment justifies both the belief and the sentence ' s use. 
The affective theor,y of aesthetic description argues that the acceptance-
condition of an aesthetic description is not a belief but some other mental 
state which more effectively explains the point of aesthetic description. 
To agree to an aesthetic description is to ' see its point ' , and this ' seeing 
the point' is to be elucidated in terms of some response or experience that 
has yet to be described. Hence aesthetic descriptions do not have truth-
conditions in the strong sense , and to justify them is to justify a response 
or experience and not a belief. This does not mean that aesthetic 
descriptions are merely arbitrary or ' subjective ' having no more validity 
than preferences for certain kinds of food: we must separate the concept of 
objectivity from that of truth, as I shall later argue. 
It is clear that the comparison with aspects does not yet solve the 
problem of aesthetic description: sadness and fatness are not obviously 
aspects ofl the music in the w~ that a battle is an aspect of a picture. In 
order not to beg any quesUons, therefore, I shall say simply that the 
acceptance-condition of an aesthetic description is a response, where this is 
interpreted in the widest possible sense, so as to stand proxy for whatever 
h 
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answer we may finally arrive at . It will only be after considerably 
detailed analysis .that anything more precise will be available to us. 
It follows from the fact that the condition for the sincere acceptance 
of an aesthetic judgment is a response that an aesthetic judgment can only 
be sincerely made by someone who responds to its object in the appropriate 
way. In this case it is perfectly acceptable to describe the judgment, as 
I did earlier , as an expression of the response. Aesthetic description and 
first-order description are contrasted as the expression of response and the 
expression of belief. However, there is an important asymmetry in that the 
aesthetic Iresponse ' , unlike a belief , cannot outlive the presence of its 
object , in the absence of which it must remain only as a disposition , or 
' set ' t to react in a similar way. Whereas a ' descriptive' juQ.gment can be 
the expression of its acceptance-condition in a very real sense - in that it 
is accompanied by the fulfilment of that condition on every occasion of its 
sincere assertion - the aesthetic judgment can be considered as an expression 
only in the slightly at tenuated sense of being a means of putting over some 
state of mind which at the time may exist only in a latent or remembered form. 
Before conclusions, we should note the limits of the parallel with the 
logic of 'understanding ' in ethical judgments, as this is described by 
certain well-known theories. A man understands the ethical use of ' good ' 
( s~) if he shows that he is able to use it to make a moral judgment. What 
is it to make a moral judgment ? To this question many philosophers have 
argued that it is not necessary to give an answer which resembles the answer 
one might give to the question 'V/hat is it to make a factual judgment?' It 
has been variously suggested that a man makes a moral judgment if he prescribes 
1 . 2 
a course ~f action (Hare) , or recommends an attitude (Urmson ) , according to 
1 Hare, cit. 
2 J.O.Urmson, The Emptive Theory of Ethics. 
~ .. · .............................. _______ d 
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some universal rule; or if he commends something, or if he expresses approval 
or disapproval of something, and so on . All these answers are attempts to 
get aw~ from the narrowness of construing utterances which have meaning in 
a language only as expressions of belief. We find out how a man judges 
morally, it is argued, not b,y examining his beliefs, but b.Y examining his 
feelings and behaviour. 
This leads certain moral philosophers to confer on t erms like ' good ' 
and ' right ' a specifically moral sense. It is argued that we require a 
language in which to express our moral attitudes and practical decisions, in 
order that they might be brought within the bounds of practical reason. 
Hence the logic of terms used in ethics must be connected to a special kind of 
speech-act - that of evaluation - which confers on these terms a non-
descriptive sense. Anyone who is to make moral judgments in language must 
therefore learn to understand this special use of terms. In the case of 
aesthetic evaluation it is possible that something similar occurs: the terms 
which are characteristically employed in aesthetic evaluation must borrow 
the evaluative meaning peculiar to this kind of speech-act. At any rate, 
this ~pothesis has as much plausibility as the similar ~pothesis about 
et hical judgment s o: But it is less easy to argue that terms have some 
special kind of meaning when used in aesthetic descriptions, even though 
terms are being employed differently in such descriptions. For we have seen 
that aesthetic uses of terms, like the use of the terms 'fat' and ' lean' in 
Wittgenstein ' s example, must often be construed as derivative. The only 
clear explanation of what the terms mean in their aesthetic use is to be 
given by referring back to their ordinarx use. So we can find no clue in 
the meantng of the term ~s to how we 0 n justify applying it. 
But this does not mean that there is nothing to understanding the 
aesthetic use of terms besides understanding their ordinary use. There is a 
difference between the man who uses a term to make an aesthetic judgment and 
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the man who is simply referring to a relationship of similarity. 1 And there 
is a corresponding difference between the man who knows when a description is 
intended as an aesthetic judgment (the man who, among other things, 
recognises the difference just referred to), and the man who does not. 
The latter will think that aesthetic judgments are misguided similes. Such 
a man understands the form of words that is used in making an aesthetic 
judgment, but does not understand what is being done by the use of this form 
of words. The man who does not understand aesthetic description is the man 
who has no familiarity with the experiences that i t is used to express. 
Our investigation of the l ogic ' of ae sthetic description has , therefore , 
turned full circle. Hoping to define the aesthetic states of mind as those 
which are directed towards a certain group of features , we find that there 
is no access to the notion of a ' feature ' of this kind except through the 
understanding of aesthetic description. But we discover also that aesthetic 
description can itself be understood only in terms of the states of mind which 
it serves to communicate. We must turn, therefore, to an analysis of the so-
called ' responses ' that were invoked as criteria for the acceptance of 
aesthetic jUdgments. Before beginning this analysis, however, it is 
necessary to show that it really is possible to account for the meaning of 
aesthetic descriptions in the way so far attempted. The next chapter will 
therefore consist of a brief digression int o the theory of meaning. 
1 V.G.Santayana, The Sense of Beautl, pp.18- 19. 
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CHAPrER FIVE 
NON-DESCRIPrIVE MEANING 
The last chapter has left an unsolved problem. It was argued that 
aesthetic descriptions need not be descriptions: the condition for their 
acceptance might not be a belief, and hence they may lack truth-conditions. 
It remains to be shown that this supposition can be incorporated into an 
adequate theory of meaning: if it cannot, then we have every reason to 
doubt it. 
There are t wo standard approaches in contemporary philosophy to the 
theory of meaning: through the analysis of speech-acts. and through the 
study of semantics. The concept of meaning is applicable both to what is 
done when words are uttered) and to the structure of the utterance itself: 
the two approaches do no more than reflect this inherent complexity in the 
concept of meaning. 'l'he theory of speech-ants takes its inspiration from 
Austin, but has found its firmest theoretical basis in the work of Grice, 
who analyses what it is for a speaker to mean something in terms of the 
1 intentions that underly his utterance. The semantic approach takes its 
inspiration from Frege, and in fact seems to move away from the theory of 
meaning to what Quine has called the theory of reference : that is, its main 
tendency is to replace questions about meaning with questions about truth. 
To approach the theory of meaning from the point of view of semantic theory 
leads almost inevitably VO a connection between meaning and truth-conditions. 
In fact , although the two views are often presented as rivals , neither 
can be dismissed as superfluous. For the speech-act theory and the semantic 
1 H.P.Grice, "Meaning" , PhiI. Rev. , 1957 , and "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-
meaning , ana. Word-meaning " , in Foundations of Language , 1968 • 
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theory seem to be generalised accounts of answers to two separate questions. 
The first tells us how language has meaning at all , while the second tells 
us how a language is able to convey the infinite number of meanings that 
there are. Unlike the speech-act theory , the semantic theor,y does not 
give an ultimate answer to the question 'What is it for a sentence to have 
meaning? , Rather, it offers a recursive answer to the question 'What 
meaning does any given sentence have?' (where 'sentence' is used in a 
structural sense, to refer to an ordered sequence of linguistic elements ) .1 
We must assume, therefore, that the conclusions of the last chapter 
will fit into either theory. And we can see at once that, from the point 
of view of the theory of speech-acts, the idea of ' non-descriptive meaning' 
present s no genuine difi'icul ty. The essential feature of Grice's theory, 
for example, is the analysis of meaning-that-~ in terms of an intention that 
someone else should believe-that-~. The utterance of '~ ' is accepted or 
agreed to by the man who acquires the right belief. 2 Clearly there is no 
theoretioal difficulty in extending this account to the case where the 
intention is to get another not to believe something but rather to ' see the 
point ' of what one says , in the way that ) in responding appropriately. he 
will ' see the point' of an aesthetic judgment. Thus Grice's theory can 
readily incorporate as part of the meaning of an utterance a specif ication 
of the mental state which is its acceptance-condition, and the condition 
for its sincere assertion. 
It is for this reason that we ha,ve relied, until now, on a speech-act 
analysis of meaning. But in doing so we seem to have evaded the problems 
that the semantic theory is designed to solve. HoVl do we give an account 
of the m~aning of a given sentence ? Surely, on Grice ' s theor,y , meanings 
1 
2 
C1'. J.R.Searle, Speech Acts, ch.1. 
Subsequent emendations have brought about a slight change in this principle 
but it is not a change that affects the point at issue. Cf'. Grice ~ 1968, 
ci t. 
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will be differentiated only in so far as the mental states expressed are 
differentiated. For example, one identifies what a given descriptive 
utterance means by identifying the belief expressed qy it . But how is this 
done? How are beliefs differentiated and identified in a language except 
by reference in turn to the sentences that express them ? Reference to 
belief in a language must employ sentences of oratio obliqua or oratio recta 
form: the belief is identified by the sentenoe in reported speech. But if 
this is so, it is possible to understand which belief is referred to only 
when we have some recursive method that will tell us the meaning of the 
reported sentence. A semantic theory is designed to meet this demand. 
1 Strawson has argued that to approaoh the theory of meaning from the 
standpoint of the theory of truth is not to give any clear alternative to 
the speech-act theory: for the idea of truth leads us straight to the notion 
of the kind of thing that can be true, and this leads us to what is said 
( for it is statements, not sentences, that are the bearers of truth-values) 
and to the content of what is said when utterances are made. And this 
brings us finally to the question of what is done when utterances are made -
which is to be analysed in the kind of way that Grice suggested. But this 
short way with the semantic theory seems to ignore the problem to which the 
theory is addressed, and which cannot be solved by the analysis of speech-
act s. For it is a remarkable fact that sentences in a language can be 
used to express infinitely many thoughts, beliefs 1 truths, or meanings; and 
yet they are built up from a finite vocabulary. Now no merely syntactical 
rules will allow us to sqy when a given string of words is meaningful: from 
the point of view of syntax ' John drank the milk ' and ' The milk drank John ' 
are both ,well-formed. So we could understand the way in which a language 
can be built up out of words only if we could give ~ theory entailing some 
generalisable scheme of the form (A): ~ is ~ if and only if ~ where ~ is a 
1 P.F.Strawson, "Meaning and Truth" , in Losice-Linguistic Papers, pp.177-1 84. 
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structural description of a sentence, .!!! characterises the required property 
of meaningfulness,. and .£ is a proposition stating conditions under which 
this property is accorded to the sentence ~.1 Now the property characterised 
by .!!! is that of acceptability in a language, and Davidson has argued that the 
only plausible schema of form (A) that has .yet been produced - and perhaps 
the only one that could be produced - is Tarski's celebrated T-schema. 2 That 
is, the notion of acceptability employed in (A) is to be explained not in 
terms of meaning but in terms of truth. Ultimately, questions about the 
meaningfulness of a sentence must be settled by finding a distinction between 
ciroumstanoes in whioh it must be agreed to and ciroumstances in which it may 
be denied. We understand a sentence when we know the conditions for its 
truth. Thus tA) becomes (B): ~ is true, if and only if .£. 
If we can generate a theory that entails a schema of this form we will 
be able to relate the truth-conditions of eaoh sentence to those aspects of 
the sentence (the "words ") that can recur in other sentences and there be 
assigned a similar role. For any sentence we will then be able to say, in 
at least one important sense, what meaning it has. This suggests that, in 
the first instance , an explanation of meaning will be of the form '" Snow is 
white' is true if and only if snow is white " . The right hand side , whioh 
is the brief statement of the truth-conditions of the original sentence , can 
then be expanded as theory provides , acoording to how much explanation is 
available, and how mucb explanation is required. 
It would seem at first sight that the suggestion that there might be 
sentences without truth-conditions must inevitably conflict with the semantic 
theory: for how could meanings be ass i gned to such sentences? Davidson 
suggests that this difficulty is only apparent: 
1 
2 
See D.Davidson, "Truth and Meaning" , Synthese, 1967. 
Davidson, cit., and A.Tarski~ "The Concept of Truth in Formalized 
Languages" , in Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics • 
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corresponds in aIly particular case to the more substantial idea of a truth-
condition that was explained in Chapter One. It would seem to follow from 
this that the semantic theory cannot be used to frame the contrast we wish 
to make, between sentences with truth-conditions and sentences without them, 
not because it denies the distinction but because it is a distinction that 
must be made in other terms : for example in terms of the s peech-act theory 
discussed above. 
In fact we cannot escape quite so easily from the problem that seems to 
be posed by the semantic theory. In a sense Davidson ' s answer is entirely 
adequate: from the epistemological point of view, however, it goes against 
the whole tenor of the semantical approach. For the point of Tarski ' s 
theory as applied to the discussion of the concept of meaning, is that there 
is, fundamentally, no difference between the theory of meaning as 
traditionally conceived, and the theory of reference in the Fregean sense: 
the theory of how language makes contact with the world. Knowing the 
meaning of a sent ence is a matter of knowing what it says, that is, knowing 
what information i t conveys, what state of affairs will make it true. And 
we can know what an individual sentence says only if we first know the links 
between the individual words aIld the world: what they refer to or the 
properties they express. 
A speech-act theorist might object that the conveying of information is 
only ~ possible speech-act. How, after all, does the semantic theory make 
sense of such things as questions and commands ? But the semantic theory 
is , arguing in effect , that the use of sentences to convey information - the 
ordinary indicative assertoric form - lS central: it is through understanding 
this use~ that we understand the meanings of individual words. Only if we 
understood this use could we understand the ftu·ther employment of words in 
questions, hlfpotheticals , imperatives and the like. It is only because I 
understaIld what is posited by all assertion that I understand, on the basis 
d 
.'. 
I, 
• 
81 
of l'l\Y familiarity with the imperative mood, what is commanded by a command. 
Moreover, evaluative sentences, like aesthetic descriptions, share the 
surface-structure of information-bearing sentences, and are therefore in some 
sense a semantic anomaly (unlike commands, whose deviant acceptance-
condition accompanies a distinct grammatical form). For this surface-
structure enables them to pass the first gate of Tarski ' s schema, after which 
they seem to wonder unattached in a semantic theory whose interpretation 
makes no place for them. 
Finally? we should bear in mind that , once an assertoric s entence is 
included under Tarski' s schema , then the theory of truth-functions can be 
invoked to explain its logical behaviour in more complex utt erances. The 
semantic theory showB us how we can understand conditionals, in a w~ that 
takes for granted that sentences occurring in conditionals have conditions 
for their truth. For if to understand '~ ' and to understand '~ ' is to know 
their truth-conditions, then the understanding of at least the material 
implication .E"::::> .9. follows immediately from an understanding of its components. 
The truth-condition of the complex sentence is given by a simple function of 
the truth-conditions of its component parts. (This is not to say that ' if ' 
in ordina.ry language means exactly what , ~ , means, though it is an 
argument for sa~ing that there is a model for the meaning of ' if ' that can be 
incorporated into semantic theory). But here we have the basis for the most 
popular objection to the idea of non-descriptive meaning. For how does this 
explanation of conditionals apply when one or the other of '.E' or 's' lacks a 
truth-condition in the realistic sense? How do we learn and understand the 
conditional structure in such cases? 
From the point of view of speech-acts , we might put the objection as 
follows: If we say of an adjective that it is characteristically used to 
perform a certain speech-act, defined, let us suppose , by a certain acceptance-
condition , and that this explains its meaning in assertoric contexts , then 
d 
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this fact ought also to explain its meaning in the protasis of a 
conditional ( for example , in ' If she is good , then she is happy ' , or in 
IIf the music is sad , then Alfred will walloVl in it I). But how can these 
terms ,' good l and Isad ') be performing their standard speech-acts in this 
context, where from the very nature of conditional assertions ~ their 
acceptance-condition cannot be i. iincorporated as a part of the acceptance-
1 
condition of the sentence as a whole ? This seems to suggest that the 
meaning of a sent ence can only be explained semantically, and that 
acceptance-conditions cannot directly influence meaning. In particular, 
they cannot make meaning ' non-descriptive t , unless they also bring about 
the kind of deviant grammatical form to which concepts like truth can no 
longer be applied. 
However, we must be careful not to confound the substantial sense in 
which a sentence may lack truth-conditions, despite an indicative and 
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assertoric form , with the merely formal sense in which such a sentence must 
have a truth-condition , on account of its position in the language. Because 
moral and aesthetic judgments have an indicative and assertoric form , then 
they can be incorporated into a semantic theory , as Davidson suggests1 along 
with all other indicative sentences. But once they have been fitted into 
the language in this way, then it is inevitable that they should borrow the 
logical transformations of description. This consequence will follow 
whether or not the assertoric use of moral and aesthetic judgments has truth-
conditions: the real question is not how it is possible for such judgments to 
fit into the language as quasi-descriptions, but rather what is the point of 
their doing so. What purpose does it serve that moral and aesthetic 
judgment~ have the fully propositional form of ordinary descriptions? How , 
does our understanding of them extend to their use in complex sentences ? 
This is a quest i on for which answers have already been sugge st ed in the case 
1 J.R.Searle , Speech Acts ) p.138. 
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of moral judgments. 1 In Chapter Nine I shall point to various facts which 
provide an answer for aesthetic judgments too. 
The problem about conditionals arises, I think, because it is assumed 
that the logical basis of conditional argument can be displ~ed piecemeal , 
for each particular example. Thus it is assumed that , for any proposition 
of the form tIf ~ then S f , it ought to be possible to s~y ~ is being 
Qypothesised in the protasis. But clearly , if the relation of non-
descriptive sentences to the truth-schema has the merely formal character 
that we have suggested , this question will, for such sentences , have no 
answer . To explain the behaviour of such sentences in conditionals we can 
only point to the central case of descriptive sentences , where the general 
theory of truth-conditions has its epistemological basis. 
This last point can be brought home by an example. Suppose t hat a 
natural language is in use, with a proper division of parts of speech, and 
a grammar for descriptive utterances that satisfies the normal conditions of 
adequacy, including the condition that it should be possible to formulate 
a schema corresponding to (B) above. It will be pos sible to incorporate 
into this language new expressions that lack criteria, by referring only to 
the conditions for the acceptance of sentences ~ and not to the conditions 
for their truth. For example, I might introduce the adjective ' nuff I as 
follows: ' Call a thing "nuff" only if it . has some quality which attracts you 
to it ' . The acceptance-condition of ' X is nuff ' is incorporated into this 
rule: the judgment is accepted by a mam ,who is attracted to X ~ on the basis 
of some quality that X possesses. The rule gives a clear account of what 
it is to agree or disagree about the nuffness of a thing, and nothing about 
the rule prevents the word t nuff ' from having a normal position in the 
language - that of an adjective, tied to sentences of propositional form. 
1 See, for example, J.E.J.Altham, "Evaluation and Speech" , in John Casey 
(ed.), Morality and Moral Reasoning • 
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Nor does the rule allow ' X is nuff' to collapse into ' I like X' ~ since the 
acceptance-condition s of these two judgments will be entirely different. 
I can agree to one and not to the other (except in the ' degenerate ' case 
where I utter both myself). There could be no first-person sentence about 
a mental state that shared the acceptance-condition of the sentence ' X is 
nuff ' , since to agree i n this judgment is to adopt an attitude and not a 
belief. Nor does this mean that the attitude must be expressed whenever 
the judgment is made. 'rhe acceptance-condition makes intelligible the 
extension of the use of 'nuff ' to the expression of opinion at second-hand: 
I may remark that a man is ' said to be nuff', and so on. Once the 
acceptance-condition is clear such usages become comprehensible in terms of 
the structure of language as a whole. The mature user of the language may 
also find that he has a use for the extension of ' nuff' into complex 
sen tences ~ such as Qypotheticals and disjunctions. Wonderin g whether I 
shall enjoy a meeting with X I say to myself ' If he is nuff then everything 
will go very we1l ' , and so on. To use the adjective in this way will show 
as much understapding as the mastery of its assertoric use. 
Note that this example begins from a language to which the truth-schema 
is already applicable. We assume from the start that it is possible to 
introduce the word ' nuff ' in this way, rather as we introduce the Vlord 'nice ' 
into our own way of talking. Given this assumption, then an explanation of 
the fact that an adjective can suffer certain t~an8formations without change 
of meaning is simply an explanation of the fact that adjectives have the 
logical and grammatical place that they have. It is an independent question 
what speech-act the assertoric use of an adjective performs, and hence an 
open question whether the adjective has criteria in any stronger sense than 
~ 
simply being incorporated into the language as an adjective. 
This might suggest that judgments without truth-conditions must be 
incorporated into a language piecemeal, on t,he basis of a prior understanding 
of the language as a whole • And it might also suggest that , once a judgment 
," 
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is incorporated in this w~~ it will have a permanent and inevitable 
tendency to acquire truth-conditions, as indeed ethical judgments seem to 
have. Nonetheless, it also shows that the semantic theory, llice the 
speech-act theory, cannot be used to demonstrate the impossibility of non-
descriptive meaning in aesthetic judgment. Moreover if it is asked how we 
explain the place of aesthetic judgments in language as a whole, then an 
explanation is available which compl etely by-passes all the difficulties 
that I have, for the sake of completeness , been raising. VIe need answer 
only that words like ' sad ' , ' expressive ' , ' heavy ' , ' fat t and so on already 
have a use outside aesthetic judgment, a use that is governed by truth-
conditions, which provides an explanation of their place in ae sthetic 
judgment, and which fits without strain into a semantic theory. Since 
we are supposing that this use is logically prior, and explains the place 
of the terms i n,., th language as a whole t then we do not have to ask 
ourselves how we can derive from an analysis of the speech-act of aesthetic 
judgment the propositional structure of the utterances that express it. 
The propositional structure is derived from the primary employment OI' the 
terms involved. 
There are individual judgments, however , which still need to be 
accounted for. 'l'hese are the judgments that do not employ terms in an 
extended sense, and yet which nonetheless have the kind of propositional 
form that the semantic theory stipUlates: judgments such as ' Her dress is 
elegant', ' His style is beautiful ' , ' The play was moving ' . I wish to 
argue that there is a sense in which many of these judgments also lack 
truth- conditions, and I shall rely on the previous explanation of how such a 
thing is po.,ssible. It is a separate question, however , and one to which I 
shall return , why the propositional form of these sentences is useful. 
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CHAPrER SIX 
RECOGNITION AND RESPONSE 
I have suggested that we should attempt to explain aesthetic 
description in terms of the condition for its acceptance rather than the 
condition for its truth. This acceptance-condition will vary from case 
to case, and there may be no one category of mental state to which all 
such acceptance-conditions must belong. But at least there are certain 
central examples of aesthetic description - those employing emotion tern~ 
and terms of comparison - for which it is plausible to suggest that the 
condition for their acceptance is not a belief but some other mental 
state, which, for the sake of argument I have described as a response. 
If it is possible to characterise this response, and if it is possible to 
discover certain features in virtue of which we might wish to describe it 
as aesthetic. then we will have at least begun our task of describing the 
general conditions of aesthetic interest. In this chapter I shall 
-, 
examine certain arguments that seem to suggest that the whole enterprise of 
explaining aesthetic judgment in this way is radically confused. 
If we were to concentrate only on those aesthetic descriptions 
employing 'affective' terms then of course the task of describing 
acceptance-condit ~ons would present no difficulties. To find something 
moving is (in the appropriate ciI'cumstances) to be moved by it, and so on. 
Judgments employing affective terms fit well into any account of non-
descriptive meaning, for they already name the response involved in their 
acceptance. But it is for precisely this reason that they will be of 
little help in the present investigation. for the responses named by 
, 
affective terms are nameable only because of their generality. They are 
easily recognisable, and commonly referred to,and it would be abSUrd to 
argue that there is anything aesthetic about them: one can be moved, 
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excited and depressed by many things besides works of art. What makes 
being moved into an 'aesthetic' experience lies in other features of the 
case, features which must be described independently. Of tjourse, it is 
no accident that the affective terms plqy such an important part in 
criticism: given what has been already said, this should only be expected. 
For present purposes it is more instructive, then , to concentrate on 
other examples of aesthetic description - those employing emotion t erms, and 
terms of comparison. These descriptions will serve to indicate more 
directly where the problems of an 'affective' theory of aesthetic 
description lie . Even here we must acknowledge that there are non-
aesthetic uses of the terms involved which are also "extended" uses in the 
sense of Chapter Four. However there are reasons, which will become 
apparent in time, for thinking that the acceptance-conditions of this kind 
of judgment are in general more closely connected with aesthetic experience 
than are the conditions for the acceptance of judgments involving affective 
terms. 
How do we describe the acceptance of the lfudgment that a piece of 
music or a play is sad ? I have argued that there are at least two uses 
of the term 'sad ', one in describing a state of mind , the other in 
expressing a state of mind. But I have also argued, in criticising the 
normative view of aesthetic description, that the state of mind described 
in one use is not in general the same as that expressed in the other. 
It is not because the music makes me feel sad that I call it sad - 'sad' 
does not mean ' saddening '. How then do we come to use the one term in 
these different ways ? What explains its new use in aesthetic and quasi-
asethetic description ? It is undeniable that we do not have to learn the 
< 
new use: it is quite natural to acquire it, indeed it is given along with 
the primary meaning of the term. This fact alone serves to lay severe 
restrictions on the I response t that we must attempt to describe • 
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A simple answer to the question would be this: when I find a work of 
art sad, or see it as sad, I am responding to it in some way like the wqy 
that I respond (under certain specifiable conditions) to sadness (to the 
sadness of a human being). It is because I respond to each in a similar 
way that I use the same term of each , and this response is the condition 
for the acceptance of the aesthetic description. To see the work of art 
as sad is, therefore, not simply, and perhaps not even, to see a resemblance 
between the work ana the phenomena of sadness - not even a 'dynamic' 
resemblance, or resemblance of 'logical form'. I use the term ' sad' 
spontaneously to describe all those objects that elicit in me responses 
analogous to my response to human sadness, and it is this that explains why 
I do not have to learn any new meaning for the term ' sad' in order to be 
disposed to use it, and understand it, in this extended sense. In other 
words to find a \'Iork of art sad is to respond to it in the way I respond to 
a man when I am 'touched' by his sadness. 
Such a theory is by no means uncommon - it is implicit both in certain 
works of phenomenology, as well as in a great deal of standard empiricist 
1 thought about metaphor. The tbeory of 'empathy' can be seen as an elabora-
tion of this view of aesthetic experience ~ and even Collingwood , in his quasi-
idealist aes thetics , makes room for it, with the distinction between literal 
and emotional representation. 2 When a portrait is said to be ' like ' 
the sitter , what is meant ~ according to Collingwood , is that the spectator , 
looking at the portrait! 'feels as if' he were in the presence of the 
si her. Thus representation becomes detached from resemblance, and 
approaches the status of expression: "The pianoforte accompaniment of 
Brahms ' s song Feldeinsamkeit does not make noises in the least degree 
" 
1 
2 
Thus we find that thinkers as diverse as Ingarden and I.A.Richards both 
subscribe to a form of this theory: v. R.Ingarden, "Aesthetic Experience 
and Aesthetic Object " , Phil. & Phen. Res., 1961 , p.3u5; and I.A.Richards, 
Practical Criticism, p.221. 
Principles of Art, pp.52-56. 
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resembling those heard Qy a man lying in deep grass on a summer ' s dqy and 
watching the clouds drift across the sky; but it does make noises which 
evoke feelings remarkably like that which a man f eels on such an occasion" 
(Note: cit., p . 56 ). It is perhaps unfair to quote Collingwood in this 
context, since he would not have endorsed the suggestion that the response 
evoked by a work of art, when an object of aesthetic interest, could be 
de scribed independently. But i t is interesting to find him r epeating a 
sentiment t at was accepted long before Express ionism would even have been 
considered intelligible as a view of the nature of art. "The Imlsician ' s 
art does not consist in direat ly painting objects, but rather in putt ing 
the hearer ' s soul in a disposition similar to that in which it would be 
put by their presence " (F.Couperin , L' art de Toucher au ClaveQin). 
Before considering the objections to this kind of theory it is 
important to note what it does not. say. For a start nothing definite has 
been said about the nature of the ' response' in question - all that has 
been implied is that it is not a belief. Despite the traditional account 
in terms of ' feelings ' it is certainly not true that in giving an affective 
theory of aesthetic description, we are forced to account for the 
appreciation of art in entirely emotional terms. As yet we do not know 
to which category of mental state the aesthetic responses belong. 
Consequently it cannot be objected to the affective theory that it is 
impossible to extend it beyond the example of terms such as ' sad ' which 
name a feature that might be the object of some emotional reaction. I 
have mentioned Wittgenste in' s example of the description of the days of the 
week as ' fat ' or ' lean ' . Some one might at once ob ject "What is the 
response of which ' fat ' is the expression ?" 
~ 
How could there be such a 
thing as a response to fatness ? Here one might have recourse to the 
traditional empiricist idea of an association. Metaphors do not simply 
refer to analogies, it might be said, they are also charged with associations. 
Thus to show the part played by judgments of comparison in criticism is 
,I, 
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simply to show the importance of association in the appreciation of art. 1 
The temptation is to say that I am not merely associating fatness and 
Wednesday in the judgment that I make (although of course this is trivially 
true); I am also expre ssing an association of the two ideas. Certainly t if 
there is anything to ~ judgment that Wednesday is fat, anything that you 
could understand in it, other than the mere fact that I am disposed to say 
this peculiar thing, than it is not to be found in analogies: there are not, 
and could not be, analogies of sufficient importance. This is not to say 
that the judgment that Wedne sday is fat describes associations; rather, that 
associa.ti ons may well ent er int 0 the response thilt constitutes accept ance of 
t he judgment. 
In other words, emotion t erms and comparison terms present exa.ctly 
the same problem, and if an aff ective theory is an answer for one of them, 
it will be an answer for the other as well. But how do we begin to say 
anything more than what has been said so f ar? How do we give content to 
the extremely simple theory that to see a wor e of art as sad is to respond 
to it in the way one responds to a man when touched by his sadness ? 
Just to refer to a response is inadequate , for this tells us nothing 
about "l the particular conditions of aesthetic experience and judgment. 
The example of Wednesday, for instance, is certainly not an aesthetic 
judgment as it stands. If it is an aesthetic judgment to describe the 
music of Brahms as fat, then this is presumably because the description is 
being used to express a response that itself has an aesthetic character. 
But what is this response like ? The affective theory must necessarily be 
empty unless we can provide an independent description of the response in 
1 Associationist theories are the stock in trade of classical criticism of 
abstract art-forms, as is exemplif ied for example, by Addison ' s essays, 
"The Pleasures of the Imagination" , Spectator, 171 2, and other works 
cited in the first chapter of Peter Collins ' Changing Ideal s in Modern 
Architecture. 
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which the acceptance of an aesthetic judgment consists - a description of 
the response independently of the supposed ' aesthetic qualities ' of its 
object. But immediately we encounter certain quasi-idealist objections 
that seem to imply that this whole enterprise of independent description is 
the outcome of confusion. In giving a vague description of an aesthetic 
'response ' it is possible to set up a plausible affective theory. But if 
we attempt to say anything more than we have already said then we are 
immediately involved in certain familiar paradoxes arising from the 
supposition that the experience of art can be characterised independently 
of its object. 
First there is the following objection. We have spoken of a response 
to a work of art which is in itself the 'recognition ' of the sadness of the 
work. But responses are intent ional: they are directed towards their 
objects, and certain very important features follow from this feature of 
' directedness ' . In general we may say that if responses are intentional it 
is because , unlike mere reflex reactions , they involve an awareness and 
understanding of -- their objects. As a result responses must be founded on 
a certain conception of their object ,a conception that mayor may not 
correspond to reality). We might say , without too much distortion of 
current usage, that this conception defines the "intentional object " of the 
response . Hence, in referring to a kind of response, we must also be 
referring to a kind of awareness that this response involves. In other 
words, if a response belongs to some kind K, then it must involve thoughts 
and judgment s characteristic of K. It seems to be a necessary truth, 
therefore, that the objects of responses of kind K are seen under a certain 
description: they are thought to possess some property or set of properties 
characteristic of K. We might put this point by saying that the intentional 
object of this kind of response must possess a oertain feature, and we could 
1 
call this feature , adapting a usage of Kenny's, the ' formal object' of the 
1 Action, Emotion and Will, p.189. 
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response . For example, that which is feared is thought to be harmful ( so 
that the intentional object of fear is ' something harmful ') . That which 
is envied is thought to be desirable, that which is despised is thought to 
be a weakness, that which is regretted is thought to be bad. And so on. 
In classifying intentional states of mind we find that we are also identifying 
certain qualities of their intentional objects ,that is , certain qualit ies 
that their material objects are thought to possess). 
It will be immediately concluded from this argument that in classifying 
together ~ response to human sadness and my response to a sad piece of music 
I have already assumed some quality thought to be in common to their objects. 
And what can this quality be if not their sadness? Hence a man can only 
be said to respond in the way we have in mind if it can be shown that he has 
noticed this quality of sadness, which suggests that we need independent 
grounds for saying that a man has seen the sadness of' the work: grounds 
independent 01' his r esponse. "Seeing the sadness " cannot, therefore, be 
analysed in terms of the response, on pain of circularity. Moreover, we 
"-
seem to be driven to the conclusion that aesthetic appreciation is, after 
all, entirely cognitive, and that aesthetic features are genuine properties 
of their objects. 
It might seem that this argument gains in plausibility from the fact 
that the only description so far offered of the response of ' recognising 
sadness ' is in terms of the quality of sadness that belongs to at least 
one of its objects. The response is defined in terms of the sadness of its 
' primary ' object. How then, can we avoid the charge that the affective 
theory of aesthetic de scription is merely trivial, as the objection from 
intent~onality suggests? 
If the argument from intentionality is, as so far stated, simply a 
statement of the prinCiples on which we classi~ responses, it is in fact 
not sufficiently strong to entail the sceptical conclusion just referred to. 
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For it does not entail that in classifying a response as that felt towards 
human sadness we are classifying all the possible objects of this response 
as independently sad. It may be necessary for the moment to identify the 
response in terms of one of its objects, but it does not follow that, if 
the kind of response corresponds to a kind of object, then the kind of 
object is given precisely by this one example. There is no reason wQy 
our classifications of objects and of responses should not cut across one 
another. 
However , the objection can be re-stated in a more powerful form. It 
could be argued that emotions,_ for example, and responses in general , 
acquire formal objects in that they are founded on beliefs or judgments. 
It is because I think that something is harmful that I am afraid of it, and 
so on. Thus the formal object seems to result from a belief or judgment on 
which the mental state is founded. I believe that an object possesses a 
certain quality of harmfulness, and ~ fear both grows out of this belief 
and depends on it. Without this belief my state of mind would not be 
described as fear but rather as anxiety or dread. The quality of harmful-
ness is thus bound up with the emotion of fear. Fear might be described as 
a way of believing something to be harmful. 
The defender of the affective theory immediately has to face a dilemma. 
He wishes to say that I find a piece of music sad if I respond to it in a 
way that is either the same as, or at least resembles, the way I respond 
when I am touched b,y human sadness. Let us call ~ response to human 
sadness R. Then plainly R is founded on, grows out of , the belief t h t i t s 
object is sad. N~I either this belief is to be considered as partly 
definitive of R (so that sadness is the formal object of RL or it is not. 
'i 
If it is considered as definitive of R then it must recur whenever R recurs -
in particular it must recur when the object of R is not a man but $ say , a 
symphony. From which it would follow that a symphony can be thought to be 
sad in exactly the way that a man is thought to be sad ~ so that the 
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'recognition of sadness' in aesthetic experience is a matter of belief t and 
sadness is the common quality that we are already familiar with. If on the 
other hand the belief is not considered as partly definitive of R - if R can 
recur without it - then in what sense is it an important fact about R that 
it is directed towards human sadness, and by what right do we call its 
recurrence, in another context, the recognition of the sadness of its object 1 
This objection is, it seems to me, extremely powerful. It forces us to 
retreat from all the traditional theories of the place of feeling in art, and 
it determines the description of the acceptance-condition of aesthetic 
judgment in a \'la;[ that most traditional empiricist theories of mind are 
unable to follow. Only in the context of a theory of imagination - such as 
I shall suggest in the next chapter - can the solution to this dilemma be 
found. First however we must rebut the suggestion that the intentionality 
of a mental state arises only through judgment or belief. To suggest that 
intent~onality arises only in this w~ is to force the totality of mental 
states into too rigid a mould. While I must believe that the lion I see is 
harmful in order, to be afraid of it, what must I believe about a situation 
if I am to be amused by it? To say 'something, but nothing definite' is 
to give no answer at all. It might be said that at least the object of IDlf 
amusement must be thought to exist: but even this is wrong. I can be 
amused by somet hing entirely imaginary. Indeed, amusement is just one among 
many states of mind - horror is another - that can exist with entirely 
imaginary objects. They may exist, that is, as responses to the scenes 
that a man calls up in his imagination. Such mental states are not, 
therefore, founded on belief or judgment at all. The activity of imagination 
is - as I shall argue - essentially contrasted with belief. 
Thus we might compare my response to a man who I think to be sad, with 
~ response to the imagined spectacle of such a man. In imagining the man 
I certainly "respond" in some w~: that is, lIlY image or thought gives rise to 
certain states of mind analogous, perhaps, to those aroused by the spectacle 
~"'~""",,,,""""""""""" __________ "'1 
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of genuine sadness. 
'l'he defender of the affective 'theory must, then, argue that nw response 
to sad music is not founded on belief in the sadness of its object, and 
hence does not have a forw3l object of the kind already described. The 
empiricist must argue that nw response is founded in some other w~, as 
amusement is founded in another w~, a Vf~ that allows it to exist 
independently of any belief about the presence or nature of its object. 
In other words, we must argue that the response in question is founded not on 
belief but on some other kind of thought, a thought that does not involve the 
attribution of some quality to an existing thing. Such thoughts are 
characteristic of imagination, and if we are to describe ' aesthetic ' reactions 
without mentioning any 'formal ' object, we must have recourse to the theory 
of imagination. My response to a work of art involves a distinct order of 
intentionality, derived from imagination and divorced from belief and 
judgment. Indeed, it m~ be that the word 'response ' is already 
tendentious as a description of this state of mind. For it seems to imply 
something emotional , while it may well be the case that the recognition of 
sadness in a work of art involves nothing emotional at all. 
The objection from intentionality is just one aspect of the protest 
against the w~ in which the distinction between belief and non-cognitive 
states of mj,nd has been formulated: as though the coritrast between belief and 
the aesthetic re sponses can be made only by appealing to emotion. This is 
certainly the way that empiricists - when forced to abandon the idea of 
aesthetic perception - have tended to think about art: as though it sun~oned 
up a wealth of feelings that we could readily describe, and as though these 
feelings w~re quite unproblematically separable from the awareness and 
judgment of their object. This goes completely against our deep conviction 
that art is a means for the control of emotion, a means of converting feeling 
into directed thought. 
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It is important to realise that the intellectual content of aestheUc 
experiences may be so pronounced that any talk of I emotion t seems out of 
place. Works of art are highly deliberate and complex ob j ects, and 
considerable understanding may be required if we are to grasp their 
meaning. Aesthetic experiences must therefore include a large element 
of intellectual understanding, and hence will have a more than contingent 
connection with verbal expression. One way to show that one sees a work 
of art under a description ( such as ' sad ' ) is to produce the description 
itself. The verbal expression of a response is, typically, a description 
that is held to justif,y the response , and frequently justification consists 
in making comparisons - I show that a poem is tender by comparing it with 
expressions of tenderness. In other words, the verbal expression of a 
response may well consist in a pattern of reasoned justification , rather 
like the justification of a factual judgment. And the judgment tends to 
rest on comparisons, like the justification of the judgment that ascribes a 
property. For example, take the following passage from a Schubert sonata: 
-I~ may argue that this passage has an outward-looking, brightening movement, 
despite the sinking and lassitudinous line of the melody . And I may 
justify this ' aesthetic ' description by making certain comparisons. The 
bass, for ~example, leads the harmony onwards, through the unaffirmed keys 
of F and B flat, and this bold gesture seems to counteract the sinking of the 
melody onto the mediant of E flat. If someone notices this feature of the 
bass line, he is more likely to agree to the aesthetic description: the 
r 
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character of the passage will change for him. It is as though, in 
describing the relationship of the work of art to other things (for example, 
to the w~ the boldness of one gesture may count eract the weakness of 
another ) , one were trying to show that the work possessed some property in 
common with those other things. Reference to a 'response ' seems entirely 
inappropriate, simply because it seems to ignore the evident intellectuality 
of the aesthetic judgment. What is interesting about aesthetic experience 
is as we shall see, not the ' response ' in its entirety, but rather the 
thought which lies at its heart. I. 
But having got this far , we find yet another argument against the 
possibility of producing an independent description of an aesthetic experience. 
This objection points t o ~nother logical relation, but not that between a 
response and its formal object; rather that between a response and its 
expression. 'l'he argument, familiar from Croce and Collingwood, m~ be 
given in the following form: A mental state and its expression are not 
separately identifiable, so that when I say that a work of art expresses a 
particular feeling, for example, I am not asserting that there is a relation 
between the work of art and something else. Likewise, when I s~ that 
someone understands the particular feeling of a work of art (its particular 
quality of sadness, s~) ! then there ca~ be no expression of this understand-
ing other than a close attention to ; or involvement wi th ~ that particular 
work of art. Any other way of identifying the feeling would have the 
consequence that the work of art, which is the expression of this understand-
ing~ is only contingently connected with it. Any generalised description of 
the response, that would allow us to s~ that it could be felt towards some 
other work of art, would not be a description of what it is to grasp or 
understand the emotional qua~ity of that particular work of art, and hence 
would not be a description of anything that could be called recognising the 
work ' s aesthetic quality. 
This objection is very close in spirit to the objection from intentional-
," 
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ity, and occurs in many variants. Perhaps the most impressive statement 
of it is due to Collingwood,1 who argued that there must be a distinction of 
kind between art and craft. For art is an end, not a means, and can only 
be appreciated as an autonomous activity with no rationale external to 
itself. It does not, for example, refer beyond itself, to objects or 
states of mind that are separately identifiable. Nor is it an expression 
of any state of mind that is already identified, since expression in such a 
case would have an external end, namely, the expression of that identifiable 
state of mind. In so far as expression occurs in art it is essentially 
opposed to description: it gives us the particularity and not the generality 
of states of mind. In a similar way, we may argue that our feelings 
towards art find their principle and central expression in the appreciation 
of art, and cannot be identified separately . Extended in this way, the 
objection argues from the necessary connection between response and expression 
to a necessary connection between response and object, exactly as the 
previous objection, and so arrives at a similar conclusion. But its tenor 
is in fact very different, since it is based on the view that to attempt an 
independent description of aesthetic appreciation is in fact t o mistake the 
whole nature of appreciation. Appreciation is essentially tied to the 
particular circumstances in which it finds expression . Wittgenstein, 
rehearsing the objection, argues somewhat as follows: If someone says that 
a work of art expresses a feeling of a certain kind, then this suggests that 
we could identify and describe the feeling in question. But if t his were 
so, we could think of some other way of expressing the feeling which would 
serve just as well. But this would permit an experimental approach to 
works of art, which is quite different from our present and accepted modes 
of aesthetic inteI"Elstl: we do not look beyond the music to something that 
1 Principles of Art, ch.2. 
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1 the music is not. In a similar w~, to think that the experience of music 
can be independently described, to think that it is a replica of some other 
experience, is to give the music itself a purely instrumental role in 
appreciation. 
At the heart of this objection lies a quibble about identity that needs 
2 to be exposed. It is quite possible to choose a very strong criterion of 
identity for mental states, such that no two instances are regarded as 
instances of the same state unless their expressions are absolutely 
identical. 'rhus when I say that the particular feeling expressed by 
Tchaikovsky ' s Sixth Symphony is not identical with the particular feeling 
expressed by the Kindertotenlieder, what I say can be construed as an 
analyt ic truth. The plausibility of the Crocean argument given above 
hangs on a sense of the term ' particular' that masks the trivi ality of this 
analytic truth. As Wittgenstein points out,3 the term ' particular' has an 
intransitive and a transitive use. When I say that the first movement of 
Tchaikovsky's Sixth Symphony expresses a particular feeling, or that I react 
towards it in a ~particular Via;[, then I might be using the term IOparticul ar ' 
intransitively , so as to forbid the question 'What feeling? ' or ' What way? '. 
In this sense ' particular ' means soroothing like 'peculiar'~ and is being 
used simply to enforce the strong criterion of identity to which mental 
states are susceptible. On the other hand , when I wish not merely to refer 
to a mental state but also to describe it, then I might say that it is a 
particular feeling, or a particular response, in a t ransitive sense - so as 
----------------.------------------~----------
1 
2 
3 
4 
Collingwood: £it., pp.29-36. Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations on 
AestheticsL-~tc., pp.28ff., esp. pp.34-36, and Brown Book, pp.177-e. 
Cf. R.Wollheim, Art and Its Objects , seo.48. 
Brown Book, p.15eff. 
Cf. Collingwo od, cit., p.113: "this quite peculiar anger". 
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to allow the question 'What feeling (response)? t • Here the word ' particular ' 
stands proxy for a generic description that I have not yet produced. That 
there is also an intransitive sense of 'paPticular' does not prove that 
there is no wqy of describing feelings referred to by means of this 
intransitive locution; it means only that the speaker does not intend to 
EJve any further description. He has identified the feeling he wishes to 
refer to as the particular feeling expressed by (or felt in response to) 
Tchaikovsky's Sixth Symphony. This, for him , is its most important 
feature - it is this particular expression that he wishes to draw attention to. 
But while the objection can be circumnavigated in this wqy , it leaves us 
with a puzzle. For it is undeniable that in referring to the feelings that 
are supposedly expressed by art. and to the feelings that art supposedly 
arouses, we very often do use this intransitive locution. And the fact 
that we do so is not merely contingently connected with the fact that we 
appreoiate works of art as we do. It' we were always describing the 
feelings that are aroused in us by works of art then this would be an 
expression of the fact that we appreciate art as a means for arousing those 
feelings. But this goes against the intuition that, in general , we do not 
appreciate art as a means at all. This is the principal reason why 
philosophers, from Kant to the present day, have wished to deny that there 
is a place for feeling in our response to art. If' we think of art simply 
as a means to rousing emotion. then the best art is presumably that which 
arouses the most emotion of the appropriate kind. But it is objected that 
the use of art as a m.eans t'or arousing emotion in this sense is a perverted 
use , and the whole f ailing of sentimental art is that it employs whatever 
means ~re available for the end of feeling. Such art interests us only 
in our own emotions and not in their aesthetio object. 1 Surely, it 
is argued , aesthetic appreciation is not like this? Or if it is , then 
it is a far less interesting phenomenon than we had imagined . Appreciation, 
1 
Cf. F.R.Leavis , "Thought and Emotional Quality" , Scrutiny, voleXIII, 1945. 
on this account, reduces to intoxication, and the value of art is of no 
different order from the value of certain drugs. (Cf. Collingwood, cit., 
p.34) • The evaluation of art becomes an instrumental procedure t based on 
the investigation of its causal relation to certain feelings. No work of 
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art will be regarded as having any relation to human psychology higher than 
that of pornographY or journalism. 
The objection to the place of a ' response ' in appreciation is thus 
part of a whole tradition of aesthetic thought, beginning with Kant ' s attack 
on the place of ' interest ' , and reaching into the present century with 
Croce ' s dismissal of the estetica del simpatico and Collingwood ' s critique 
of t magic art ' . It goes with a justified contempt for a cert ain view of 
aesthetic appreciation \ a view encouraged by standard empiricist theories 
of mind) ana exists alongside the attempt to define appreciation as a self-
subsistent realm of mental life t whose values , and whose place in human 
experience : can be independently defined. To think of aesthetic appreciation 
in terms of a response seems to involve falling into an old fallacy, the 
fallacy of reducing aesthetic interest to some other and more commonplace 
exemplar. Combined with this fallacy are many other errors: the confusion 
of means and ends, of feelings and thoughts, of causes and objects (for on 
this view what is interesting about a work of art is not its status as the 
object of a certain feeling, but rather its status as the feeling ' s cause). 
1 And so on. 
Once the presuppositions of this objection have been revealed, we find 
ourselves bound to agree with them. What Vie must d0ubt, however, is the 
conclusion that therefore aesthetic experiences simply cannot be 
independently described. We will answer the objections if we can describe 
some response or experience that is essentially bound up Vii th the perception 
of its object - in the way, perhaps that the perception of an aspect already 
1 Cf. John Casey, The Language of Criticism, passim . 
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involves the perception of the thing that ' contains ' it. Aesthetic responses, 
I shall argue , are modes of interest in the object as perceived J and must be 
described partly in terms of a perceptual experience. In showing t hi s t I 
shall have gone part of the way towards analysing what it means to say that 
aesthetic interest is interest in an object for its own sake. For we will 
be in a position to see how the fact that aesthetic responses can be 
cl as si fied int 0 kinds, and hence referred to, independen tly of the ir 
l material ) objects, is nonetheless compatible with their involving an 
appreciati on of the particular objects to which they are directed. 
One thing that emerges from this discussion is that there seems to be 
li ttle point in saying that a work of art expresses a particular feeling, 
when one intends the term ' particular ' intransitively. Similarly there is 
little point in saying that a work of art awakens in one. a particular 
response, when one intends the term ' particular ' in this way. And for the 
most part we do use the term in this way when discussing works of art, simply 
because we wish to draw attention to the object, rather than to any feeling 
or response that could be independently described. And it is this above 
all that suggests that the attempt to describe such a response is both 
futile and irrelevant to aesthetics. 
The suggestion that I wish to develop - in the face of this objection 
is that it is, after all, both possible and interesting to describe the 
acceptance-conditions of certain aesthetic judgments, in such a way as to 
distinguish them from beliefs. It is certainly true that traditional 
empiricist theories of mind have made the task of describing such ' responses ' 
extremely difficult. This is partly because they supposed that the 
distin'ction between cognitive and non-cognitive states of mind is intuitive 
and obvious, and partly because of their Cartesian assumptions about mental 
states in general - that they can be distinguished by direct " introspection", 
independently of any knowledge of their outward expression. Vie have 
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rejected these asswoptions. If we are to elucidate the nature of aesthetic 
responses therefore, we should look deeper; in particular we should examine 
the distinction between cognitive states of mind - such as belief - and non-
cognitive states, such as the mental phenomena grouped under the head of 
imagination. It is to the subject of the imagination) therefore , that we 
now must turn. 
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CHAPrER SEVEN 
THE IMAGINATION 
In previous chapters I have taken the concept of belief for granted, 
and the time has come to say something definite about it. It might be 
objected that in proposing a contrast between indicative sentences that 
express beliefs and indicative sentences that do not, I have implied that 
beliefs can be identified independently of the sentences that express them. 
Since it has been argued by several philosophers that the concept of belief 
can only be explicated in terms of the concept of an utterance or assertion 
in language, it might seem that ~ argument collapses, and that the attempt 
to distinguish types of judgment in terms of the condition for their 
acceptance is wrong from the start. It is necessaIJr to say something in 
reply to this objection if the contrast that I wish to develop between 
belief and imagination is to have the intended force. 
The argument has it that one cannot attribute beliefs to a creature 
unless one can say something about what he believesl if X believes something 
it must be possible to decide , for some~, that X believes that ~. Now if 
we list the number of beliefs that there are, we find that we do nothing 
but list indicative sentencesl there is no walf of counting beliefs except 
b.Y counting assertible sentences. Or, if we do say that two sentences may 
express the same belief then the only criterion of this would be their 
identity of meaning. Sentences and their meanings seem to provide the only 
sure access to the concept of belief, and this argues a connection between 
~ 
belief and language of a remarkable kind. It seems natural to conclude 
that, without a language, no creature could express any definite belief 
( say the belief that ~ rather than the belief that oS). No merely animal 
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behaviour can express the essential definiteness of belief , a definiteness 
that must be described in terms of the correspondence between belief and 
language. To have beliefs , it is argued, a creature must displ~ the 
ability to assent to a sentence, or to use a sentence as a premise in 
theoretical or practical reasoning. 1 
If this argument has force, then perhaps there is something wrong with 
the idea that only ~ indicative sentences express bel i efs. And it is 
certainly true that in ordinary parlance we make tl9 distinction between 
indicatives that do and indicatives that do not express belief. We talk 
quite freely of moral beliefs, for example, and there are no restrictions 
other than grammatical ones on which sentences can occur after the 
construction 'X believes that •••• • or 'X thinks that •••• '. Indeed, it is 
arguable that the logic of these constructions must itself be explained in 
terms of the logic of 'X says that •••• ·, and not vice versa. 2 It may be 
that we could still reconstruct a distinction between those sentences that 
do, and those that do not, express beliefs, in terms of some philosophical 
theory. (The theory, for example , that while most indicative sentences in 
a natural language have truth-conditions in a strong sense, there is a 
minority of sentences that acquire meaning in some other w~). But such a 
theory renders the idea of an 'acceptance condition' redundant' it will no 
longer be useful to explain the meaning of a sentence in terms of the, 
condition for its acceptance. 
How, then, can the difference between belief and other 'modes of 
acceptance' be described? In fact, if we examine the argument we find 
that it has certain extremely paradoxical consequences. For if we really 
could ~argue from the premise that beliefs are identified in language only 
1 
2 
B.Aune, Knowledge, Mind and Nature. p.213ff. 
Cf. D.Davidson, "On Saying That " , in D.Davidson and J.Hintikka (eds.), 
Words and Objections. 
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b,y referring to indicative sentences to the conclusion that beliefs are in 
some w~ dependent on language for their very existence, then we ought to be 
able to construct a similar argument for the language-dependence of any other 
kind of entity that is identified in a similar w~. But this we cannot do, 
for among such entities we find not only beliefs . but also bits of 
information , truths , facts , and even states of affairs themselves. To 
argue for the language- dependence of all such entities is to give w~ to 
idealism in its most paradoxical form. 
This should lead us to reject such an approach to the concept of 
belief. Consider the parallel concept of 'information'. It is commonly 
assumed in scientific circles that this concept can be used in the 
description and explanation of the behaviour of machines; and yet it shows 
just the same kind of relation to language and meaning as does the concept 
of belief. Information is identified in language with just the same 
constructions of indirect speech that are used to identify beliefs. We 
speak of the information that •••• , where the gap is filled by a sentence 
that conveys the precise piece of information that we wish to discuss. 
It is perhaps true , nonetheless, that the concept of information can be 
applied to the behaviour of a machine: a guided missile, s~. Such a 
machine could receive and respond to the infor mation that a metallic object 
is moving ten miles above it at a speed of five hundred miles an hour. 
Here , the sentence in indirect speech offers a plausible and verifiable 
explanation of the machine's behaviour - whether it -r is the best kind of 
explanation is another matter. Why should not the same be true of the 
sentences that identify beliefs? We can see the concept of belief as 
giving , a particular kind of explanation of human and animal behaviour , 
(explanation by 'reason' rather than 'cause'). If the concept of belief 
is introduced in this w~ then it by no means follows that a creature which 
has bel i efs .must also have a language in which these beliefs can have their 
'direct' expression. 
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The parallel with the theoretical concept of information leads us to 
draw certain useful conclusions. First, one could imagine a machine (a 
computer, s~) being given a formula that, while grammatically well-formed, 
conveys to it no information (s~ because it contains an undefined term). 
And one can imagine the computer being programmed to react to such sentences 
in one of two definite w~s - corresponding to our acceptance or rejection 
of a non-descriptive sentence. In other words, the analogy of non-
descriptive meaning could be reconstructed in the theory of information. 
Secondly, we find that, if there is a basic application of the concept of 
belief in the explanation of behaviour (on analogy with the concept of 
information), then beliefs will be given by precisely those sentences that 
are connected with truth-conditions in the strong sense. For in explaining 
animal behaviour in terms of belief, one is relating the animal's responses 
to states of affairs of which it is in some way aware: observable states of 
affairs that can be di~ectly located in the external world (cf. the relation 
of the missile to its target). Hence these basic beliefs will be given by 
tr.uth-cond~tions in the strong sense. Admittedly a language-using creature 
can also have general and theoretical beliefs which are made available to 
him by language. But we call the assent to general and theoretical 
sentences belief because of the connection with central examples. 
This suggests that while it may normally be necessary, in referring to 
beliefs, to mention the indicative sentences that express them, the mental 
state of believing something can be explained in terms of its expression 
independently of language. Exactly what form this explanation will take is 
another matter, and one quite beyond the scope of the present discussiont 
but ~t least we can see how it might lead us back to the kind of strong, 
philosophical idea of a truth-condition from which our investigations began. 
It is undeniable, however , that all our w~s of referring to belief in 
language are parasitic on our ways of referring to sentences and meanings -
which is only to be expected. In order to discuss belief in the abstract , 
..--. ........................................ ~1 
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therefore, it is best to approach it indirectly, through the idea of an 
assertion in language, as Geach and Aune, for example, have found it 
1 
necessary to do. But if we do approach belief in this way, then we soon 
discover a means of distinguishing belief from other modes of thought; for 
not everything that is said is also asserted. We find that we can 
distinguish two types of utterance, first the case where sentences are being 
used to say something, and secondly the case - as in elocution - where 
sentences are being treated as mere patterns of sound. And among the 
examples of things said we can again distinguish between asserted and 
unasserted occurrences. For example, '~' occurs unasserted in 'Suppose 
that ~'t 'It is possible that ~', '~ implies .£1', and so on. This is not a 
distinction of grammar, for sentences that occur unasserted may preserve 
their assertoric form. Indeed it may often be difficult to tell with 
which kind of occurrence we have to deall we may have to relate a sentence 
to its entire context. For example, someone may embark on a narrative in 
the following Wayl 'Suppose that .EJ then .£1, after which.!, and. so on ••• ' . 
It may be impossible to discover the unasserted character of any sentence 
in this sequence without relating it back to the initial supposition from 
which the story flows. (The situation is even more complicated in the 
case of story-telling as commonly practiced; for, except when told to a 
child, the initial suppositions remain unspoken.) 
Relying on these broad distinctions, we might say that there is such 
a thing as entertaining the proposition that ~ unasserted, and we might 
describe this as a mental act analogous to the overt act of saying '~' 
unasserted, in the way that Geach has argued that judging that ~ is a 
mental act analogous to the overt act of asserting '~'. 
l 
Now, believing 
and judging are. different concepts, although the former is a necessary 
condition of the latter. Believing, unlike judging, is dispositional or 
P.T.Geach, Mental Acts, Sections 22-23, and B.Aune 1 2!i. 
I. 
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quasi-dispositionala it is not a mental occurrence of the same instantaneous 
variety. But this should not worry us unduly, since everything that we 
need to say about the contrast between belief and other modes of thought can 
be expressed in terms of the contrast between judgment and other kinds of 
mental act. Clearly there are modes of thought that involve not the 
assertion of ',2', but the more elusive ability simply to hold the 
proposition that ,2 before one's mind, to entertain,2 as a possibility, or as 
a supposition. Indeed much of our more complex thought processes -
imagination, for one - are of this kind, and we know exactly what it is to 
say ',2' unasserted. Moreover, it is a celebrated conclusion of Frege's 
1 that assertedness cannot be part of the sense of a sentence, '~' must 
mean the same in its asserted and in its unasserted use. In Frege's 
terminology, every declarative sentence has an assertible content in common 
to its asserted and unasserted uses. This content is 'before the mind' 
when one entertains the proposition that ~, whether or not one also believes 
that ~. 
So far this seems obvious enough. If there are mental acts of 
judging, then there are also similar acts of 'entertaining' that are 
divorced from judgment. In these acts propositions come before one's mind, 
and it seems to be a necessary consequence of the w~ in which this idea of 
an unasserted thought has been introduced that what is before one's mind in 
entertaining ,2 is precisely what is asserted in asserting~, and hence 
precisely what is believed in believing ..e. Thas when we imagine something, 
or tell a story, while being indifferent to its truth, the content of our 
thought is the content of a belief; but the thought process itself is 
independent of this belief. 
1 G.Frege, "Sense and Reference", in P.T.Geach and M.Black (eds.), 
Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. See also, P.T.Geach, 
"Assertion" , Phil.Rev., 1965. 
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Entertaining a proposition unasserted, like judgment, involves the idea 
of a proposition being 'before the mind', an idea that has so far been 
explained through analogy with the overt act of speech. Inde ed we find 
that the basis in behaviour for attributing mental acts of this kind pre-
supposes that the agent is a language user. We could not make sense of 
the attribution of such thoughts to animals: they are the peculiar property 
of rational beings, and, unlike beliefs, require the dimension of verbal 
behaviour if they are to be expressed at all. As we shall see, this fact 
has important consequences in the description of imaginative and perceptual 
experience. 
So far we have contrasted belief (and its associated act of jUdgment) 
with only one other kind of thought - the entertaining of a proposition 
unasserted. This is as yet an insufficient basis for a theory of aesthetic 
judgment that will meet the requirements of the preceding chapter. For we 
need an account of some mode of thought that is directed at , and aroused in 
response to , its object , in the manner of aesthetic experience. And the 
mere entertaining of a proposition about an object is scarcely yet a genuine 
response to it . However, we find that we are also in a posit ' on to 
describe other species of thought in terms of the idea of entertaining a 
proposit ion. For example, we can already give a partial elucidation of 
the concept of ' thinking of •• ••• '. To think of X may invol ve entertaining 
thoughts about X, that is, it is to have before one's mind propositions 
whose subject-matter is X. When one thinks of X it is not necessary that 
one t s thoughts about X should also be beliefs about X. Indeed, one can 
think of things that are entirely fic t ional or imaginary. Thinking of is, 
in this sense, indifferent to truth. 1 
It may seem that I have made a mistake in assimilating thought about a 
fictitious object to the category of thought that is tunasserted ' . 
Surely , when I say tBanquo was murdered' I am asserting something: the 
peculiarity of the utterance lies in the fact that I am not referring to 
L cont idJ 
I 
1 
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Now the first attempt at a solution to the problem of aesthetic 
responses might be through a consideration of the concept ' To think of X 
~ Y' , a mode of thought that is distinct from belief~ and yet closely 
related to 'seeing as ' . In the process of thinking of row friend I may 
think of him as s~, an army officer, or a composer; and I may come to 
the conclusion that while he would do very well as the one, he has no 
aptitude for the other. Here again, the propositions entertained are not 
necessarily asserted: I may think of X as Y while knowing that it is 
untrue - even impossible - that X is Y. In no sense need I, in having 
this thought, assert to myself that X is 'i.. We might say that to think 
of X as Y at least involves the entertaining of the proposition 'X is Y' . 
However, this is clearly not all there is to thi s species of thought. 
In at least one sense of 'to think of X as 'i' the entertaining of this 
proposition is not sufficient for having the thought. If' I say that I 
1 [cont ' dJ anybody real. What 1 say is deficient in the dimension of 
reference, not in the dimension of assertion (in the sense in which 
'reference' denotes a property of a speech-act , rather than in the 
Fregean sense in which it denotes a property of a linguistic expression). 
However, just as Russell attempted to analyse the reference of a 
description in terms of the truth of an existential proposition (v. 
"On Denoting" Mind 1905) , so might one reconstruct the speech-act of 
referring to an individual in terms of the speech-act of asserting an 
existential proposition. In saying ' Banquo was murdered ' I do not 
refer to a real man called Banquo, since I entertain unasserted the 
existent ial proposition that secures the reference of "Banquo" . I have 
supposed the existence of a man called Banquo - and that man, I am 
saying, was murdered. One might say that I am "referring" to a fictional 
object ani "asserting" something about it, and this way of speaking is 
harmless so long as one does not think that being fictional is a property 
of an object. But of course, since it is not a property (since fictional 
objects are not objects of a certain kind) ' to refer' and Ito assert' are 
here being used in an extended sense. Only if we concede this will we 
be able to say that words in fictional contexts have their normal meaning 
and have reference (in F'rege's sense) in the normal way. (In other 
words, "Banquo" refers to a man called Banquo, even though I am not -
in using this expressi on - referring to a (real) man called Banquo). 
think of the Chairman as an ogre, say, then clearly I am saying something 
about a mental dJ.sposition of mine: it is not sufficient for the truth of 
this pronouncement that I should ent ertain the proposition ' The Chairman 
is an ogre ' on one occasion. Nor is i"t; sufficient that I should have a 
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disposition to entertain this proposition if I always immediately reject it. 
The idea must strike me as in some way right or appropriate if it is real y 
to be a description of the w~ I think of the Chairman. This is not to 
say that the thought has an 'asserted ' character: for clearly it would be 
a total misrepresentation of my thought process to say that I was under the 
impression that the Chairman is (literally) an ogre. In other words, in 
thinking of X as Y, I very often think of X~ and think of the description 
'Y ' as particularly appropriate , for whatever reason) t o X. This is a mode 
of rational acceptance of the proposition ' X is Y' that is nonetheless not 
a belief, even though it shares many of the properties of belief, including 
the character of a disposition rather than an act. 
Now superficial ly it might seem that it is precisely this kind of 
thought that is involved in the acceptance of at least some aesthetic 
judgments - for example the judgment that Brahm' s orchestration is fat, 
that Schubert ' s Am Bach im Fruhling is sad, that Gainsborough ' s portrait of 
Mrs Siddons as Perdita is tender, and so on. And in fact we might wish to 
argue that it is precisely this kind of thought that is involved in the 
exercise of imagination generally: imagination is essentially thought that 
is unasserted , while being entertained as 'appropriate ' to its subject 
matter. And aesthetic experience: as one of the phenomena of imagination, 
shares the structure that this particular kind of thought dictates. 
Unfortunately this conclusion is far too hasty. We will find that it 
both simplifies the concept of imagination in an unacceptable manner, and 
also fails to locate the precise way in which an aesthetic experience is 
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directed at its object. This point is best appreciated by approaching 
the topic of imagination independently . We will find that the reI ation 
of imaginative thoughts to their object is considerably more subtle than 
is implied by the above account. 
The first question that comes to mind in attempting to analyse a concept 
as complex as that of imagination is this - ' Is there one concept or many?' 
It is easy to say many -and leave it at t hat. 1 When we consider all the 
separate phenomena that have been discussed under this title it seems unlikely 
that any series of links could be discovered between them. But in that case 
why do we use the same term ( , imagination' ) to denote ~ than one concept? 
1 shall argue that there are links of an important kind between the various 
phenomena grouped under the heading of imagination , and that, in effect, 
there is onl y one concept expressed in the use of this term. The phenomena 
that need to be discussed are : forming an image (, picturing ' ); imagining in 
its various forms (imagining that •••• , imagining vlhat it would be life if •• .. , 
.... 
imagining what it is like to •••• - some of these constructions are 
propositional, some not; some relate t o knowledge that •••• , some to knowledge 
by acquaintance); doing something with imagination (imagination as adverbial 
rather than predicative ); using imagination to see something; seeing an 
aspect. The last of these is rarely described as 'imagination t , and hence 
presents a superficial difficulty. However it Vlill be one of my conclusions 
t hat there is at least one sense of the expression ' seeing as ' in which it 
denot es an activity of the imagination rather than an activity of j udgment. 
1 Three is a fairly popular number. 
and P.F. St rawson, "Imagination and 
(eds.), Experience and TheoEY' 
v. E.J . Furlon p , Imagination, ch.II, 
J:'erception" , in Foster and Swanson 
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We can investigate how the separate uses of 'imagine' and its cognates 
connect in various ways, but evidently we do not simply want a map of usage. 
We must see how to account for certain phenomena in the context of a 
coherent philosophy of mind. We must discover the truth-conditions of 
certain things that we s~ about people, and show how they relate to the 
truth-conditione of more fundamental propositions in the description of 
mind, such as proposit ions employing the concepts of belief, sensation and 
desire. The phenomena of the imagination seem to lie strangely detached 
from the analytical philosopher's list of mental notions, and although at 
least one empiricist (Hume ) gave to the imagination a central place in the 
theory of knowledge, there has been little attempt to analyse the concept 
within the framework of an empiricist philosophy of mind. It is not unfair 
to suggest that this failure is of a pieoe with the present lack of any 
s,ystematic aesthetics in the empiricist tradition. No such lack can be 
discovered in idealist philosophy, and it is common for idealists to devote 
some part of their writings on aesthetics to the imagination, from which they 
1 derive the cQntinuity of aesthetic and non-aesthetic experience. 
Where does our investigation begin ? Modern philosophers have tended 
to broach the topic through the notion of an image, as though the presence 
of images were the distinguishing feature of all acts of imagination. One 
of the main objects of the discussion has been to refute the traditional 
dualist and empiricist notion of imagery, which conceives of the image as 
a private mental picture formed like a cop,y of a sense-impression, only 
slightly more faded, as it were. This notion has been refuted on thl~ee 
grounds I it fails to distinggish imagery from sensation (Ryle, Sartre); it 
does not account for the intentionality of imagery (Husserl, Sartre ) J it 
~ 
makes the image into a private object to which one cannot refer (Ryle, 
1 See , for example, Collingwood, Principl~s of Art, Book 11. 
Wittgenstein).1 Each of these arguments is conclusive, but gives little 
basis for a positive theory of imagination. We do not learn from these 
arguments what an image is, nor do we learn how imagery relates to 
imagining imagination, memory, perception and belief. All t hat emerges 
is (i) the existence of a connection between imagery and thought, (ii) the 
need to give public criteria for the \ truth of the proposition tha.t a man 
has an image of something (or ' pictures' something). Ryle ' s view of 
imagery, as a species of pretending J meets these two requirements. But 
2 for a variety of reasons it fails to provide an answer to the problem. 
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In much of what follov/s I shall lean heavily on arguments of Wittgenstein's, 
from Zettel, espeCially sections 621-655, and from the Philosophical 
Investigations, pt.II, xi o 
Can we make any general remarks about the notions listed above that 
will serve as a starting point for a more positive theory of imagination? 
Only, I think, of the most primitive kind. We can begin by separating 
two strands in the use of ' imagine ' and its cognates, a predicative and. an 
adverbial strand. On the one hand we talk of 'X imagining Y' , ·X seeing 
Y as Z· . ' X forming an image of Y' , ' X imagining that 2 , what it would. be 
like if ~ ' and so on, all of which predicate an activity of X. On the 
other hand we talk of X doing something with imagination , or imaginatively, 
using his imagination in the performance of some task (whether it be 
fulfilling a practical aim, or ~cquiring some particular piece of knowledge) -
in this sense imagination qualifies a further activity , identified 
separately. The predicative activities are all mental acts whereas the 
activities performed with imagination need not be. This is exactly like 
G.R~le, The Concept of Mind, ch. VIII. J.P.Sartre, L'imaginaire. 
E.Husserl, Ideas, ch.3. (There is also an account of Husserl I s views in 
the final chapter of Sartre, 1' imaginati on.) 
2 See Hide Ishiguro, "Imagination" , in B.Williams and A. Montefiore (eds.), 
British Analytical PhilosoEhl, London 1966. 
" I 
• 
thinkinga thinking is a mental activity; doing something thoughtfuily is 
often not. This might lead us to suppose t hat the mental activity is 
prior - although Byle derives the opposite conclusion, partly because he 
seems to think that purely predicative mental concepts open the w~ to 
Cartesian dualism. 
What does it mean to s~ of SOD~one that he has (or forms) an image 
of something? We need a positive account of imagery, but where do we 
find H '? The account given by' Sartre, 1 like that of Husserl, 2 from 
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which it takes its inspiration, remains on the level of pure phenomenology -
it is a study in depth of the first-person case, independently of the third-
person criteria which must be invoked to give the meaning of any psycholo-
gical term. As the remarks in the introduction imply, we must not attempt 
to answer the question ' What is an image? ' by looking inwards. The 
knowledge we have of our own images is immediate, based on nothing; it 
therefore rests on no features of images whereby we recognise them for what 
they are. Mere ' observation' of our images wi1l tell us nothing about 
them: the only facts about images are facts about the third person case. 
Although there are what might be called 'phenomenological ' descriptions of 
such things as images, they are not properly speaking descriptions - they 
do not convey information about images in the w~ that a description of a 
table conveys information about a table. To understand such descriptions 
is not to recognise features in experience to which they might applya it 
is simply to see how they might be appropriate, or how they might convey 
what cannot be truly described. Such de scriptions are metaphors, which 
may be phrased in a technical language designed for the purpose (Husserl), 
and therefore incomprehensible, or which m~ be expressed in the literary 
language characteristic of Sartre (who compares the image to a magic 
1 J.P.Sartre, cit. 
2 E.Husserl, ill. 
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incantation designed to re-capture an absent thing), and hence pleasant but 
. f t · 1 un1n orma 1ve. If we wish to know what an i mage is, we must ask, 'Wha t 
is it about another that enables us to Sa{! of him that he has images'?' 
There is a feature of both imagery and imagining which serves to 
distinguish them from many mental states. This is the feature of 
subjection to the wiU. 2 Thi s does not mean that 'picturing' or imagining 
are always or nearly alwa{!s voluntary. Nor does it mean that other mental 
states - such as sensation, perception and belief - cannot be induced by 
an effort of will. It means that the re quest to imagine or form an image 
of something makes sense. Someone can assent to it directly. There is 
nothing else he has to do first in order to comply with this kind of 
request. He can call up an image, and if images are sometimes involuntary, 
and sometimes impossible to banish or summon, this is entirely contingent, 
and not of their essence. It is impossible to imagine someone, aware of 
the evidence which conclusively proves that ~, for example, choosing first 
to believe~ , and then not, at will. Nor is it possible to imagine 
someone choosing first to see what is before his eyes and then not. What 
one can imagine is someone choosing to avoid the evidence for~, or choosing 
to close his eyes. But here he is doing something else in order not to 
acquire the belief or the perception in question. The voluntariness 
attaches not to the belief or perception themselves , but to the actions that 
bring them about. The order to believe , or to see > does not in itsel f 
make sense. 
This might be doubted. Surely when I say that someone has imagined 
that something, the proposi tional construction I employ is meant to identify 
1 
2 
Sartre, L'Imaginaire, p.239. 
The feature is difficult to define precisely, and has been variously 
described by philosophers throughout the ages - v. for example Aristotle 
De Anima, 427b; Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1a, 2ae, 56,5; Locke, Ess5l, 
11, XXX; and more recently Sartre and Wittgenstein (cit.). 
< 
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a belief (which I imply to be false). Does not imagining therefore 
sometimes in.volve belief? If belief is not sub ject to the will how can 
imagination be subject to the will ? Here we must contrast two dif ferent 
uses of the term 'imagine't one to refer to a mental act, the other to 
pass judgment on another's beliefs. When I say 'Imagine that ~', I am 
not asking you to believe falsely that ~. Obeying this order does not 
involve believing something, but rather entertaining propositions unasserted. 
I shall take it, then , that the use of the t erm 'imagine' to pass judgment 
on another' s beliefs is derivative. In this use 'imagine' rreans simply 
'believe falsely', and plainly no interesting theory of imagination could 
be founded on such a usage. A similar derivative use of 'imagine' occurs 
in reporting a certain kind of speculative belief. For example: 'Where do 
you think John is?' - 'I imagine (that) he is in the librarY'. 
The contrast with belief is in fact rather difficult to draw, for a 
further reason. There ~ sense to the request 'Believe~' in certain 
contexts. It gets sense from its surroundings, when these contribute an 
independent plausibility to~, thus making it possible to 'obey' the order. 
That is 'Believe~' is not so much an order as a way of vouching for the 
truth of .E. This is the case in most examples of the form , 'Believe you 
• me,l2.. Orders to believe are ways of giving one's word to the truth of a 
proposition and henoe of adding to the belief the anteoedent plausibility 
derived from one's own truthfulness. In the absence of these speoial 
oircumstances, however, the order to believe does not make sense. It 
might be said that there are, nevertheless, circumstances in whioh I might 
believe a proposition by ohoice - for example, when I know no reason against 
believing it, and wish it to be true. For example, I might ohoose to trust 
someone, and this oommits me to believing what he says. When I say to 
someone 'Tell me what happened - I will believe you', what I say is not 
unlike an expression of intention. It carries the suggestion that belief 
is at least sometimes subjeot to the will. On the other hand, there are 
119 
features of the relation between belief and the will which serve to 
distinguish imagination and belief. For example, I cannot choose one 
moment to believe~, and the next moment not to believe~, and so on, 
without having discovered some further evidence against ~. Whereas I can 
imagine some thing one minute, and then cease to imagine it, and so on, 
irrespective of any other circumstance. For imagination is something I 
engage in, whereas belief is not. Thus the absurdity of the White Queen's 
remark. "sometimes I have believed as many as six impossible things before 
breakfast" . And thus the absurdity of believing something for a practical, 
rather than a theoretical, reason (which is the paradox involved in Pascal's 
wager) • 
We might summarise this difference as follows: whereas the order 
'Imagine the following: •••• • makes sense, the order 'Believe the following: •••• ' 
does not , except in ver,y special circumstances. And this is a logical point, 
reflecting a categor ial _ difference between imagination and belief. The 
contrast with perception, sensation and desire is much cleaer. I cannot, 
for example, order you to have a pain in your finger, although I can order 
1 you to do something that will ensure that you have such a pain, and so on. 
Again it might seem that this difference is only contingent. it just so 
happens that I cannot acquire pains in this w~. But in fact we find that 
the difference is more fundamental than this. If we attempt to describe 
the case of someone obeying the order to have a pain in his finger, we seem 
constrained to describe him as doing something else, such as thinking about 
it , as a result of which he suffers the pain. The mental act is the 
thought, while the pain is only its causal consequence. 
Images, like imagination generally, share this feature of subjection , . 
to the will. Forming an image is something I can do: it is not alw~s 
something I suffer or undergo. Likewise I can sensibly ask someone to 
1 L.Wittgenstein, Zettel, sec. 52. 
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imagine a scene, or to imagine what it would be like if ~, and so on. In 
this respect imagination is like unasserted thought. Indeed, we can often 
substitute for 'imagine' and its cognates, 'think' and its cognates ('Think 
what it would be like if ~ ' , and so on), and this might lead us to suspect 
that in general imagination was nothing more than a species of thought. 
Later I shall show that this is too simple an approach. imagination m~, 
and often does, involve imagery, and imagery is not just a kind of thought. 
However, we might wish to argue that imagery is a separate phenomenon: 
it is not only in imagining that we have images; there are memory images 
as well. It should be possible, therefore, to treat imagination and 
imagery apart, since neither is a necessary feature of the other. We 
might then wish to s~ that imagination just is a species of thought. In 
fact we s~ that a man imagines X (or what it would be like if ~) to the 
extent that he can give an account of X ( or ~), provided certain further 
conditions are fulfilled. These further conditions are difficult to 
specit,y in detail, but a rough analysis might proceed as follows. 
1) Imagination involves thought which is unasserted, and hence which goes 
beyond what is believed. Thus a man is not said to be imagining X (or 
what it would be like if ~), if he produces his account on the basis of what 
he already knows - s~, because X is before him and he is studying it, 
because ~ is true and he is observing the consequences of its truth; because 
he has been told, or remembers, the account he now produces, because he has 
evidence, which in conjunction with knowledge he already has , will enable him 
to deduce or predict his account of X or ~. In other words imagination goes 
beyond what is given in ordinary prediction and belief. This is not to s~ 
that one cannot believe that X is as one imagines it to be. But one cannot 
imagine X to be as one knows or has good reason to think it to be. In 
imagination one is engaging in speculation, and one is not typically aiming 
at a definite assertion as to how things are. In imagination, therefore, 
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one goes beyond what is strictly given. 
2) Not any w~ of going beyond the 'given' will count as imagining X, or 
what it would be like if~. Imagining is a special case of thinking of ~ 
as z. It has two objectss the primary object (the X or ~ that has to be 
imagined), and the secondary object, which is how X or 2 is described. 
Imagination is not simply producing descriptions of an object which one is 
unprepared to assert. It involves thinking of these descriptions as 
appropriate in some w~ to the primary object. Imagination is a rational 
activity. The man who imagines is trying to produce an account of some-
thing, and is therefore trying to relate his thoughts to their subject-
matters he is constructing a narrative, and to do this it is not sufficient 
merely to go beyond what he is already 'given'. It is necessary that he 
should attempt to bring what he s~s or thinks into relation with the 
subject: his thoughts must be entertained because of their 'appropriateness '. 
Because of this rationality inherent in the activity it is natural that 
'wQy'-questions should be in place when someone gives an imagined 
description of an object or state of affairs. We can explain therefore 
wny there should be a partly normative idea of imagination: we often 
distinguish among the activities of the imagination between those which are 
really im%S1nation and those which are mere fantasy or whim. This is not a 
genuine distinction between imagination and something else, but it is an 
instance of a derivative use of 'imagine', it marks a distinotion based on 
our own feelings as to what 1& appropriate in describing an absent thing. 
What is it to judge a description to be appropriate to a certain 
object? This is a deep question, and one funuamental to aesthetics, about 
which I shall have a certain amount to s~ in Chapter Thirteen. Clearly, 
we cannot reduce this notion to the more commonplace one of judging something 
to be likely. When one imagines what X would be like one often abandons 
the normal categories of causal thought, and invents a story which one thinks 
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of as peculiarly appropriate to X, even though one may know it to be 
unlikely or false. When Flaubert set himself to im~ine what it would be 
like for someone of a vain and romantic disposition to live married to a 
country doctor in prOVincial France, he did not tell a story about the 
likely consequences of such a marriage. He chose the details of his story 
in the light of what he thought to be most revealing and expressive of the 
provincial state of mihd, whether or not such details were in any way 
likely to occur. To take a more extreme example, Lewis Carroll imagined 
what it would be like to live behind the looking glass , by carefully 
choosing illogicallities that create the semblance of a coherent story. 
Similarly I may imagine what it would be like for row friend to meet the 
Queen, and thereby arrive at a story that fits his character, and that 
exploits the ~nusing possibilities, without paying the least ' regard t~ 
plausibility or truth. In imagining, propositions are entertained for a 
reason, and the reason is to be found in the subject matter and nowhere 
else. This is all that we need say here about the concept of the 
'appropriate' • 
The element of rationality introduced by this feature must not lead us 
to confound imagination with belief, even though there is, as we saw, a use 
of 'imagine that' where it does simply denote belief. When I tell a story 
what I say counts as an expression of imagination whether or not I believe 
it. The rationality of imagination is not the rationality of belief 
(although it might in certain cases include the rationality of belief); it 
is rather a species of practical reason. When I ask someone 'Wny?' in 
the midst of his account of an imagined object, he replies by giving reasons 
wby he said that thing, not reasons why he believed (asserted) it. 
It follows from this account that we might 'often want to compare two 
exercises of the imagination by saying that one showed more imagination than 
the other. B,y which we mean that it went further beyond the obvious 
(condition (1)), while not departing from the appropriate (condition U~)), 
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and hence not degenerating into mere fantasy or whim. Imagination admits 
of degrees. It may indeed be diffioult to define the vanishing point of 
imagination where mere literal-mindedness sets in. 
It is in terms of this last consideration that we might attempt to 
define the adverbial sense of imagination. Doing something imaginatively 
means doing it thoughtfully, where one's thought is not guided b.v the 
normal processes of rationality, but goes instead beyond the obvious in 
some more or less creative way. In doing X imaginatively one does more 
than X, and this additional element is one's own invention, added because 
it seems appropriate to X. It goes without saying that there is a 
normative sense of the adverbial construction: some actions may be judged 
to be truly imaginative, while others might be thought of as whimsical or 
foolish. On this basis we can see how the concept of the imaginative 
becomes extended to apply to a plan, an hypothesis, a work of art or a 
person. All these uses, even those where something cognitive is implied, 
can be derived without too much distortion from the above conditions. 
But even if we say that the two conditions given above do define the 
central core of the concept of imagination, and ~o show how imagination 
differs from other thought-prooesses, we still have not explained what is 
meant by imagery , nor have we accounted for the plaoe of imagery in 
imagination as a whole. It is here that we find the idea of a thought 
acquiring an altogether new and more subtle connotation. For there are 
certain strong reasons for saying that an image is a kind of thought of 
something - l'I\Y' image of lI\Y mother is lIlY thought of her as she looks. This 
is t suppotted t by the following considerations: First, an image is always 
an -image of something - imagery has the intentionality characteristic of 
thought", and this is brought out b.v the fact that one can only imagine 
what one can also think of. Secondly, imagery, like thought , is an object 
of immediate knowledge. I know immediately, on no basis ' and incorrigibly, 
what lI\Y own images and thoughts are like. (These two properties, with 
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certain modifications in the case of the first, are also properties of 
sensor,y experiences or sense-impressions). Thirdly, imagery is subject to 
the will, in the w~ that thought is subject to the will. (Which is not 
to say that imagery is necessarily as responsive to the will as thought.) 
Finally, images and thoughts are identified in a similar way, and ascribed 
on a similar basis. Thus the principle criteria for saying that a person 
is having an image, or picturing something , are verbal - they consist 
largely in descriptions he would be prepared to offer of an absent or non-
esistent thing. That is, to think that X had an image of Y involves 
thinking that, had X been asked what was in his mind, he would have 
produced descriptions purporting to be descriptions of Y (of the look of 
Y, say), or he would have referred in some way to Y. A (visual) image is 
like a thought of the way something looks, and to identify ~ image X is 
having involves reference to criteria that would equally identify a thought. 
We can imagine criteria other than verbal ones - for example a man might 
express his image by drawing or pointing to a picture - but the criteria 
always seem to apply equally to both images and thoughts. 
These four features seem to place imagery firmly in the category of 
thought, and hence create an immediate distinction between images and such 
things as dreams and after-images. The justification for regarding such 
category divisions as all-important will be given shortly. But it needs 
to be said immediately that to conclude that imagery just is a species of 
thought is to ignore two very important features of imagery, in addition to 
those mentioned , which it is extremely odd to consider as general properties 
of thought - the features of intensity and exact duration. These features 
are in fact characteristic of sensations and sense-impressions, and seem to , 
show that imagery, like sensory-experience, lies across the boundary 
between thought and sensation. First, then, images can be more or less 
vivid or intense, while remaining constant in respect of detail. ~ image 
of Mary might be so vivid that I almost see her standing beside me. It is 
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a characteristio expression of visual imagery that one should screw up, or 
even close, one's eyes, as though subjecting oneself to an impression, and 
the impression m~ be strong, or not so strong when it finally comes. 
Thus we speak of images as 'fading' - a description that is not applicable 
to thought. Needless to s~, this phenomenon has nothing to do with the 
supposed 'degrees of belief' that are mentioned by such writers as Price. 1 
When I believe something I m~ indeed be more or less convinced of it, but 
this variation has nothing to do with the relative vividness characteristic 
of imagery and sensation. 
Secondly, there is the f eature of precise duration. An image, like 
a sensation, comes into e~stence at a precise moment and lasts unchanged 
for a precise length of time, it is a mental process that can be precisely 
located in the stream of events. We s~ such things as 'I had a vivid 
image of Mar,y, lasting some considerable time, and then suddenly I thought 
of something else and it went aw~'. We might compare images in this 
respect with their nearest equivalent among thoughts: the. thought of the 
look (sound"smell etc.) of something. Suppose I begin to think of the 
way ~ grandmother looked. I say to ~self: 'Let me think ••• she usually 
wore blue, her hair was grey, she had a fun~ w~ of peering down her 
nose', and so on. Did ~ thought of the w~ she looked begin when I said 
'Let me think?? Or just after? Or on completion of the first 
proposition? Or, suppose it took me time to formulate a thought, was I 
thinking of the way she looked during this time? Clearly none of these 
questions need have an answer, and if we i2~choose to give an answer then 
our choice is not dictated by the nature of the thought itself. It might 
be said that we should compare imagery with entertaining a proposition, 
since this is a kind of thought that does have determinate temporal 
boundaries: if a proposition is before ~ mind over a length of time, then 
there is a precise point when this process begins , and it lasts unchanged 
1 H.H.Price, Belief. 
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until the precise point at which it ceases. But again the matter is not 
susceptible of such an eag,y legislation. Suppose I am entertaining the 
proposition that ~ wife is at church, and while doing so I look out of 
the window and notice the brown colour of a man's hat against the leaves 
of a trees is my thought interrupted by the perception, or does it last 
through the peroeption unchanged? This question only admits of an answer 
in exceptional cases - for example, when I have the experience (after 
observing the hat) of being recalled to ~ former train of thought. In 
general, in discussing thought, we have no use for the idea of a single 
unchanging mental process that has a precise beginning and an exact 
duration. If we do tr,y to think of entertaining a proposition in this 
w~ then we find that we are thinking of the case where one forms an image 
of the words which hovers briefly before the inner eye. 
This distinction b.etween imagery and thought is borne out by the fact 
that people express images very much in the w~ that they express 
experiences. If I ask you to form an image of your mother you may well 
concentrate for a moment and then, after some time, s~ 'Now I have got its 
it's as though I could see her.' Similarly, the particular form of words 
"Now it has gone , now it has come back", which _is the expression of an 
experience, has no place in the report of thinking. On the other hand it 
is certainly in place in reporting an image, since I can think of an object 
even while being conscious that the image is fading. This seems to suggest 
that while thought is a necessary part of imagery, it cannot be the whole 
of it. Indeed all our w~s of referring to images seem to suggest an 
element of experience over and above the constitutive thought. Thus I can 
know what image I had even when I cannot recall, or recapture, the image 
itself. Plainlr for this to be true imager,y must be distinct from thought. 
For only in a ver,y special sense could I ever be said to know what thought 
I had while at the same time being conscious that it had faded beyond 
recall. In remembering what the thought was, I have the thought again. 
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The argument so far is deficient in one ver,y important respect. I 
have explained the experiential component of imager-y" in terms of t .he first 
person case alone. The concept of thought has been related securely to 
its public expression, whereas the concept of an image has been 
differentiated by features whose significance is so far almost wholly 
private . (Indeed, certain philosophers have spoken as though this were 
1 the essential difference between imagery and thought, Frege, for example, 
and COllingwood.)2 If this is the only explanation of imagery that we can 
give , then clearly we will have given the concept no sure grounding. Not 
only will it be impossible for me to convince another that there are or 
could be such things as images; I will even be uncertain that I am entitled 
to attribute such things to myself. 
Fortunately , we can point to a further feature of imagery r a f eature 
that partly explains the two just mentioned, a~d which can itself be 
described in terms of the verbal expression of imagery. When a man refers 
to an image that he has , he describes it in terms of a gengine experience , 
the publicly observeable form of which is familiar to us all: he will describe 
his visual image of X in terms that are equally appvopriate to the 
experience of seeing X. He will imply that having an image of X is in 
some way like seeing X: if he does not acknowledge this, then we say that 
he has not understood the concept of an image . We might put this point 
~J saying that there is an analogy between the two processes of imager,y and 
sensory experience. The analogy is, however , ' irreducible,.3 That is to say, 
a man will be unable to indicate in what way his image is ' like' a particular 
----------.-------------------------------------.------------~.-.--------. 
1 
2 
3 
G.Frege, extract in Geach and Black, cit. , p.79. 
R.G.Oollingwood , cit., pp. 157-B. 
Geach. Mental Acts sect.23: 'irreducible' is not Geach's word, although 
it is a word that is natw'ally suggested by his approach . 
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sensor.y experience, although he will feel that to describe his image in 
terms of a sensor.y experience is appropriate, and indeed inevitable. A 
consequence of this connection between imager.y and its verbal expression 
is that it will be impossible to attribute visual imager.y to a blind man, 
or auditor.y images to someone who is deaf. This is a logical truth, not 
a contingent fact. Thus we can see how the connection between imager.y 
and its public expression will explain the formal (conceptual) properties 
of imagery. This , crudely, is the principle advantage of third-person 
analysis over the methods of phenomenology. 
We must now s~ something about the connection between imagery and 
imagination. At first sight it m~ seem that there is no special 
connection, since imager.y does not occur only when one imagines, nor always 
then. We can divide images into two kinds: those where what is pictured 
is something that has already been seen, heard etc. (imagery as part of 
memory); and those where what is pictured has not in fact been experienced 
(imager.y as part of imagination). This second kind of imager.y - forming 
an image of' something that has never been 'given' in experience - clearly 
involves the features of imagination, as these have been described. But 
is there no more to the connection between imager.y and imagination than 
this? We can soon see that there is. For one thing, forming an image 
is one of the principle w~s of imagining - this explains, I think, why we 
use the same word to describe the two activities. Moreover, there is a 
kind of imagining that essentially involves the distinguishing 
characteristics of imagery. This is the kind of imagining involved in 
con~uring an experience, as when I undergo an experience in imagination, or 
imagine the sound , taste, sight or smell of something. 
" 
It is useful to recall Russell's distinction between knowledge by 
acquaintance and knowledge by description. 1 To know what an experience is 
like is to be possessed of a wholly different kind of knowledge from that 
1 
B.Russell, MYsticism and Logic, pp.152ff. 
• 1. 
I-
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involved in knowing what a (material) object of experience is like. In 
knowing what an object is like I can recall certain of its features. I 
know how to describe it. In knowing what an experience is like, I do not 
have this kind of familiary with 'features' of the experience, although I 
am familiar with the experience itself. Knowledge of an experience by 
acquaintance means having had the experience and being able to call it to 
mind. Similarly, we may contrast imagining what an object is like with 
imagining what an experience is likes the latter involves the ability to 
form an image which 'matches' the experience, whereas the former involves 
the contrasting ability to describe an absent or non-existent thing. 
Thus 'imagining what it is like to •••• ·, like 'Knowing what it is like .to. l .' , 
has an experiential component. Imagery - when it is not a species of 
remembering - is related to 'knowledge by acquaintance' in the way that 
imagination generally is related to belief. 
Imagery is expressed, then, i n such reports as 'I can imagine what it 
feels like to die in battle', or ~ I can (cannot) imagine the taste of rum 
mixed with HP 'sauce' • It is not sufficient for the truth of such reports 
that one should be merely thinking of the taste of rum and HP sauce, or 
whatever. 'Imagining what it's like' refers to the particular experience 
involved in 'knowing what it's like'. Plainly thinking of the taste of 
rum and HP sauce is not yet imagining the taste of rum and HP sauce, since 
'thinking of' extends no further than the ability to give an account of an 
object. Imagining the taste of rum and HP sauce involves t he two further 
properties of duration and intensity referred to above. Olfactory and 
gustatory images are particularly instructive in this respect. For while 
visual appearances can be described in terms of visual features of an 
'< 
object - and hence can be as it were re-created through description - the 
same is not generally true of tastes and smells. It is therefore more 
obviously the case here that the request to imagine what a taste or smell 
is like i s a request to form an image • 
,I, 
I' 
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Here we can see one of the dangers inherent in a phenomenologioal 
approach to the problem of imagery. For the phenomenologist what I have 
called knowledge b.Y acquaintance is already a kind of private knowledge 
b.Y description: it involves an awareness of features of an experience 
that must be identified introspectively. Images may therefore share these 
features with their original experiences, and so come to be described in a 
simil ar way. To reject the phenomenological approach involves insisting 
that ther e is nothing ~ to knowing what it's like to break a bone than 
being able to recall the part'icular experience. In a similar way there 
is nothing more to be said about imagining what it's like to break a bone 
than that it is an image, irreducfubly analogous to the experience of 
breaking a bone. The point of imagining what an experience is like is not 
given by the ability to describe the experience. Any description is 
necessarily the kind of description that could be applied and learned with 
reference to the third-person case; so it will not relate to 'knowing what 
it's like' in the quite special sense in which knowing what it's like 
means having e~perienced it. 
Among the things that need imagination for their achivement are some 
kinds of 'seeing': it takes imagination to see from the circumstances that 
one's friend is unhapP.1 or hurt. Tbi s sense of imagination as a kind of 
'perception' or , 'perceptiveness' has two aspects , and it is perhaps the 
failure to distinguish the two that is responsible for the Romantic idea 
1 that imagination is the fundamental source of knowledge. One aspect is 
given by propositional constructions of the form: 'It takes imagination to 
see that X is sad' - CA). The other aspect is given by a special 
metaphorical sense of 'see' 'It takes imagination to see the sadness in 
X's face (even when one knows independently that X is sad), in the music, 
in the life at Hill Farm, and so on' - (B). CB) relates to 'seeing as', or 
1 
v. Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, end of vol .I . 
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noticing an aspect; (A) relates to forming an hypothesis. Only (A) m~ be 
counted as fully cognitive, that is, as referring to a species of judgment 
(a judgment that goes sufficiently beyond the evidence to count as an 
expression of imagination). (B) does not, or at any rate need not, refer 
to a species of judgment, strictly speaking; for here what one 'sees' one 
'sees' without, in any straightforward sense , believing it to be there. 
It is not seeing that X's face is the face of a sad man (for example), or 
that the music is the kind of music that would be produced by a sad person 
(for example) , or.illi!i living at Hill Farm tends to make people sad (for 
example), that const i tutes this kind of seeing , although making these 
judgments may help to put us in a position to 'see' the sadness that is 
there. 
We cannot explain this sense of 'see' as 'see imaginatively', and 
hence relate the element of imagination to the adverbial sense. For 
seeing, in the normal sense, is not the kind of thing that ~ be done 
imaginatively. It is not a voluntary activity, and is not within the 
control of thought. To add imagination to seeing is to change it from 
seeing to 'seeing'. We have a new activity of the imagination that oannot 
be explained in the terms we have already employed. It remains to disoover 
how this new aotivity should be desoribed. 
The aotivity has already been referred to as aspect perception, or 
'seeing as'. But there are at least two aotivities that might be desoribed 
in this way , one related to imagining, the other oloser to imagery. It is 
the seoond of these that I wish to disouss , although I shall shortly make 
one or two remarks about the first as well. The points that I wish to 
make arise (in the main) out of Wittgenstein's disoussion of the ambiguous 
"' 
f " 1 l.gure. But it must not be thought that I shall be treating every 
problem that this figure raises, nor every idea that Wittgenstein derives 
from it. The problem of the ambiguous figure lies at the intersection of 
1 
Philosophical Investigation, 11, xi. 
many different areas of philosophy, and if I use it as a point of departure 
for the discussion of a particw.ar kind of sensory experience it is not 
because this is the only - or even the principal - use to which the figure 
may ' ,be put. 
When I see the fi gure as a duck it is not merely that I notice a 
resemblance between the figure and a duck: I could do thi s while seeing 
it as a rabbit. Besides, resemblance is a symmetrical relation - if a 
resembles ~ then ~ resembles ~. Hence in noticing a resemblance between 
~ and ~ I notice also a resemblance between ~ and ~. But of course if I 
see a portrait of the Queen as the Queen I do not for that reason see the 
Queen as her portrait. Nor can the experience of seeing an aspect be 
reduced to that of noticing a likeness of appearance, for the same reason. 
Moreover there are certain very important considerations that I shall 
touch on. both later in this chapter and in Vhapter Eleven, for saying that 
aspects and appearance do not belong to the same logical category. 
(Compare notiCing the resemblance between two f aces, and then suddenly 
'see ing the likeness': there is a quite peculiar experience involved in 
this whose expression can be one of surprise.) In other words ' seeing 
an aspect ' cannot be analysed in terms of ' seeing that ' : it does not 
reduce to a set of beliefs about its object , not even a set of perceptual 
bel iefs. 1 
The problem that 1 wish to discuss is this: to which mental category 
does the experience of ' seeing as ' belong? First of a1l, we cannot 
reduce ' seeing as' to anything like a simple sensation: ' seeing as' shares 
with imagery the property of being internally related to thought. In 
seeing the figure as a duck we, as it were, thiruc of it as a duck. For 
example, we think of the shape and appearance of ducks, and think of this 
particular duck as quacking, say. In fact 'seeing as' is like thought in 
1 These considerations are by now fairly fruniliar: see for examples 
Richard Wollheim , Art and its Ubjects , sections 11 - 14. 
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just the way that imagery is like thought. First, it has intentionality -
there is always something that we see in the figure when we see an aspect. 
Secondly the aspect, like a thought, is an object of immediate knowledge -
when I "see" an aspect I know immediately and incorrigibly the aspect that 
I see. (It goes without saying that when I see something, in the normal 
sense of 'see', I do not have this kind of knowledge of what I see.) 
Thirdly, the principle criteria on the basis of which we attribute the 
capacity to 'see as' are verbal. One criterion for seeing X as Y is to 
be found in the false descriptions that the subject is disposed to apply 
(unasserted) to X. This is not the only kind of criterion. But, once 
again , any criterion of 'seeing as' seems to reflect a similar criterion 
of thought. A child before a picture may show signs of amusement or 
fear, and these certainly show that he has 'seen' the aspect that is there. 
But in interpreting his behaviour as emotional in this way we have already 
characterised it as an expression of thought. Moreover, it is a thought 
that is in some sense unasserted, as we shall see. This is an important 
point, since ~it has the consequence that animals, who lack a language, and 
hence have only beliefs and no other kind of thought, cannot see aspects, 
just as they cannot form images. A dog may take a picture for a man, but 
he cannot in a~ other sense than this, of delusion or mistaken belief, see 
the picture ~ a man. 
Finally, 'seeing as', like imagery, am like unasserted thought in 
general, is subject to the will. Which is to say that it makes sense to 
order someone to see a figure in a certain way. Moreover, once a man has 
grasped the several aspects of an ambiguous figure , he may see it in almost 
any of the possible ways at will. Once again it is necessary to remember 
that the meaningfulness of the command to see X as Y does not mean that it 
is always - or even usually - possible to obey it. Indeed obedience is 
even more difficult here than in the case of imagery, which is what one 
would expect. For what one can see in X (or 'see X as') is strictly 
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limited by the observable nature of X itself. The object presents a 
visible frame, as it were, to which one's image is confined. Moreover, 
there is a whole area of 'seeing as' where the order to see an aspect is 
entirely out of place, and must be replaced qy the request to ~ to see 
the aspect. It is this area that bears the closest affinities to 
aesthetic experience. 
'Seeing as', like imagery, contains further features which are more 
truly sensuous, and not characteristic of thought in general. Once again 
there is the property of precise duration: it is possible to 'clock' the 
perception of an aspect in the way that it is possible to 'clock' a 
sensation. For example, I may see the ambiguous figure as a duck, and 
then suddenly find that it has changed, until, precisely ten seconds later, 
it changes again. This feature of precise duration makes it possible to 
locate the phenomenon of 'seeing as' in time in a way that it is not 
possible to locate the phenomenon of 'interpretation' generally. 
But this one property of precise duration does not constitute a 
"-
complete account of the sensuous element in 'seeing as'. As in the case 
of mmagery, we can point to the conceptual (internal) relation with seeing. 
We might say that there is something like an irreducible analogy between 
the two processes of 'seeing' and 'seeing as', which is to say that it is 
part of the concept of 'seeing as' that the process should be referred to 
and expressed in the language of seeing (of visual experience). When a 
man describes his experience in seeing an aspect, he must say something 
like 'It is as though I were seeing a duck'. And once again it is 
impossible to say in what way the seeing of an aspect is like the seeing of 
the ~hing itself. As Wittgenstein puts it, the resemblance is manifested 
only in the expressions that a man is inclined to use in describing his 
experiences, not in something he uses those expressions to say.1 The two 
experiences do not have introspectible ('phenomenal') features which they 
1 Zettel, sect.630. 
J 
~, 
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share , any more than do the experiences of seeing red and seeing pink 
(which are also irreducibly similar) . This enables us to attribute to 
'seeing as ' a !'ormal f eature that also belongs to perceptual experience -
the feature of ' having parts'. When I see the figure as a duck then the 
aspect is, as it were, spread out over a visual H eld. Geach has already 
point ed out that t his is the kind of feature that serves to distinguish 
1 
sensory experience from thought. 
However, there is a sensuous feature of imagery that it is difficult 
to attribute to 'seeing as ' - the feature of vividness or intensity. In 
this sense it might be argued that the analogy with i magery is incomplete. 
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If I notice the duck aspect of the figure then I may be more or less struck 
by it 1 and I may see it in more or less detail. But this is not yet to 
say that ITlf experience may be more or less vivid or intense in the manner 
of an image. Is it then impossible to attribute this formal propert y of 
vividness to ' seeing as ' ? I think not, although it is difficult to 
demonstrate that ' seeing as ' is the kind of mental process to which such 
a dimension must belong. But perhaps it will help to study t he similar 
case of ordinary visual experience ~ whose relation to sensation has also 
been a matter of considerable dispute. It is an undeniable f act that 
certain things stand out to a greater or less extent in our visual field , 
and this property is not necessarily to be attributed to their clarity , 
intere st orcillumination. In a similar way a detail in a picture may 
stand out from the rest: indeed it is possible to have the sense of some 
de t ai l suddenly 'coming at' one, and then receding once more into the 
background. In default of analysis it is natural to hypothesise that 
this feature of 'seeing as ' (and of seeing) is the feature that corresponds 
to the dimension of vividness that is common to i magery and sensation. 
But I do not wish to dwell on this point , nor to attempt a non-phenomena-
logical analysis of the feature in ques tion. It should by now be 
sufficiently clear that 'seeing as' bears a relation to both thought and 
1 Mental Acts, p.128. 
,', 
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sensation that is strikingly similar to that of imagery. 
A digression into phenomenology will bring out this relation between 
'seeing as' and imagery in another way. For example , there is the 
following peculiar characteristic involved in description of images. 
Suppose that I have an image of a sail, and someone asks me what it is 
like; 1 may point to an A written in this way - }j - and say 'It is a 
triangular sail, bellying out ih a peculiar way, like this'. 1 Only if 
someone sees '· a quite specific aspect of the figure I point to will he 
understand what I wish to say about nw image. Always in identifying a 
visual image, I must refer to physical objects. But here I wish also to 
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show what nw image is like, in the sense in which really to know what it is 
like to have the image oneself. It is significant therefore that this 
knowledge Cru1 be achieved through the perception of an aspect. A similar 
illustration of the phenomenal proximity of imagery to ' seeing as ' is 
provided by an example from Miss Ishiguro. 2 Suppose I see a photograph of 
a man. and suppose that as I look at i t the photograph gradually fades away, 
even though I am nonetheless able to go on seeing it as a man as less and 
less of the features remain. It seems that I must in some way 'supplement ' 
the disappearing features with an image. At the point of attenuation, when 
I am left with nothing to ' see as', there remains the image of the man. 
And tbis image is the image of precisely the man whom I had previ ously seen 
in the picture. It seems then that in this gradual change from seeing the 
photograph as a man to merely imagining the man without the photograph 
something remained the same. 3 
It seems, then, that the strange mixture of the sensory and the 
1 I owe ,this example to Professor G. E.M. Anscombe. 
2 
"Imagination", A.S.S.V., 1967. 
3 There are in fact complications raised by treating photographs as 
straightforward instances of ' seeing as ' in the sense under consideration. 
These complications - which I cannot discuss here - do not affect Miss 
Ishiguro ' s example. 
,I, 
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intellectual characteristic of images is present also in ' seeing as'. The 
very same phenomena recur here in a different form: in ' seeing as' it is 
as though I imagined an object and simultaneously ~ it in something else; 
in imagery it is as though I imagined an object and then mlf imagination 
~ alive in quasi-sensory form. Moreover, the element of thought 
involved in ' seeing as' lies clearly in the field of imagination: it is 
thought that goes beyond what is believed or inwardly asserted, and beyond 
what is strictly given in perception. Hence it is a thought that is 
subject to the condition of 'appropriateness'. ~ seeing an aspect raises 
the question of the appropriateness of what I see ~ the object to the 
object in which I see it. ' Seeing as' is rational, and the normative 
distinction between true imagination and whimg,y can be applied to it. 
Although I can, logically, see almost anything as ~ything (provided the 
ob ject contains some feature in which IIlf image ma.Y, as it were, take root) 
mlf perception may change in the light of reason. I san be stopped from 
seeing a picture as a rabbit by being shown that it is meant to be taken 
as a duck, or that the mood of the picture can only be understood if it is 
taken in that wa.Y. To take a more interesting case: I can see some of the 
bathers in Cezanne's picture as either moving or at rest, and mlf understand-
ins of the picture governs the aspect that I choose. Reasoning in terms of 
appropriateness can equally be applied to images. If I am asked to describe 
mlf image of Brutus I ma.Y give a description which another might find 
unjustified or fanciful; he would attempt to persuade me to imagine Brutus 
differently. 
On this basis we might conclude that in fact there is only one concept 
of imagination, which covers all the activities I have attempted to 
describe. Imagination is a species of thought, involving distinctive 
features that recur even when the thought is as it were '~mbodied ' in an 
experience, as in imagery and tseeing as'. We might say that it is a 
characteristic of imagination that i"t is J,iable to this kind of embodiment 
......................... --------------
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in experience. 
Our description of 'seeing as' stopped short at the comparison with 
images. In fact the locution ' seeing as' has a wider use than this 
comparison suggests. There seems to be a continuum between the kind of 
case exemplified by the ambiguous figure, where ~ imagination becomes 
part of ~ seeing, hearing , or whatever, and other examples where I simply 
imagine something in an object (the sadness in the music, the Mozartian 
style in Verlaine). As the thought-process involved in 'seeing as' 
becomes more complex it becomes ever more difficult to have the particular 
experience of seeing (or hearing) an aspect , even though one is still , as 
it were, bringing the thought and the object together in imagination. It 
is an important question how far it matters in aesthetics whether an 
imaginative response finds .this particular embodiment or not, and I will 
s~ more about this in the next chapter, That there is this strange 
t ransference of imagination to experience might after all be one source of 
the idea that aspects are properties - for in many ways they bear a 
logical analogy to 'simple' properties, such as colours - and hence one 
source of the idea that in aesthetic appreciation one is really seeing 
properties of a work of art. 
We must now attempt to describe in more detail the kinds of thought 
process that go b,y the name of 'seeing as', and which underly the experience 
of aspect perception. In order to do this we must first make clear in 
what w~ the experience of 'seeing as' relates to ordinary perception. 
1 Several philosophers have argued that all seeing is or involves 'seeing as'. 
Why is it then that we call 'seeing as I a branch of imagination when 
imaginat~on , we argued , always goes beyond the content of present sensor,y 
experience ? What does this distinction between ordinary perception and 
1 See, for example, R.Chisholm, Perceiving, ch.I; P.F.Strawson, 
'Imagination and Perception" , cit.; B.N • Fleming , "Recognizing and Seeing 
As", Phil. Rev., 1957. 
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imaginative perception amount to if the latter is always involved in the 
former ? 
Here is an argument for saying that 'seeing as ' is always involved in 
ordinary perception: it is often possible to find a trick of thought that 
will enable us to experience a change of aspect or dawning of an aspect , 
even while looking at something that we straightforwardly~. I can make 
the tree that I am seeing change into a man with waving arms. If I can 
get this peculiar experience of a change of aspect, then there must have 
been something 1££m which the aspect changed: the tree must have already 
presented an aspect to me in rrw ordinary seeing of it. 
But does this argument really prove very much ? That we have this 
peculiar experience of change does not yet establish the point. Involved in 
ordinary sensor~ experience there is a belief (or tendency to believe) in 
the existence of an object. Indeed, it ha.s been argued that there is ~ from 
the menta.l point of view, nothing more to sensory experience than this. 1 
Whether or not this identification of sensory experience and perceptual 
belief is warranted we must concede that there is at least a close logical 
1 
connection between the two, just as there is a close logical connection 
between imagery and unasserted thought. In other words, sensory experience, 
unlike 'seeing as ' , is internally related to a belief: hence , unlike ' seeing 
as', it is not subject to the will. 
Now, in the case we are imagining, we are asked to believe that our 
ordinary perception of the tree involves the recognition of an aspect. This 
Vlould involve saying that all perceiving of the tree involves not only the 
belief in an object, but also something analogous to entert aining a thought 
about the" object (thinking of it). The consequence must be that anairnals, who 
1 
2 
See D.Armstrong, Perception and The Physical World. 
For example we might argue that necessarily in the normal case, visual 
experience accompanies visual belief and that visual experiences are 
classified by reference to beliefs • 
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can have beliefs but no other kind of thought, cannot see. Such a 
consequence is, I think, unacceptable. Of course human beings often will 
entertain propositions about what they see, but this is not an essential 
part of seeing. What is essential to seeing is the thought that there is 
an object (answering to some description). This thought is not subject to 
the will, and it can give rise to no embodiment in an aspect, in the sense 
of this term discussed so far. The particular experience which goes with 
it is the sense-impression, which is no more voluntary than the thought 
itself. Now it is undeniable that in some, Kantian sense, beliefs, and the 
visual experiences that depend on them, go beyond experience, and hence that 
our report of a sensor,y experience already contains more than the mere 
register of a visual sensation. But this does not affect the present 
issue, since it only serves to confirm that sensory experience is not, as it 
stands, one of the phenomena of imagination, since it lacks the essential 
relation to unasserted thought. Perceptual experience involves genuine 
interpretation, or judgment, and that is what the locution 'seeing as' might 
be used to refer to in this context. But in this case 'seeing as' means, 
in general, no more than 'taking for'. 
What happens, then, when the 'change of aspect' takes place? We can 
describe this quite simply' I imagine ~self not believing that the tree 
exists, and instead I think of the tree ~ something else. Suddenly the 
imaginative thought m~ become embodied in an image, which I see ~ the tree. 
There is no change of aspect, only the dawning of an aspect where previously 
t here was none. 
One cause of the view that all seeing involves 'seeing as' lies in the 
vagueness of the locution 'to see X as Y', which I have been using until 
( 
now as a purely technical term. Sometimes the locution means 'tb take X 
for ye, in which case it is of course understandable that philosophers have 
argued that all seeing involves 'seeing as'. For perception alw~s involves 
beliefs about the external world, and to say that someone took X for Y is to 
~. 
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say, with certain min.or qualifications, that he believed X to by Y, and that 
1 t b 1 th · It f . 1 le came 0 e ieve 1.S as a resu 0 sensory exper1.ence. 
However, this vagueness in the notion of 'seeing as' extends beyond the 
fact that it is sometimes used to refer to perceptual beliefs. I ndeed the 
particular phenomenon so far described under this heading is not even 
typical of all aesthetic experience, as we shall see. It is clear from 
the start that 'seeing as' can be used to refer to attitudes and emotions, 
and this use tends to occur intertwined with the perceptual use. When I 
say of someone that he sees his mother as the most perfect of God's 
creatures, or that he sees social failure as more humiliating than the loss 
of private affections, or that he sees his neighbour as hateful, I am 
referring to his emotions and attitudes. 
Furthermore, the locution tseeing as' is associated with certain modes 
of what we might call interpretation - this in two ways. irst, there are 
such cases as the interpretation of motives, of fine points of history , and 
so on; cases where judgment is necessarily tentative or uncertain , and where 
imaginative hypotheses are more in place than dogmatic assertions. For 
example, I may say ' Whereas John saw his behaviour as jealous , I saw it as 
motivated by a nervous concern for his wife's state of health'. What 
characterises these cases - and distinguishes them from' seeing as' in the 
perceptual sense - is the fact that here 'seeing as' aims at truth. It 
involves a tentative judgment. It is not possible for both John and myself 
to be right, and in this sense the phenomenon of a 'double aspect' cannot 
arise. 
Secondly, there is a rather more subtle kind of tseeing as', which 
cannot be said to aim at truth, so much as at coherence. This is 
" 
emphasised in particular by memory judgments, where, for example, the truth 
1 
'Seeing as' might also be used to report a likeness of appearance : tne 
analysis of this will be suggested in Chapter Eleven. 
.', 
I' 
• 
141 
s~, with certain minor qualifications, that he believed X to be Y, and that 
he came to believe this as a result of sensor,y e~erience. (Note: 'Seeing 
as G might also be used to report a likeness of appearance: the analysis of 
this will be suggested in Chapter Eleven.) 
However, this vagueness in the notion of 'seeing as' extends beyond the 
fact that it is sometimes used to refer to perceptual beliefs. Indeed the 
particular phenomen~n so far described under this heading is not even 
typical of all aesthetic experience, as we shall see. It is clear from 
the start that ' seeing as' can be used to refer to attitudes and emotions, 
and this use tends to occur intertwined with the perceptual use. When I 
say of someone that he sees his mother as the most perfect of God's 
creatures, or that he sees social failure as more humiliating than the loss 
of private affections, or that he sees his neighbour as hateful, I am 
referring to his emotions and attitudes. 
Furthermore, the locution 'seeing as' is associated with certain modes 
of what we might call interpretation - this in two w~s. First, there are 
such cases as the interpretation of motives, of fine points of histor,y, and 
so on; cases where judgment is necessarily tentative or uncertain, and where 
imaginative nypotheses are more in place than dogmatic assertions. For 
example, I m~ s~ ' Whereas John saw his behaviour as jealous, I saw it as 
motivated b,y a nervous concern for his wife ' s state of healt h'. What 
characterises these cases - and distinguishes them from ' seeing as' in the 
perceptual sense - is the fact that here 'seeing as ' aims at truth. It 
involves a tentative judgment. It is not possible for both John and mlfself 
to be right, and in this sense the phenomenon of a ' double aspect ' cannot 
arise. .' 
Secondly, there is a rather more subtle kind of 'seeing as ' , which 
cannot be said to aim at truth, so much as at coherence. This is 
emphasised in particular by memor.y judgments, where, for example, the truth 
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of the matter is either long established, or beyond the reach of further 
knowledge, but where it may still be necessar,y to form some kind of 
'picture' of past experience. Indeed, everyone forms in this way a 
'picture' of his past existence, and in so far as more than one picture may 
be compatible with the totality of his knowledge, a phenomenon somewhat 
analogous to tbe double aspect can arise. For example, a man's vision of 
his childhood in old age may become totally transformed. Events that were 
confused, chaotic , or trivial at the time form into more coherent patterns 
under the influence of ideas acquired in later life. Some such process 
can occur in psychoanalysis (an activity that Wittgenstein explicitly 
compared with aesthetic judgmen~; but it is by no means a recent discovery. 
Consider, for example , the famous opening sentence of the Vita Nuova: 'In 
quella parte del libro della mia memoria, dinanzi alIa quale poco si 
potrebbe leggere, si trova una rubrica, la quale dice: incipit Vita Nova.' 
Clearly such a rubric could only be the result of later reflection:, and yet 
it has become, as it were, part of the remembered experience itself. The 
picture that Dante has formed of his child.hood experience has - by drawing 
it into relation with later events - given to the experience a character 
that no child could have discovered in it. 
Finally, we should note that the phrase "seeing X as Y" may be used 
simply as a substitute for "thinking of X as Y". In effect then, 'seeing 
as' has two dimensions: one of thought, and one of experience. As thought 
it might refer either to a variety of quasi-interpretative attitudes , or 
to the imaginative thinking of an object as something that it is not. 
This second kind of thought process seems to underly the experience of 
'seeing as' which we might be tempted to describe as the senso~ 'embodiment' ~ , -" 
of just this thoug~t. 
Now it might be asked 'What does it matter if there should be no 
'experience' of seeing as ? Is the thought process itself not enough? 
In fact it does matter. For when we examine the phenomenon we must conclude 
143 
that it is impossible to treat the sensory aspect of 'seeing as' as a mere 
optional addition to an underlying core of thought. For we cannot, in 
fact, give a full independent account of a thought process to which the 
sensory experience of 'seeing as' is related in this simple way. All we 
can do is describe thought processes - such as the quasi-interpretative 
attitudes mentioned above - that are in some way analogous to ' seeing as'. 
In other words, it is wrong to think that, when a man sees a picture as a 
cow then it is first that he thinks of it as a cow (where this thought is of 
the unasserted kind discussed at the beginning of this chapter), and then 
(or perhaps simultaneously) that this imaginative thought becomes embodied 
in an experience, so that he also sees the picture as he imagines it. 
For it is clear that, in the experiential sense of ' seeing as', the thought 
cannot be isolated from the experience and described independently. 
Suppose that I am looking at a picture and see it as a man. It does 
not seem unnatural to say that I am also thinking of something - whether it 
be the picture, or the figUl~ - as a man. But it could hardly be maintained 
that I have before rnlf mind a proposition of the form 'This picture (or this 
configuration of lines) is a man'. If I entertain a proposition then it i s 
the proposition that this, namely, the thing in the picture, is a man. 
But in that case, the thought that I have must be described in terms of the 
aspect that I ' see ' and not vice versa. Again, if I entertain the 
proposition that this tWhatever it is) is some man, then which particular 
man do I have in mind ? Surely once more the only answer is this man, or 
the man who looks like this - pointing to the picture. 
In other words, the attempt to give an independent description of the 
thought: involved in the seeing of an aspect cannot be carried through. 
Moreover, this result is hardly surprising. For when we look at 'seeing 
as' from outside, from the point of view of its expression, we find that it 
is impossible to identify any object that is thought of as something else. 
,I, 
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For if there are thoughts characteristically expressed in 'seeing as' they 
are not thoughts about the tmaterial) object - the picture that is seen. 
It would be natural to express one's perception of an aspect in the terms 
'It is a man1', but not in the terms 'The picture is a man!'. The question 
'What is a man?' then makes no sense. For the 'it' in 'It is a man' was 
not intended to refer1 - on the contrar,y, it stands proxy for an intentional 
object of sight, and hence marks a position that is referentially opaque. 
It follows that the attempt to describe the component of thought in 'seeing 
as' in terms of 'thinking of X as y' is illegitimate. It is for this 
reason that we might prefer to speak not of seeing X as Y, but rather of 
seeing Y l!l X. 
What, then, becomes of our previous conclusion that 'seeing as', like 
imagery, is a species of thought? I think that we can still abide by 
this conclusion. But we must remember that there need not be a thought 
which both fully specifies the intellectual content of 'seeing X as ye, and 
which can be itself described independently of this experience. • Seeing 
as', like imagery, was assimilated to thought because it shared the formal 
and exterior characteristics which are definitive of thought. But this 
does not mean that we must be able to split up the mental process of seeing 
a picture as a man into two components - a thought and an experience - even 
though there are thoughts which clearly influence the way the picture is 
seen, and even though we may well have the sense that it is precisely these 
thoughts that we see, as it were , embodied in the picture. 
This becomes clearer as we turn our attention once more to the case of 
seeing. When I see a man I have a visual experience, and intimately 
connected ~ith this experience there is a perceptual belief. Now there 
are powerful arguments - as I have already mentioned - for saying that the 
experience and the belief are internally related. The experience of 
seeing a man carries with it - in the normal case - the belief in the presence 
1 
E.Bedford, 'Seeing Paintings', A.S.S.V., 1966. 
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of a man. But can we specify this belief in detail ? Again we find a 
difficulty, not wholly unlike the difficulty we experienced in trying to 
describe the thought process involved in 'seeing as'. To say that the 
belief is 'There is a man', is scarcely to do justice to the complexity 
of perceptual experience, just as we scarcely do justice to :the complexity 
of 'seeing as' if we describe the thought-component of seeing a picture as 
a man in the terms 'There is a man'. The man appears in each case enmeshed 
in a complex of visual features. We see a tall man, in a red coat , with 
pink hands and an arrogant grin. But it would be unwise to think that 
we have any means of completing this description. We do not seem to be 
able to capture the content of what is seen in the form of a proposition 
that is , as it were, simultaneously believed. For if we attempt to describe 
in full what it is that we believe about the man that we see, then we must 
have recourse to the fact that he has a certain appearance: we believe that 
he looks a certain way. But now, of course, we have identified the belief 
in terms of the way the man looks, and so have not described it independently 
of the visual experience. 
The quest for a total and independent specification of the thought 
involved in 'seeing as' is as out of place as the request for a total and 
independent specification of the belief involved in visual experience. 
But it is clear that this is no more an argument for saying that 'seeing 
as' is not a mode of thought than it is for saying that visual experience 
is not (in some sense) a mode of belief. We must say that the thought 
involved in 'seeing as' is in some measure sui generis: it has an 
irreducibly sensuous character. However, its relation to other modes of 
thought (in particular to the mode: 'thinking of X as Y') can be , 
delineated , and this can , as we have seen, shed light on its essentially 
'unasserted' character. In conclusion we might say that the relation 
between 'seeing as' and perception mirrors the relation between imagination 
and belief. 'Seeing as' is like an 'unasserted' visual experience: it is 
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the embodiment of a thought which, if 'asserted', would amount to a genuine 
perception, just as imagination, if 'asserted', amounts to genuine belief. 
l'his point is very important, since, as we shall see, the lunasserted' 
nature of 'seeing as' dictates the structure of aesthetic experience. 
We have developed what I hope is an adequate theory of imagination, 
and we must now use it to describe the aspects of aesthetic experience that 
have until now proved so elusive. This I shall do in the next chapter, 
before moving on to an account of the conditions of aesthetic experience 
in general. In conclusion it may be wondered how the above account of 
imagination squares with certain prevalent views - f or example the view that 
'seeing as' involves the organisation of experience through a concept, and 
that Iseeing as' is somehow a basic ingredient in all perception. These 
doctrines are combined in the Kantian theory of imagination. as the fitting 
1 
of 'intuitions' into a sensory manifold , according to conceptual rules. 
What I have said implies a piecemeal account of visual phenomena in terms 
of the various categories of thought: to this extent it goes against the 
Kantian view. In Chapters Ten and Eleven I shall show in more detail why 
I think that such a view is mistaken. 
1 This is the view sketched and defended by strawson in "Imagination 
and Perception". 
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CHAPl'ER EIG Hr 
IMAGINATION AND AESTHErIC ElCPERIENCE 
The argument of the last chapter stopped short of describing the 
precise kind of 'seeing as' that is involved in aesthetic' judgment. In 
fact, not only is there more than one kind; it is also difficult to 
describe any of the several kinds with adequate precision. However, in 
this chapter, I wish to illustrate some of the more important connections 
between aspect perception and aesthetic judgment, basing ~ remarks on 
the theories just expounded. 
Let us return to our principal example - the sadness of music. 
Normally we do not doubt that the recognition of this sadness involves 
something like an experience - you have to hear the sadness in the music. 
And the use of this locution seems to suggest that the case is not so ver,y 
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far removed from the examples of 'seeing as' discussed in the last chapter. 
But if this is so, we ought to be able to give at least a partial 
description of the thought that is 'embodied' in the experience. Can this 
be done ? Clearly, it must be done if the objections of Chapter Six -
objections from which this analysis of imagination began - are to be 
answered. For we have yet to show that there is a core of thought on which 
aesthetic experiences are founded, and that this core of thought is 
genuinely distinguished f»om belief. 
In fact: it is easy to see that, in a great many ways, ' hearing the 
sadness in the music' is formally analogous to 'seeing the man in the 
picture';~ and this might lead us to suspect that the thought involved must 
belong to the same unasserted category. To see this, we have but to 
resume the features of 'seeing as' that this particular auditory experience 
shares. For we soon discover that 'hearing the sadness' has all the 
," 
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thought-like characteristics possessed by 'seeing as'. For example, its 
principle expression is verbal, and consists in descriptions that the 
subject wishes to apply to the music. And these descriptions have an 
unasserted character. Indeed, if he is to count as understanding them, 
the subject must show that he does not mean them literally. Moreover, it 
makes sense (at least in some contexts) to order someone to try to hear the 
music as sad, rather than as, say, langorous or tender. (And again this 
point is not affected by the impossibility, in any case, of actually 
obeying the order). Normally, of course, one does not order people to 
try to hear music in a certain way; rather one attempts to persuade them. 
One says 'Hear it as sad, and then it will make more sense to you'. 
I think we can see that the structure of thought involved in our 
example of aesthetic judgment is not that of the quasi-interpretative 
'seeing as' discussed at the end of the last chapter - although there is a 
sense in which it is legitimate to talk of aesthetic description as a kind 
of 'interpretation' of a work of art. 1 For in this case 'interpretation' 
is not primarily cognitive. it does not aim at literal truth. Nor can we 
s~ that the prime import of the judgment that a piece of musio is sad is 
simply to 'bring the musio under a conoept ('sadness')'. For, given that 
'sadness' is not a concept under which the music could literally fall, 
this description of aesthetic judgment is empty. Nor, again, can we say 
that the prime purpose of the judgment (to return to the theme of Chapter 
Four) is to indicate analogies. To say this is to confuse meaning and 
justification in an area where we have every reason for saying that the 
two concept s - which can only co-exist in the notion of a trut h-condi tion -
fall apart. In fact, the comparison with aspects is all that we have to 
.~ 
fall back on if we wish to illuminate the conditions for the acceptance of 
this kind of aesthetic judgment. 
1 See S. Hampshire, "Types of Interpretation", itl S.Hook (ed.), Art and 
Philosophy. 
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Just as two aspects can be seen in the same first-order features of a 
fi£ure, so can two rival 'interpretations' of a work of art find support 
in identioal descriptions of it. And in fact the same phenomenon of a 
double-aspect m~ arise in aesthetic judgment. While there are w~s of 
dismissing some 'interpretations' as whimsical or unilluminating, more than 
one interpretation ~ be equally helpful. As an example it is useful this 
time to take a passage of music, for it is with music that the problem of 
aesthetic description is at its most acute. Take the slow movement of 
Schubert's penultimate piano sonata, in A major. This begins with a 
melancholy theme in the minor key. Suppose a critic, in discussing this 
work, wished to describe the particular quality of this opening passage, to 
show the extent to which poignaney is qualified qy irony, and so on, as 
might be necessary to convey a full understanding of the passage. 
It would be normal to begin with a kind of analogical catalogue of 
elements, hoping to bring out the contribution of each to the overall effect. 
Suppose, for example , that we were to argue in the following manner: "The 
melody begins on ' the min.or third: it has that character of being 'pulled 
down', of drooping towards the tonic, which results from the tonic being 
sounded simultaneously in the bass. The left hand is simple and bare, 
providing no more than a skeleton of octaves and fifths, which leave to the 
melody the principle task of expression. When the melody falls a semitone, 
however, the bass falls with it, resulting in an unstable harmony (first 
inversion) that necessitates an upward move. It might be said of this 
fall, on account of its heaviness (the bass falling with it) and its 
inevitability (it began on the minor third) that there is something 
lassitudinous about it • 
. :
And yet, at the same time, because of the unstable 
harmony in which it results, necessitating an upward move, it gives the 
impression of a strength that returns through the melanoholy movement, 
pushing it onward ••• ". To argue in this way is to p~ck out certain 
salient features, so describing them that they seem to contribute to the 
~\ 
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emotional quality with which the melody began. (It is as though the 
melody were 'imitating' a state of mind. ) For example , there is the sudden 
rise of the melody into the relative major, from which point it gains 
strength to rise again - though onto the minor sixth and a dissonant 
harmony (dominant minor ninth - see the asterisk in the example) that drags 
it, through a series of faltering notes, back onto the tonic from where it 
begins again. It is interesting to examine the transformation of the 
theme as it is repeated in a new context, almost without change, over a 
bass equally bare and unornamented, in the relative major. (It is a great 
part of Schubert's genius that he could discover these melodies which, while 
beautiful and subtle in themselves, suffer such transformations with hardly 
a changed note - cf. par excellence the slow movement of the last sonata. 
Thus a theme seldom wears its character on its face, but must be understood 
through layers of careful irony.) A new strain of tenderness is introduced 
by this transformation , which remains when the minor key reasserts itself , 
adding dignity to the conclusion. 
Producing' some such analogical description has the effect of uniting 
the firs t -order features of the work under a particular 'interpretation'; 
in which case it is not difficult to see that, since any detail can be made 
to upset the interpretation, every detail is to that extent answerable to 
it, and can play a determining role in deCiding on the correct interpretation 
of the piece. Likewise, to decide on the emotional value of anyone part 
of the work it is never possible to dismiss other parts as irrelevant. 
The significance of ' Un Amour de Swann' only emerges in i t s sequel, and to 
characterise the emotion expressed in a novel which, taken alone, can only 
strike the reader as vacuous, we must refer to parts of the total work 
l 
which come l ong after the episode of Swann's love is forgotten. 
Now, it is plain that suoh analogical interpretations as the one I 
have given are subjeot to the kind of reasoning that produces double 
aspeots. One man can see a work of art as tragio , another as ironical 
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(Death in Venice, s~), both be able to justif,y their judgments to each 
other, and both refer to the same first-order features in doing so. It 
is clear that the phenomena of the double-aspect can be translated into the 
realm of critical 'interpretation' substantially unchanged. Indeed, 
emotional ambiguity has often been prized, as an artistic virtue. 
Troubadours would deliberately obscure their poems so that it was 
impossible to decide whether the love they expressed was religious or 
sensual. One mark of a successful troubadour poem is that the ambiguity 
should strike the reader as a unity, so that the love expressed seems both 
religious and profane at once. In this w~ the poems came to express an 
ideal, an ideal which animated Provence during the Middle Ages and which 
reached its culminating expression in Florence at a later time - in the 
'Vita Nuova' of Dante and the 'Donna mi Prega' of his friend Cavalcanti. 
As an example, we might choose the falling phrase from the Schubert 
slow movement (Ex. 1). This could equally be described as dance-like or 
stumbling, as tenderly melancholy or heavily sad. Perhaps one might s~ 
that the contex~ decides between the two descriptions, but the context 
only seems to have weight when considered in the light of some relevant 
interpretation. Now the question arises 'Where do we stop?·, and we see 
that this question cannot have the kind of answer that would be associated 
with the quasi-interpretative idea of 'seeing as' discussed in the last 
chapter. That is, we do not stop when we have arrived at the right answer, 
when we have shown that the music is, literally, melancholy. For such an 
answer would not be meaningful. In other words, the judgment is wholly 
unlike the interpretation of the feelings and emotions of another man, 
where, however many rival opinions there may be, not more than one of them 
l 
can be right. In the case of the aesthetic judgment, the phenomenon of a 
double aspect m~ endure with just the same degree of tenacity as the double 
aspect of an ambiguous figure. 
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Now it may be argued that there are important differences between 
representation and expression, and that it is on account of these 
di f ferences wrong to explain the recognition of what we might call 
'expressive' features (such as 'sadness') in terms of the recognition of 
the aspects that embo~ representation. For it is arguable that whereas 
an aspect is alwqys of some definite object, what is expressed is alwqys 
1 
a feature or property. But if this is so, then we should be able to 
identify some object to which this expressive feature is ascr ibed. And 
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in fact there is such an object in the case we are considering , namely, the 
music itsel f . Hence it might seem that the argument that, in the sentence 
' I t is a man I , said of an aspect , the 'it' does not refer to the picture, 
cannot be extended to cover such expressive features as sadness. For when 
I sqy I It is sad' I . am speaking of the music, to which 1 attribute the 
aesthetic t'eature of sadness. 
But this argument is scarcely conclusive, and could have weight only 
if we were to construe the sadness that is attributed to music as a genuine 
property. I have already argued that this is impossible. Now it is often 
said that the sadness that we hear in music is in a sense unattributed. 
That is, it is something that seems to wander detached in the music, and 
although we can imagine a subject for it (the composer, say) , it is certainly 
true that this imagined subject is not, and cannot be, present in the music 
in that way that he might be present in the aspect of a picture. The 
question is , does this really matter ? In a wqy it does matter, since 
we find that it is even more difficult to specify the thought that is 
'embodied' in the perception of the music's sadness. The thought 'It is 
sad' will scarcely suffice, since in this case there is no 'it'. And the 
thought 'There is sadness' is misleading, to say the least. 
What we can sqy, however, is that the experience of hearing the sadness 
in the music is in some irreducible way analogous to hearing the expression 
1 N .Goodman, Languages of Art. 
Chapter Twelve • 
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of sadness in another ' s voice. That is, we can do as we did for 'seeing as', 
and define the element of thought in terms of the experience. Hearing the 
sadness in the music then becomes the ' unasserted' auditory percept ion of 
sadness. In other words, we can resuscitate the original intuition of 
' affective ' theories of aesthetic judgment. It is not that the music is 
analogous to the emotion , but rather that the experience of hearing the 
music is analogous to the experience of hearing the emotion. Our theory 
of imagination has, I hope, rescued this contention from the triviality and 
circularity into which it naturally seems to fall. What is significant is 
that, if we attempt to explain, by analogy and approximation, the element of 
thought involved in hearing the music as sad, then we must - as in the case 
of 'seeing as' - resort to the general category of unasserted thought, and 
not to the category of judgment or belief. 
The affective theo~J of aesthetic description has, then, been vindicated, 
and substance has been given to the logical analogy between aesthetic 
perception and aspect perception that was noted in Chapter Four. It goes 
without saying that we can also show how it is that the term 'sad' has the 
same meaning when applied to music and when applied to men, just as the 
term 'duck' has the same meaning when used to describe an aspect and when 
used to denote a duck. But while the problems that we experienced over 
the nature of aesthetic description have, I think , now been largely solved, 
there remains a problem about the nature of aesthetic experience. In 
Chapter Six I spoke of the acceptance conditions of some aesthetic judgments 
as 'responses ' . In fact this was in one way misleading, since it seems 
to suggest that the appreciation of a work of art is something that goes 
on after the work has been heard or seen. The comparison with aspects 
implies that ther~ is something like an experience which accompanies the 
hearing or seeing of the work of art, and which is indeed not truly separable 
from that seeing or hearing. From the point of view of the autonomw of 
aesthetic experience this is a more satisfacto~J conClusion. But having 
,I, 
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isolated the core of thought which defines this experience, we still have 
to describe the feelings, reactions and so on that might arise out of this 
thought. For it would seem to follow that these feelings will enter as 
an important and perhaps even determining feature into aesthetic experience 
as a whole, and if the perception of aesthetic features has any value it 
may well be on account of the feelings to which it gives rise. 
It is a consequence of the theories of the last chapter that the mental 
life of the imagination will be quite different from that of judgment or 
belief. If there are, as has been argued, aesthetic emotions (which can be, 
as it were, 'seen' in their objects, in the manner of aspects) then these 
emotions must be founded on imagination and not on judgment. It is 
therefore impossible that they should be identified in a similarw~. 
Our account of aesthetic experience will therefore grant to these emotions 
a measure of the autonomy that has often been claimed for them. But it was 
pointed out en passant in Chapter Six that there is a difficulty inherent in 
the idea of autonornlf. We wish to say that rnlf response to a sad poem, and 
-, 
my response to a sad person are in some w~ comparable. How else can we 
explain the importance of the poem's sadness? Yet in the one case the 
reaction is founded on a belief, and in the other case it is founded on a 
mere 'unasserted' thought. How, then, can the emotions be comparable, and 
how can the one be used to identify and make clear the nature of the other ? 
We see that our theor,y of imagination is after all in danger of doing us a 
great disservice in destroying the necessary continuity of aesthetic and 
non-aesthetic experience. 
There are certain ways of answering this question that are not open to 
us. For ekample, it is not possible to argue that in aesthetic experience 
one is under some kind of illusion, bel ioving, s~, that one stands before 
the man himself and not before his picture. As RuSkin puts ita 
,I, 
" 
, 
"The action of the imagination is a voluntary summoning of 
the conceptions of things absent or impossible, and the 
pleasure and nobility of the imagination consists in its 
knowledge and contemplation of them as such, i.e. in the 
knowledge of their actual absence or impossibility at the 
moment of their apparent presence or reality" 1 
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Nor is it possible to subscribe to the traditional theory of 'empathy I , that 
posits an 'ideal' self as the imaginary subject of aesthetic emotions. 2 
This supposition that aesthetic emotions are attributed to an imaginary 
self, rather than to the real self, cannot help us to circumvent the 
present difficulty. For to attribute the emotion to an ' imaginaryl self 
is not to attribute it. The question still remains I in what sense is 
what 1 feel towards the music comparable to what 1 feel in the presence of 
sadness ? 
To appreciate the force of the we.s.ent difficulty it is necessary to 
remember the intimate connections that exist between emotion and belief, 
and between emotion and desire. Normally, as the argument about 'formal 
objectsl given in Chapter Six makes clear, an emotion is identified partly 
in terms of a belief. It follows from the statement that a man is afraid, 
for example, that he believes that there is or might be something harmful 
to him. It also follows that he desires to avoid that thing. We might 
s~ - simplifying somewhat - that an emotion is,normally, a complex of 
belief and desire, united in a causal relation. But aesthetic emotions 
are not founded on belief but rather on the entertaining of propositions 
unasserted. Before an enraged lion I feel fear, and ~ fear is of a 
piece with the awareness of a dangerous object. But before a lion-hunt by 
Rubens or Delacroix I have no such awarenessl the propositions that I 
entertain about the dangerous object are not asserted. How then can ~ 
emotions in the two cases be compared ? Moreover, without the beliefs 
1 J.Ruskin, Seven LamES of Architecture, ch.2, section III. 
2 Cf. Th. Lipps, in M. Rader, £!i., p.379. 
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characteristic of fear I do not have the desire to avoid what I seel on the 
contrary, I desire to look at the painting and 'drink in' its horrifying 
aspect. If neither the belief nor the desire characteristic of fear are 
present, in what Wa;[ can I be said to feel anything resembling fear ? 
The response to the picture can be compared with the response to a 
real lion-hunt in two Wa;[S. First, we might compare them on the level of 
normal, 'factual' emotion, as I have already doneo In one case I believe 
IDlfself to be in the presence of a lion-hunt, with all that this entails. 
Co~sequently, I desire a successful outcome; I desire that the danger should 
be removed and the lion's ferocity overcome. In the other case I believe 
myself to be in the presence of a painted canvas, and I desire to look at 
it. On this level, comparison of the two emotional states is fruitless. 
But suppose now that I see the aspect of the painting, and so come to, as it 
were, imagine just what in the 'normal' case I would also believe. It is 
now as though I were entertaining unasserted just those propositions that 
in the other case I would take for true. Why do we not Sa;[ that I also 
entertain, along with these propositions, the desires that would also'r in 
the normal circumstance, arise out of them? Why can I not 'entertain' 
desires ? For not only ma;[ I become excited by what I see, imagining what 
I would do in the real event of a lion-hunts I can also imagine llW fear (in 
the sense of 'imagining what it is like' that relates to knowledge by 
acquaintance) • In other words, just as I may recreate in llW imagination 
the thoughts that I would have, so can I recreate the feelings that these 
thoughts give rise to. (Something comparable to this occurs when one 
imagines 'what it is like' to die in battle, or to discover oneself heir to 
a fortune.) In describing the emotion that a man feels towards the aspect 
{ 
of a picture, therefore, we refer to the 'imagined counterpart' of his 
reaction to the situation depicted. In the only sense that matters we 
might then say that the emotion he feels in response to the picture is the 
'same' as (and classified by reference to) the emotion he would feel towards 
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the depicted situation. For his feeling towards what he sees in the 
picture is, like his perception itself, only tunasserted'. 
But of course, in another sense, the emotion is not the same, and it 
is important to know what the difference consists in. The above account 
has an ominously phenomenological sound. Surely we should be able to say 
how someone manifests emotions of this kind? But if there are no beliefs 
on which they are founded, and no desires embodied in them, how are they 
expressed at all ? 
Now if there were no more to aesthetic experience than the kind of 
unasserted thought that we have analysed, this question would pose no 
difficulty. For we could readily set about describing the verbal 
expression of unasserted thought. But this would not satisf,yus. For 
not only is it clearly true that aesthetic experience involves emotion, it 
is also true that if it did not involve emotion, or something like emotion, 
we would be far less able to indicate its value. Is the expression of 
aesthetic experience the expression of anything more than a thought 1 
It is not unusual for someone , on looking at the portrait of a child , 
say , to remark that it awakens in him a feeling of tenderness. Do we 
dismiss this remark as metaphor? I think not. For it occurs (typically) 
in circumstances that forbid us from construing it as the mere expression 
of a thought. First of all, we must not neglect the fact that a man wishes 
to describe his feeling in this way - it is an integral part of the 
experience that tenderness should be called to mind. Secondly, the subject 
will describe the object of his feeling in terms that can themselves be 
construed as an expression of feeling. It is significant that he describes 
the painting in a certain tone of voice (not ~ tone of voice is 
appropriate to the remark), and that he makes connections with his attitudes 
and emotions in other circumstances that are important to him. It is for 
this reason that we have a clear test of the sincerity of his remark in his 
," 
j, 
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subsequent behaviour. A man who deolares that his tender feelings have 
been awoken by the ohild he imagines in the pioture is at odds with himself 
when he shows himself unable to feel tenderness towards a real ohild. 
Thus, although we are supposing that his remarks betray an emotion in whioh 
neither belief nor desire is present, and whioh does not, therefore, have 
its oharacteristio forms of expression in action, but rather in the passive 
symptoms (such as the tears and sighs familiar from the theatre) that 
remain when all belief and desire have been subtracted, we may still test 
the sincerity of his remark through his subsequent behaviour. There is a 
non-oontingent oonneotion, therefore, between imagined emotion and the 
behaviour that, in other oiroumstanoes, oounts as an expression of the 
oorresponding 'real' emotion. What I feel in the presenoe of works of 
art may find its ultimate expression in mlf behaviour towards mlf fellows. 
~ 'imagined' feelings oan show their effeot in the expression of their 
'real' oounterparts. 
It will be objeoted that all these suggestions point to oonneotions 
witb behaviour that are remote from the aesthetio experienoe itself. If 
what I feel before the painted lion-hunt is something analogous to fear then 
it ought to be possible to oharacterise what I feel at the time in terms 
appropriate to fear. But suppose we were to characterise fear: we refer 
to the beliefs, the desires , the 'passive' symptoms suoh as trembling, 
sweating, and palpitating, and the oausal relations that bind all these 
together, And suppose we propose this (as would be correot) as a complete 
analysis of fear. Then someone might objeot that we have yet to explain 
what fear is like: what it feels like to be afraid. Here we can do no 
more than refer onoe again to the totality of the symptoms of fear,. including 
l 
its expression in language. And if we subtract from this description those 
elements that are expressions of the beliefs and desires characteristio of 
'real' fear, then there is no reason to think that we have not given a full 
oharacterisation, in what remains, of the symptoms of 'imagined' fear. But 
,,, 
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suppose our objector is not satisfied - like Siegfried. he wishes to know 
what fear is like, independently of its expression. In this case either 
he is asking to be made to feel fear ( so that he may ' know what it is like' ) . 
or else he is asking a question of pure phenomenology that has no coherent 
answer. It is no more possible to describe fear independently of its 
expression. origins and circumstances than it is possible to describe ~ 
mental state in terms of pure phenomenology. A phenomenological description 
is not. in the relevant sense, a description. A fortiori, it is no special 
objection to the notion of a purely ' aesthetic ' emotion that we cannot 
describe it independently of its expression, which is the expression of an 
emot i on that includes neither belief nor desire. Hence the so-called 
ineffability of aesthetic emotions is a logical consequence of their being 
mental states at all. 
It remains to be pointed out, however , that there is little of interest 
that can be said about aesthetic emotion, beyond describing the thoughts on 
which it is based, and referring to its expression in subsequent behaviour, 
when it is no longer strictly felt. It is through our words and our 
subsequent behaviour that we show our understanding of an emotion that we 
have entertained in thought - and it is the same with every case of 
' imagining what it is like'. It is not surprising, therefore, that the 
language in which we discuss works of art - the language of criticism - is 
primarily descriptive in form, and that it contains few attempts to classif,y 
the fee l ings aroused by art. There are no subtleties in our aesthetic 
emotions that are not matched and explained b,y subtleties in the thoughts 
on which they are founded. This briefly, is the reason why criticism must 
be concerned with interpretation and not with the recording of subjective 
! 
impressions. If we attempt to communicate an aesthetic emotion then VIe 
communicate a thought. An excellent illustration can be found in 
Shakespeare ' s description of the feelings of Lucrece before the painting of 
the sack of Troy. Lucrece's emotion is entirely captured by a sequence of 
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thoughts about imagined objects - there is no need for Shakespeare to say 
anything else about what she felt. 
We must now return to the analysis of aesthetic experience, in the 
light of this account. We are still far from a solution of the problem 
from which we began. We have shown that imagination , and emotions founded 
on imagination, have a part to play in aesthetic appreciation, and are 
expressed in the judgments to which this appreciation gives rise. But 
this does not show that imagination and aesthetic experience are co-
extensive. Indeed they are not. We have done no more, in solving the 
problem of aesthetic description, than to describe a single strand in 
aesthetic experience; we have not characterised aesthetic interest as a 
whole. But it will be seen that we are now in a position to answer the 
general question. 
• H 
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C HAPl'ER NINE 
THE AESTHETIC ATTITUDE 
The theory I have given oan be extended to oover a great variety of 
aesthetic descriptions. There is no speoial difficulty presented by any 
description employing a term with some independent primary use - hence 
judgments of comparison and of emotional content are in the main accounted 
for. Affective terms - such as ' moving', ' exciting', and 'unbearable' -
present no problem, and we may have every reason to expect that the notions 
of representation and expression will find a place in a theory that accounts 
both for the perception of aspects and for the recognition of emotional 
qualities. 
But this by no means exhausts the class of aesthetic descriptions. 
There remain descriptions belonging to roughly four separate kinds: 
descriptions of form, of accomplishment, of genre and of beauty. Now we 
can concede t hat an independent account might be necessary for those terms, 
such as ' tragic', ' comic', 'lyrio', and so on, that are used to classify 
works of art according to their genre. It may be said that the terms 
' tragic' and ' comio' do not refer only to the genre of a work: they are also 
used to describe the emotional or intellectual quality of its content. 
But this does not introduce any novel consideration into our theory of 
aesthetic judgment. For we describe not only works of art, but also the 
situations that they represent, as tragic, cOmio, melodramatio or farcioal. 
These terms fulfil a similar funotion in the description of works of art and 
in ordinary praotical and moral judgment, although the nature of aesthetic 
l 
interest will entail that the tragio and the oomic have a place in art which 
differs from their place in life. What we say about these terms may 
therefore await a general theory of appreciation • 
• 
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Similarly, it is no serious fault in a theor.Y of aesthetic description 
that it fails to account for the meaning of terms used to describe the 
technical accomplishment of works of art - 'well-made', 'polished', and so 
on. There is no reason to suppose that the use of these terms in aesthetic 
judgment differs from their normal use. If we have some idea of the 
interest that a work of art is designed to satisf.y, then there will be no 
special difficulty in knowing when a work is well made as an object of that 
interest. Alternatively, if these terms are used to describe the conformity 
of a work of art to a series of established requirements (whose justification 
is aesthetic), then again they are being used quite normally. 
There remain two classes of aesthetic description that we cannot 
assimilate to the theory given in previous chapters - descriptions of form, 
and descriptions that employ terms that have a primar,y aesthetic use. 
Descriptions of form are common in the criticism of architecture and abstract 
musics we m~ refer to the 'symmetr,y ' that exists between the subject of a 
fugue and its counter-subject, to the ' balance' of an arch, or to the 
' rhythm' of a cler estor,y. Purely aesthetic descriptions are likewise ver,y 
common , as we see from the following examples: ' Her dress is elegant ' , 'The 
music is lovely', 'The landscape is sublime'. This class extends to all 
the usual terms of aesthetic praise and dispraise , and its existence was one 
of the reasons given earlier for s~ing that there is such a thing as 
aesthetic interest, and that the aesthetic is a roughly integral realm of 
human experience. Hence it is ver.Y important that we should explain the 
meaning of judgments of this kind. Perhaps we have discovered , in the 
notion of imagination, a culminating point, as it were, in aesthetic 
experience. But it seems that we have given no account of aesthetic 
appreciation as a wh9le. 
I shall begin by considering judgments that employ purely aesthetic 
terms. Among the terms with a primar,y aesthetic use we findl ' lovely', 
' beautiful', ' elegant', ' ugly', ' pretty', and 'hideous'. These terms are 
• If 
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for the most part evaluative, used to express preferences for or against 
objects of aesthetic interest. I shall argue that there are, in fact, 
distinctively aesthetic attitudes, which are expressed in the judgments 
that employ these terms. I shall also argue that it is these attitudes that 
determine the structure of aesthetic experience. However, ~ arguments will 
be far from conclusive, and it is well to point out from the start that I 
shall be assuming that, where there are 'evaluative' judgments, there are 
also attitudes that give these judgments their point. This is not a view 
that I shall be concerned to argue for. Only at the end of the chapter will 
it be possible to estimate the plausibility of the premises from which it 
begins. 
However, a difficulty arises immediately. It is arguable that the 
purely aesthetic terms are not evaluative, or not only evaluative. They 
seem to have a descriptive function also. We feel that there is a 
distinction bet een spmetli:in€h~ being elegant and its being beautiful, and it 
is not always or necessarily a virtue from the aesthetic point of view to be 
either. It is meaningful to argue that some of James' stories would be 
better for being less bea~tiful, or that the elegance of Satie's music is a 
vice of style. I.A.Richards attempted to answer this problem in terms of 
an emotivist theor.y of aesthetic description: 
••• we have the special apparatus of the aesthetic or 'projectile' 
adjectives. We express our feeling qy describing the object which 
excites it as splendid, glorious, ~, horrid, lovely, pretty ••• 
words which indicate not so much the nature of the object as the 
character of our feelings towards it. • ••• Some of these words ••• 
m~ be used together, while others bar one another out. A thing 
m~ be both grand and sublime, it can be glorious and beautiful, or 
gorgeous and ugly, but it can hardly be both pretty and beautiful, 
it can certainly not be pretty and sublime. These accordances and 
incompatibilities reflect the organisation of our feelings, the 
relations that hold between them... 1 
! 
Richards makes no attempt to describe the separate feelings that are collated 
1 Practical Criticism, p.220 • 
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with the several 'aesthetic' terms, and one suspects that the task would 
prove extremely difficult. The terms seem not to indicate distinct 
feelings but rather to convey something about the character of their objects 
in virtue of which we like or dislike them. If there are distinct feelings 
involved, then their distinction is acquired through the distinction of their 
objects, and not vice versa. We must try to make clear how the purely 
'aesthetic' terms can also attribute a character to objects, how a supposedly 
'evaluative' judgment can nonetheless convey something definite about the 
object to which it is applied. 
There are certain features of the use of aesthetic terms that are worth 
considering. First, we should note their frequent occurrence ih inte~ 
jections: it is as corrmon to hear 'How eleganU', 'How beautiful1', 'How 
ugly!', and 'How sublime!' as it is to hear, for example, 'The Ninth $ymphony 
is beautiful' , 'I think she dresses elegantly' , 'If it is a beautiful film 
then I shall go and see it'. Terms of which this is true have, in general, 
an evaluative use which connects them with the expression of fav.ourable or 
unfavourable attitudes. Secondly, while it is not odd t o s~ 'It is good 
to do X, but I do not like doing it', or 'X is a good man, but I take no 
pleasure in his company', it is odd to s~ similar things in the context of 
aesthetic judgment. For example, it is odd to say II cannot stand the sight 
of an elegant horse', or lIt is a beautiful novel and I never want to read it 
again', or II like the look of that - it is the most hideous suit I have ever 
seen'. Only in special circumstances would these locutions make sense at 
all. This leads us to suspect that aesthetic appreciation involves 
enjoyment of , or pleasure in, an object. Enjoyment and pleasure occup,y a 
central plape in the aesthetic attitude . We might be tempted to think 
that purely ae sthetic descriptions are used primari ly as subst i tute s for 
i nterjections, in which pleasure or displeasure find expression. 
Wit tgenstein , for example , argues that it i s central to the l ogic of purely 
. , 
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aesthetic terms that they can be learned as interjections. 1 However, we 
cannot derive an account of the meaning of these terms from this fact 
alone. It is an important fact that a word is used as an adjective, a fact 
that prevents us from explaining its meaning as that of an interjection. 
An ad jective occurs in sentences that can undergo all the logical transforma-
tions of the indicative form. It is therefore an odd fact if a word that is 
learned as an interjection can come to have an adjectival use, a fact that 
should tell us something important about the attitude or preference connected 
with it. 
In Chapter Five I showed how it is possible for an adjective to have a 
non-descriptive meaning. However, I made no attempt to discuss the 
conditions under which a non-descriptive judgment may possess a stable 
propositional form. I argued that, in the case of such judgments, the 
propositional (or descriptive ) form is in some sense an anomaly. It is to 
be expected that, under the right kind of stress, it will break down and give 
way to a statement of personal choice. This is in fact what we discover 
with many judgment~ that are used to convey 'matters of taste ' . · For 
example, the propositional form of the judgment ' Strawberries are nice' m~ 
often be dropped in the face of criticism. If asked ' Do you really think so?' 
there will alw~s be a point at which I shall find it more reasonable to say 
'I like strawberries at least' - a judgment whose acceptance is easier to 
demand. Now it is an interesting fact that this breakdown of propositional 
form occurs more readily for some classes of judgment than it does for others. 
While it is possible to argue that the condition for the acceptance of a moral 
judgment is, typically, an attitude, we find that it is extremely odd to 
replace a moral judgment with a subjective statement. We cannot replace 'X 
is good' with ' At least 1 approve of XI , for not only does the second judgment 
show a partial \rlthdrawal of the commitment expressed in the first, it is even 
1 Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics etc., section 7 • 
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difficult to make sense of it at all. Aesthetic judgments seem to lie 
somewhere between t he two extremes of moral and gustatory jUdgments. The 
propositiona1 form of ' The ~phony is beautiful ' is stable, but it is not 
so stable as the propositiona1 form of a moral judgment. When questioned 
it is possible to withdraw to '1 found it beautiful at least ' , with a 
certain 1Qss of face, but without logical absurdity.1 
In other words , the propositional form of a judgment expressing 
preference m~ be more or less stable, depending on the kind of preference 
expressed . Although the grammatical form of ' Strawberri es are nice ' allows 
such transformations as 'If strawberries are nice then we will buy some ', 
~he use of a sentence of this kind seems t o presuppose a certain background 
of understanding and agreement. Neither moral judgments nor aesthetic 
j udgment s are like this. They have a f urther quality that gives point to 
their proposi tional form, even in unasserted contexts, in t he absence of any 
pre-established background. This quality is a matter of degree (moral 
judgments clearly possess it to a greater degree than aest hetic judgments ) , 
and I shall attempt t o explain it as a property of the attitudes that 
underly these particular kinds of judgment. 
Consider the ' affective' terms: ' moving ' , ' irritating ' , ' boring ' , and so 
on. These terms are not correctly used by someone in aesthetic judgment if 
he uses them simply to convey the fact that he is moved, irritated or bored by 
something. A correct use of these terms presupposes that one is not 
2 indifferent to the reactions of other people. If I say that a film was 
boring, then it is not a matter of indifference to me that you were not bored 
1 
2 
FUrther argument s for constru~ng gustatory, aesthetic and moral judgments 
as hier~chically related are to be found in Phillipa Foot: "Morality and 
Art " , Proc. Brit . Acad., 1970. The distinction between aesthetic and 
gustatory j udgments is well brought out by Stanley Cavell, in "Aesthetic 
Problems of Modern Philosophy" , printed in M. Black (ed.), Philosoph.y in 
America. Cavell also makes the connection with Kant t s thesis of 
' Universality ' • 
Cf. T .L. S.Sprigge , ~. "The Definition of a Moral Judgment " , Phil., 1964 . 
" 
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by it. I feel that you should have been bored by it too: either you failed 
to notice something about the film, or else your response is inappropriate to 
its object. It follows that, if you ask N the film was boring I shall be 
prepared to look for an answer that could provide you with a reason (and not 
just a cause) for reacting in a similar w~. It is significant that it is 
not so easy to say (in the face of opposition): 'I don' t know why it was 
boring, but it certainly was', as it is to say 'I don't know why I was bored, 
but I certainly was': the first of these expresses something more than the 
simple reaction recorded in the second. 
This additional element in aesthetic judgment is difficult to define. 
Kant wrote that "the judgment of taste exacts agreement from everyone; and a 
person who describes something as beautiful insists that everyone ought to 
give the object in question his approval and follow suit in describing it as 
beaut iful " • 1 Kant's instinct was sound; but he chose too strong an expression 
for it. It is not necessary that one's demands in aesthetic judgment should 
be so strong as to find expression in an aesthetic 'ought'. We might put 
the point less strongly by saying that aesthetic attitudes are normative: 
that is, they involve as ense of their own 'correctness ' or appropriateness 
to an objecto 2 Although I am certain that there is such a property as the 
normativity of a desire or attitude, I do not think I can define it with any 
precision. Normativity goes with a search for agreement, but not any search 
for agreement is normative: I may seek agreement because I feel that it is 
nicer that way. Nonnativity crops up as a feature of both moral and 
aesthetic attitudes, and is essentially distinguished by its rationality. 
1 
2 
Critique of Judgment , p.82 
I use the l term 'normativity' in place of Kant 's 'universality ' , since the 
latter might be confused with the more formal property of 'universalis-
ability' discus sed by Hare. Aesthetic judgments are normative, but it is 
arguable that they are not universalisable, since the object of aesthetic 
interest is a particular, and not a class. 
. ,
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A normative attitude seeks to found agreement in reason, and not in some 
chanoe convergence of opinion. A man with a normative attitude to X feels 
that others should recognise the qualities that he likes or admires in X, 
and on this basis come to lL~e X themselves. Explained in this w8(f, 
normativity is clearly a matter of degree - some attitudes may have it to a 
greater extent than others - and it is what explains the stability of the 
propositional form in both ethics and aesthetics. For a propositional form 
can be used as a means of exchange and persuasion; it is associated with the 
idea of truth, and so can be used to embo~ the sense of 'correctness ' or 
'appropriateness ' that is contained in a normative desire. 
This normative quality in aesthetic appreciation leads us at once to a 
similar quality in the activity of criticism itself: criticism is a 
normative science. After remarking the expressive function of such terms 
as ' beautiful', ' fine' and so on, Wittgenstein goes on to argue that really 
these terms have far less prominence in aesthetic judgment than the notions 
of what is right or correct, what fits, and so on. 1 We s8(f that the bass 
moves too much, that the door is not the correct height, that it is 
inappropriate to put beechwood furniture on an Aubusson carpet, and so on. 
This normative quality pervades the whole realm of critical discourse. 
Critics <d!o'rrro.t seek to establish how people respond to works of art: they 
attempt to create a series of norms, in the light of which some responses 
to a work of art will seem appropriate, others not. Individual critics do 
this in different ways. It is characteristic of Leavis, for example, that 
he will criticise a poem for 'inviting' or 'calling for' a response that 
involves the reader in certain confusions of thought or feeling. 
possible to respond fully to such a poem only in a confused way. 
It is 
The 
appropriate response to the poem will therefore embo~ a critical awareness 
of this confusion of thought; hence it will be impossible to enjoy the poem 
1 Wittgenstein, Lectures etc., cit. ' . 
as it asks to be enjoyed. 1 
Because of this feature of normativity, we attempt to support our 
aesthetic preferences with reasons that we hold valid for others. It is 
of no interest to me that you are bored by ShelleYI your reasons must 
support the judgment that Shelley is boring; that is, they must be reasons 
for me to share in your attitude, and not just to acknowledge it. I shall 
expect you to dissuade me from ~ interest in Shelley, and however little 
your reasons weigh with me, it will be part of the fact that they are 
reasons for an aesthetic judgment that you should hold them to be valid for 
me as well. 
I do not propose to analyse what it is to hold a reason valid for 
others. This is a problem for the theory of practical reason, and belongs 
as much to ethics as to aesthetics. It should already be clear, nonetheless, 
that as a result of the normativity of aesthetic attitudes, the concept of 
the 'appropriate ' wi l l ~ie at the heart of all aesthetic judgment. Our 
feelings and responses towards art will be in part an outcome of our sense 
of what is appropriate, and this sense will permeate all that we learn from 
art, and all that we expect to find in it. 
Normativity should not be considered a necessary condition of the 
aesthetic attitude. There are cases of primitive but basic appreciation 
that it would be wrong to exclude from the ' aesthetic', despite their 
proximity to the less normative preferences of sensuous enjqyment. For 
example, there is the dislike of clashing colours, and of grating or 
discordant soundsl these lie at the heart of more complex aesthetic 
experiences, while being themselves far removed from the activities of 
normative atgument. It is true, nonetheless, that the aesthetic attitude 
has a permanent tendency to become normative. Aesthetic interest, like many 
1 For a philosophical discussion of Leavis's procedure, see John Casey, 
The Language of Criticism, ch. VIII. 
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of our reactions towards people (of which morality is the most systematic), 
brings with it both a sense of right and wrong, and a quest for rational 
agreement. A man who is displeased at the taste of Valpollicella is simply 
displeased, whereas a man who is displeased at the sight of his neighbour's 
room is, typically, aware of something inappropriate or wrong. How, then, 
do we distinguish the aesthetic from the moral? Two lines of argument 
present themselves. First we might pursue the suggestion that aesthetic 
appreciation, being aimed at enjoyment, involves the contemplation of a 
particular object, and is not directed at the object purely as a member of 
a class. Moral appreciation t on the other hand, is essentially directed at 
a property or class 1 and this feature brings in its train the logical 
property of universalisability. But this approach. familiar from the nest 
of doctrines discussed in Chapter Two, is indecisive. For the object of 
aesthetic interest may often be a type, and types share many of the logical 
properties of universals. It would be better to distinguish aesthetic from 
moral attitudes by pointing to the absence of sanctions from the former, and 
their presence in the latter. A man who holds a moral attitude is disposed 
to certain 'reactive attitudes t1 against those (whether himself or others) 
who infringe his moral code . If these react ive attitudes are directed 
against himself then they will take the form of guilt, shame, self-hatred 
and repent ance. If they are directed towards another, then they will 
involve the removal of goodwillJ blame, indignation and the application of 
sanctions. This property of moral attitudes - whereby they make themselves 
felt precisely when they are most disregarded - is one of the central 
features of morality. It is this above all that distinguishes the acceptance 
of a moral principle from the acceptance of less rigorous jUdgments. 
Acceptance of a moral principle has an added dimension of seriousness: it 
involves a particular kind of submission and respect for the authority of a 
moral code. 
1 Cf. P.F.Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", in Strawson (ed.), Studies in 
the Philosoph.y of ThollSht and Action • 
., 
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Now it may be that not every moral assessment must involve reactive 
attitudes, and it may be also that it would be wrong or unhelpful to define 
morality in terms of them. Nonetheless it is not a contingent fact that a 
moral judgment tends to be accompanied by such attitudes as these. These 
react'ions must be part of the phenomena of morality on any view. I shall 
assume that no such feature need be involved in aesthetic judgment. This 
is part of what is meant by saying that moral considerations override 
aesthetic ones (which is not to say that moral requirements necessarily 
prevail, only that, unlike most aesthetic requirements, they leave their 
residue of guilt and indignation when they are ignored). Thus people often 
defend themselves against blame for their aesthetic outrages by saying "It t s 
all a matter of taste", reminding their interlocutor that he is giving moral 
emphasis to what is not in fact a moral question. Of course, this by no 
means implies that reasons cannot be given for or against aesthetic judgment, 
or that there is no such thing as accepting a reason or changing one's 
opin~on over a matter of taste. For aesthetic attitudes are normative, even 
if they do not involve the kind of sanctions characteristic of morality. 
Now of course it is conceivable that someone should elevate matters of 
aesthetic judgment to a status of supreme and overriding importance in his 
life. (Although whether he could do so without at the same time suffering 
from impaired rationality is not so clear.) Such a man will be outraged and 
indignant at the bad taste of others, and ~shamed or angry at his own lapses. 
But such a case is a raritYI it gives us no grounds for saying that these 
reactive attitudes are also an essential part of aesthetic judgment. On the 
contrary, one would be tempted to describe this man simply as one who had 
given a moral emphasis to matters of aesthetic preference. One can, of course, 
see how this might ?ome about. It is undeniable (and, perhaps, in some sense, 
necessary) that a man of educated taste will be guided in his preferences by 
his lasting intuitions about life , and irl this case it is clear that his 
aesthetic preferences wil1 be a sure index of his moral feeling. So that 
" 
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often an aesthetic disagreement between two people masks a genuine moral 
difference. And it is a small step from condemning another's taste on 
account of the morality that it indicates. to regarding lapses of taste as 
themselves a species of moral error. 
We discover then , in the absence of reactive attitudes, a point of 
contrast between aesthetic and moral judgment. In aesthetic interest we 
are no longer concerned with the enforcement of a code of conduct, but rather 
with the development of a particular capacity for enjoyment. If we react 
to the aesthetic heresies of other people it is out of a desire to educate 
their taste. Education is all that we can rationally hope for; no one can 
be compelled by the spectacle of common indignation to enjoy what bores or 
repells him. This brings us back to the considerations of the Seeo'l)d 
chapter - we have a sense that in defining aesthetic appreciation we are 
defining something separate from, although not wholly independent of, the 
demands of moral judgment. And in the attempt to clarify this point, it is 
to such concepts as enjoyment that we turn. But it is precisely here that 
---the discussion becoIOOs obscure - what kind of enjoyment is d:nvolved in 
aesthetic appreciation? The answer - enjoyment of an object for its own 
salee - raises many more difficulties than it solves. What is it to enjoy, 
appreciate or be interested in something for it s own sake? We will be 
unable to describe aesthetic appreciation if this phrase 'for its own sake' 
remains obscure. The theory of the uniqueness of the work of art can be 
seen as an elaborate attempt to explain the meaning of this phrase. But we 
discovered that it lapsed into obscurity at precisely the most important 
point, where the distinction between moral and aesthetic judgment was to be 
drawn. We ~st therefore attempt an independent analysis of the meaning of 
the expression 'for its own salee t • Only then will our characterisation of 
the aesthetic attitude be complete. 
We might attempt to clarify the notion by considering the kind of answer 
" 
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that is given to the question ' W~ are you interested in that l' It seems 
that, if someone asks me why I am interested in what the workmen are doing 
outside then he can tell from ~ answer whether ~ interest is in their 
actions, for their ovm sake, or whether ~ interest goes beyond what I see. 
For example, I might reply that I was wondering what the workmen were 
dOing - in which case we conclude that I was seeking knowledge from what I 
saw, and that ~ interest in what I saw was consequent on a desire for 
knowledge. Simi~ar answers are: 'I wanted to see how many of them there 
are', 'I can't stand the noise', 'I don't think they ought to be working at 
this time of d~', 'It relaxes me to see other people working', 'I was not 
interested' (a rejection of the question), 'I didn't know I was looking at 
them', and so on. In all these cases the answers reflect an attitude to 
the actions of the workmen that is either cognitive (involving an interest 
in lcnowledge) or else part of an attitude which goes beyond the desire simply 
to look at what is going on ta desire for the noise to stop , the normative 
attitude expressed in the judgment that they ought not to be working, the 
desire for relaxation). But there is a particular kind of answer to the 
'wny'-question which .is not like these at all. This is the kind of answer 
i11 which, instead of referring to some intere st I might have in what I see, 
I simply describe what I see. For example, I might s~ 'Because the 
workman standing there looks very big against the light, and he moves his 
arms in a strange w~'. Again, if I am curious simply because I want to 
know ~ he moves his arms in that w~, then ~ interest is once more 
explicable in terms of a desire for knowledge: there is a further answer I 
could give to the 'why'-question which is not simply a de scription of what 
I see. The kind of answer to the question that I wish to indicate is the 
answer which consists solely in descriptions of the object of interest, where 
these descriptions are not given because they serve to explain how this 
object is related to other desires or interests that I might have. They are 
given simply as descriptions of the object. If asked to give further 
" 
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reasons for rrrr interest I might refer to the thoughtful We;[ in which the 
workmen are digging, the abrupt sound of their conversation on the evening 
air, their bulky shapes, and so on; all these answers seem to suggest that 
rrrr interest in the scene is an interest in it for its own sake . further 
descriptions might depart from the pattern of those given so far, ceasing 
to be descriptions of first-order features , and acquiring a distinctly 
'aesthetic' character. I might refer to the ' atmosphere' of the scene . the 
'balance' of the human figures; I could think of what I see as • poignant , , 
'winter,y ' or whatever: these descriptions are still cogent answers to the 
' why ' -question, and they still have the form of descriptions of the object 
independently of any relation it may have to further desires and interests 
of mine. But they now serve to clarify rrrr o\vn response to the scene, and 
they begin to show, also, an element in rrrr appreciation of it that we might 
wish to describe as 'aesthetic '. 
Now it may be wondered how far this approach to the problem is 
satisfactory. For it is unclear what is being said when we analyse the 
notion of interest ' in an object for its own sake as an interest for which 
the question ' Why? ' has a certain kind of answer. Someone may still ask 
the question which we have been attempting all along to answer, namely, 
' What is it about the interest in question that requires ' why'-questions to 
be answered in such a we;[? ' However , if there is a basis in the interest 
itself for the fact that it is related to a certain kind of reason-giving, 
then we will have to go very deep to find it. The basis is not to be found 
in the notion of desire. For although it seems plausible at first to say 
that an interest in a scene for its own sake can be explained entirely in 
terms of a desire to go on observing it, there could be all sorts of reasons 
l 
why such a desire exists. 1 might desire to go on looking at a dark thicket 
because it rests lI\Y eyes, or because I have /3,n impression that there is 
someone hiding in it. If it is replied that what was really meant was the 
desire to go on looking at the thicket for no other reason, then this simply 
I 
I: 
I 
I 
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brings us back to the point from which we started. What does this phrase 
'for no other reason' signify? 
It might be suggested , nonetheless, that there is another way of 
elucidating the notion of 'interest in a thing for its own sake' in terms 
of desire. For it might be said that every desire is a desire !2! 
something, and that, while one often desires a thing because it is a means 
to something else it cannot be the case that all desires are of this nature. 
Ultimately there are things that I just want, and it is in application to 
these things that such phrases as 'for its own sake', ' for no other reason ' , 
and so on, make sense. And if we were asked to say in what the distinction 
between desiring as a means and desiring as an end consists we could perhaps 
have recourse to the Thomist theory that the first, unlike the second, is 
finite and bounded: if there is something for which I desire, say, money, 
then it 1'ollows that I only desire the amount of money which will secure 
that thing. Whereas if I desire money for its own sake, then I desire it 
• infini tely ' : there is no amount of money that will satisfy rw desire , even 
though ~ desire ' may as a matter of fact cease after the acquisition of a 
t . 1 cer aln sum. Thus we might say that to be interested in a thing for its 
own sake is simply to desire to observe it, where there is no point at which 
this desire to observe can be said to be satisfied (although it may at some 
point cease). 
There are certain considerations that should persuade us that this is 
not the notion of 'for its own sake ' that we are trying to de smribe. We 
attribute desires not only to human beings but also to animals, but we do 
not attribute to animals the kind of interest in an object for its own sake, 
or for no Qther reason, that is characteristic of aesthetic appreciation. 
There are reasons 1'or this, and perhaps the most important is the following: 
1 Aquinas Summa Theologiae, la 2ae 30, 4. 
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most of the desires that we attribute to animals fall under the notion of 
appetite. We ascribe to animals appetites of a general kind for certain 
kinds of satisfaction - appetites for food, shelter , procreation, safety, 
and so on - and any desires that animals have for particular objects we 
assimilate to these ineradicable dispositions from which animal reactions 
spring. The lion ' s desire to pursue a deer is part of it s appetite for 
food, and so on. Set against these appetites is the kind of curiosity that 
can exist in their absence , the desire for the knowledge that is necessar,y 
for the pursuit of anything at all. Even when it is not exactly right to 
speak of an appetite governing some animal desire - we do not speak of an 
appetite which governs the desire to escape i'rom danger - there is nonethe-
less an appetitive structure in common to all animal desires. The object 
of an appetite or similar desire falls under a general specification, as the 
satisfaction or vi61 at ion of a need. The object of hunger satisfies (or is 
thought to satisfy) the need for nourishment, the object of fear violates 
(or is thought to violate) the need for safety, and so on. In other words, 
we seem to be able to account for the objects of animal desire in terms of 
the concept of need. Those more complex cases where the idea of a need 
does not seem sufficient - the case of the dog who is trained to eat only 
when ordered to do so - can be accounted for in terms of such secondary 
concepts as that of inhibition. 
Why , then , do we find it odd to say that an animal desires safety or 
plenitude for their own sakes ? I think we can see that these descriptions 
of animal motivation serve no useful purpose. The desire for food, and the 
desire to escape danger, are not directed at plenitude or safety for their 
own S'akas '.at all, even if these are the ends to which the desires for safety 
{ 
~Q p~enitude point. The phrase ' for its own sake' seems to serve the added 
function of showing how the end of action is conceived. One does not want 
to satisfy hunger because of some conception of what the satisfaction of 
.. 
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hunger is: it is not thoughts or beliefs about the state of plenitude that 
draw us to it. Hence the question 'WQy does one want to satisfy hunger ?' 
has (in general) no interesting answer. To reply 'In order to keep 
alive' is simply to refer to the need from which this impulse springs, 
whereas a proper answer to the 'wQy'-question should consist in an 
elaboration of the intentional object of desire: it should give the 
' description under which' something is wanted, and hence give a reason for 
the desire. The desire for food has no reason in this sense, whereas to 
want something 'for its own sake' is to want it for a reason. 'For its own 
sake' is a 'description under which' an object m~ be desired. In other 
words, we must distinguish the case of wanting something when there is no 
reason for wanting it (when , for example, one's desire is based in a need) 
and wanting something for no other reason, where one ' s desire is nonetheless 
based on a concept ion of the thing one wants. 
If we do not make this distinction then we find ourselves entertaining 
the curious theor,y that there is an aesthetic need that underlies our 
interest in art. There is a basic appetite that we satisfy in looking at 
pictures, and this explains why, when we look at them, there is no reason 
for our doing so which is not to be given in terms of further descriptions 
1 
of the pictures themselves. If this theor,y is absurd it is because it 
entirely fails to capture what we mean when we say that our interest in a 
picture is an interest in the picture ' for its own sake ', or ' for no other 
reason ' • It is essential to the concept of a need that a need can be 
satisfied by indefinitely many objects, the objects of an appetite that 
springs from need can replace each other and still satisfy the same desire. 
But it is a, commonplace that we cannot substitute pictures for one another 
s~ing 'This one will do just as well', for we have no description of what 
1 This theor,y seems to be implicit in John Dewey , Art as Experience , ehs. 1 
and 2 • 
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can be done just as well by either picture. The desire to look at 
Mantegna t s Crucifixion cannot be satisfied by the sight of La Liseuse. 
To make sense of the idea of aesthetic interest we would therefore have to 
suppose a separate appetite for each of its objects. But in that case 
the notion of an appetite or need would be entirely redundant. 
It should be clear by now that one thing that distinguishes the 
interest in a picture for its own sake from the desires arising out of 
animal appetite, is that the former interest involves a thought. We can 
generalise this result : the interest in a picture for its own sake is 
distinct from a desire (however explained) to go on looking at the picture 
in that the former , unlike the latter, essentially involves a thought of its 
object. 'l'he cow who merely stares at a landscape (with or without 
curiosity) is doing something less than the man who stares out of interest 
in the landscape , and yet 'for no other reason'. T he man is thinking ot' 
the landscape, and at the same time bringing his thoughts into relation with 
what he sees. Thus we may define an interest in an object X for its own 
sake as a desire to go on hearing, looking at, or in some other way having 
experience of X, where there is no reason for this desire in terms of any 
other desire or appetite that the experience of X may fulfil, and where the 
desire arises out of, and is accompanied by, the thought of X. This 
definition is not quite pert'ect. We need to exclude those cases where the 
thought of X and the experience of X are not brought into proper relation 
(as when someone does not know that he is looking at X, even though this is 
what he is thinking of). However, such cases are already to a large measure 
excluded by ruling that the desire to continue looking at X should be founded 
on the thou~ht of X, in that the thought should provide one with the reason 
for one's desire: it is because it is X that one is looking at it, and 'for 
no other reason'. 
This definition successfully explains the applicability of a particular 
" 
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sense of the 'whyt'-question. For the expression of the thought of' an 
object involves describing the object. Hence, if I am interested in X for 
its own sake, then I shall respond to the question 'Why are you interested 
in X ?' with the expression of the thought which provides the reason for ~ 
continued interest - in other words, I shall respond with a description of X. 
It may be asked what an interest of this kind is like. The best way 
of replying to this question is through examples. For in one sense we have 
said all that is to be said: we have given an account of the thoughts and 
desires that are involved in aesthetic interest. We could attempt to 
follow Wittgenstein's procedure, and refer to the primitive forms of 
aesthetic enjoyment: the child's enjoyment of stories and pictures, the 
primitive society ' s interest in fiction. The latter enables us to visualise 
rather strikingly the distinction between aesthetic enjoyment and other 
attitudes - such as curiosity. It also gives some content to Sartre,s 
comparison between aesthetic enjoyment and magic incantation. The tribe 
who listen to a messenger speaking of some event in a nearby village are 
moved by a desire -.... for knowledge. They are impatient for the messenger to 
finish his stor.y, and only then does their reaction express how they have 
taken it. Contrast this situation with that of a t ribe assembled to hear a 
legend: now their most important reactions accompanY the hearing of the 
story. They smile with pleasure; they are "all agog". Their sympathies 
var,y with the thought of the story: they weep at what is sad, rejoice at what 
is agreeable. It is as though the story had made something present: it no 
longer points beyond itself to an absent thing which is the object of interest. 
The tribe may experience a desire to join themselves to the events of the 
story" Wld ~his desire may be manifested in ritual ' d,ance or re-enactment. 
Magic incantation - the summoning up of an absent thing by ritual - is 
an activity in which imagination and belief are inextricably mingled. It is 
partly for this reason that we might wish to say that it is not a manifest~ 
" 
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tion of aesthetio interests thought and belief are not sufficiently 
separate. Moreover, unlike aesthetio activity, it is often engaged in for 
a purposes to gain power, or to summon up the dead. But we oan usefully 
compare the creation and understanding of artistic forms with inoantation; 
it is as though the element of belief (and hence the delusion of a practical 
function ) had been refined away in aesthetic interest, leaving a residue of 
thought and feeling properly described as interest in an activity for it s 
own sake alone. 
Collingwood critioised 'Magio Art' because of its purposive aspect: to 
appreoiate it as it is intended is not to appreciate it aesthetically. In 
this he was only partly right. The appreciation of magic art is a oonfused 
affair, in which belief and enjoyment are inextricably mixed, the one 
qualifying the other, so that enja,yment is intensely serious, and belief 
only partly so. Collingwood also critioised what he oalled 'Amusement 
Art', art whioh is designed purely to entertain, at whatever cost. An 
interest in such art, Oollingwood thought, is interest in it only as a means 
for arousing amusement, and not for its own sake. 1 But this view of 
Collingwood's involves an interesting fallacy , characteristic of muoh 
writing on aesthetics in the Kantian tradition. In the right ciroumstances , 
amusement can form part of an aesthetic reaction. The element of normativity 
is . of course , lacking in general from amusement , but the remaining features 
of appreciation - at least as we have enumerated them so far - may be present. 
Amusement is not only a species of enjoyment , it is also founded on the 
thought of its object. Except in the sophisticated case where one is simply 
amused at the thought of a certain thing (real or imaginary), amusement is 
also a response to an observed situation. 
~ 
In amusement, therefore , one's 
perception of an obj~ct is brought into relation with a thought of it; and 
one's desire to look or listen beoomes founded on this thought. Thus we 
1 Principles of Art, ch. IV. 
c 
might describe amusement as a mode of attention to an object for its own 
1 
sake. Like many other reactions amusement constitutes the appreciation 
of its object. Hence it cannot be true that an interest in what is 
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amusing about an object is interest in that object for the sake of arrusement. 
Amusement is a central and important case of interest in an object for its 
own sake. And the same is true of aesthetic responses in general: in 
particular , of the emotions founded on imaginative perception that were 
described in the last chapter. In other words, pace Croce and Collingwood, 
the aesthetic of sympat~ does not commit us to the heteronomlf of aesthetic 
interest. 
Amusement provides us, in fact , with a telling picture of the kind of 
enjoyment that is involved in the primitive forms of aesthetic appreciation. 
We can contrast a child's enjoyment of the ~icture of a funny face with his 
interest in a 'picture of his grandmother (shown in response to the question: 
'What did Granny look like? '). In the first case the child will not 
characteristically ask who the picture is of, or whether anyone looked like 
that. If he rel~tes it to his ordinary experience it w·ll be in an indirect 
manner. The remark 'That's Johnny t (his little brother) will be taken as 
expressing a particular reaction to the picture and not a belief about its 
representational status. The second case is different in these respects; 
it will further involve the feature that, once curiosity has been satisfied, 
interest in the picture will wane. Or if it does not wane (for there are 
children who will seize on photographs of deceased relatives and study them 
endlessly) then we begin to describe the interest differently: the child has 
come to see something beautiful or moving in the picture. 
Before developing this point further we must return to the problem from 
which this chapter ~egan. We still have to explain the meaning of judgments 
1 Of. B.A.O.Williams. "Pleasure and Belief", A.S.S. V., 1959. 
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of beauty and judgments of form in terms of the theory of appreciation we 
have given so far. The problem about judgments of beaut y was , roughly, 
this: if we explain these judgments as expressions of 'aesthetic approval', 
i.e. as expressions of a pro-attitude with the structure indicated above '" 
we must also explain why there are so many different judgments employing 
purely aesthetic terms. For example, we do not think of ourselves as able 
to substitute ' elegant ' for ' beautiful' in all of its occurrences, without 
considerable loss of meaning. In learning the rooaning of such words as 
'elegant', 'beautiful', ' fine', and so on, we learn that not everything 
that is elegant is also fine, beautiful, exquisite or lovely. These terms 
have distinct connotations - we learn to apply them in different situations, 
and a person who praised elegance above all else would show different taste 
from another who only appreciated beauty. But to have different taste from 
another is t o appreciate different objects. It would seem, then, that 
terms like ' elegant' and ' beautiful' refer to distinct properties of things. 
The theory that these terms gain their separate meanings from the severa l 
elements in a complex pattern of responses , as I.A.Richards supposed , i s 
surely quite implausible. One could make a comparison with concepts in 
ethics. A man may be praised morally for his honesty , courage or 
benevolence. As a result terms like 'honesty' may become part of the 
vocabulary of moral appraisal, and may therefore seem to be standardly used 
to express moral attitudes. However, their principal use is in fact in the 
description of human character; the attitudes are merely conveyed b,y their 
use, as a matter of conversational association. 
But in fact there is another way of regarding the use of purely 
asethetic terms that will be more in keeping with the tenor of our 
.' 
investigations. It is possible, as Wittgenstein remarked, that these terms 
are learned as interjections. If this is so, then their transformation 
into adjectives ought to be accompanied b,y a non-descriptive meaning: in 
learning their use as interjections we should at the same time be learning 
" 
................................. --------.... # 
" 
183 
how to manage their adjectival form. But because of this propositional 
form, the aesthetic adjectives carr,y a suggestion of genuine description. 
Moreover, the learning of each term is connected with a distinct set of 
objects, even though it is learned as an expression of aesthetic appraisal. 
Hence each term will acquire a separate realm where it may be appropriately 
applied, and from this realm certain classes of object will naturally be 
excluded. Loud music will not be elegant, tragedies will not be dainty, 
humorous poetry will not be sublime. A term like 'elegant' might be taught 
in the context of aesthetic reactions to clothes, style, mathematical proofs, 
examples where in general there seems to be question of a fitting exploita-
tion of rules. The term 'lovely' might be taught in another context, say 
that of the appreciation of faces, gestures, characters, examples of things 
that can be loved or admired. The term 'exquisite' is taught in the 
context of the aesthetic appreciation of a refined and subtle exercise of 
skill or craftmanship, as in ornamental carving, or classical ballet. 
In other words, it is not necessary to assume that a term like 'elegant' 
has descriptive meaning, even though it indicates that the speaker's 
appreciation of an object is directed towards features of a certain general 
but specifiable kind. The use of the term 'elegant' does not tell us 
which of these features are present: it only indicates the area in which the 
appreciated features can be found. If it is asked why we have these 
separate terms of aesthetic appraisal. then it could be said that aesthetic 
appreciation, since it involves the 'free' thought of its object,1 will 
have a different character as its objects differ. rtr appreciation of what 
is tragic is a quite different 'experience' from ~ appreciation of comedy, 
and my appr.l3ciation of refined and civilised things is in one sense utterly 
unlike my appreciati~n of what is violent and destructive. Each object of 
appreciation will be related in thought to its own particular area of real 
1 I use the Kantian term 'free' to indicate that the thoughts involved in 
appreciation need not be 'asserted'. 
T 
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experience, and this will determine our response to it. We need a flexible 
vocabular,y of aesthetic appraisal, therefore, if we are to indicate the w~ 
in which we appreciate any given object. In a sense Richards was right in 
saying that the complex vocabular,y of aesthetic terms reflects ' the 
organisation of our feelings'. The character of aesthetic appreciation will 
be entirely dictated by its objects for appreciation is a reflective and 
undogmatic state of mind, in which belief and action are both to a large 
extent suspended. In attempting to clarify our feelings towards art we 
find it necessary to employ terms that also classify the objects of aesthetic 
experience into different kinds, terms such as ' beautiful ' and ' sublime ' , 
which have been traditionally conceived as marking a fundamental division in 
aesthetic i~terest. 
This brings us to the problem of formal features. We notice that many 
of the terms used in aesthetic description are used extremely loosely: 
indeed, this is to be expected. For in giving an aesthetic description we 
are trying to indicat e how an object is to be appreciated. For this we 
need an extensive and partly metaphorical vocabulary. Often we wish to 
describe what it is about an ob j ect that sustains our interest, without 
referring to imaginative thoughts or feelings that we see embodied in it. 
Thus we speak of the object as pleasing, satisfying, restful • • • Gradually '{ 
the list of these terms will extend to include terms denoting formal 
features, such as ' balanced ' , ' controlled ' , ' harmonious', ' unified ' , ' whole ' . 
It is not certain whether there are met aphors or literal descriptions, and it 
does not matter a great deal which they are; for their function is to 
indicate only how it is possible to find in the object the kind of satisfac-
tion that is characteristic of aesthetic enjoyment. , They stand pro~ for 
more detailed descriptions which we may not be able to formulate. In many 
cases - in particular in those of abstract music or architecture - the 
detailed and technical deSCriptions are the only interesting things to be 
said. We use these ' formal ' terms to direct someone ' s attention to the 
" 
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satisfying features of the aesthetic object. There is something ineffable 
about the capacity of an object to satisf.y us in this way, and the vague 
but extensive vocabular,y of formal terms is simp~ one indication of this 
fact. 
In conclusion let us return to the discussion of the aesthetic attitude 
where it was left. I have characterised this attitude in terms of three 
conditions: (i) the aesthetic attitude aims at enjoyment of ( and satisfac-
tion with) an object; (11) it involves an attention to that ob ject 'for its 
own sake ' ; (iii ) it is normative, involving a sense of what is right or 
appropriate. It may be said that these conditions achieve no more than an 
arbitrary stipulation: no experience is to be called aesthetic unless it 
arises from an attitude of this kind. And here we must remind ourselves 
of a point that was made in passing in Chapter Two: there is no fully 
articulated concept of the aesthetic in ordinar,y language. The philosopher ' s 
only criterion of success is that his analysis should conform to certain 
rather fragile ' intuitions ' , and that it should permit him to make sense of 
our experience of art. We have yet to discover how far the analysis already 
given will meet the second of these requirements , but we can reassure 
ourselves that it answers well enough to the basic intuit ions from which we 
began. It enables us to explain wQy there should be a diverse but stable 
vocabular,y of aesthetic appraisal, and why there should be an activity of 
aesthetic "description " associated with it. It also yields a clear 
distinction between aesthe t ic and practical attitudes, and enables us t o see 
how the aesthetic is both distinct from, and yet intimately related to, the 
moral. Finally, it characterises aesthetic appreciation as a rational 
activi ty, fpunded on thought , and falling within the province of practical 
reason. Hence we can begin to explain its privileged and irreplaceable 
position in human experience. 
Until now I have avoided the much-canvassed sensuous aspect of aesthetic 
186 
appreciation. Philosophers who have wished to emphasise this sensuous 
quality have tended to stress the arts of painting and music, where what 
is pleasing is the sound or look of something. But to base one's theory 
of aesthetic interest on these cases alone is to risk making nonsense of 
the appreciation of literature. Indeed, any attempt to define aesthetic 
appreciation in sensuous terms will fail to explain the arts of poetry and 
narrative. If there is something inherently sensuous in aesthetic 
appreciation, then this should follow from the conditions already given -
conditions which by no means exclude literature from the sphere of aesthetic 
interest. It is not something that we should assume from the start. In 
the next chapter I shall attempt to show that our appreciation of literature 
must be based in certain perceptual experiences, and that, in this sense, it 
has a partly sensuous origin. But this is a conclusion that follows from 
our definition of the aesthetic attitude together with certain assumptions 
about the nature of literature: the sensuous element cannot be located in 
any more direct way than this. 
On the other hand, we find that , in the case of the visual arts at 
least, the analysis given does lead directly to a connection with perceptual 
experience, and therefore explains in part why the connection of the 
aesthetic and the sensuous has so often seemed inevitable. The principle r 
manifestation of aesthetic interest is attention to an object, which, since 
it cannot go beyond the object in the manner of practical or theoretical 
judgment, must come to rest in the perception of the object itself. To 
take an example: I may admire the character of Marcus Aurelius, and as a 
result be pleased when I come across his bust in an Italian town. hall. I 
begin to look at the bust and study the features of the Emperor's face, 
thinking of the character that once animated them. There is a point when it 
, 
would be natural to say that ~ interest in the bust has become aesthetic, 
the point, namely, when the nobility of character becomes part of the 
appearance of the bust. The bust acquires a noble aspect, and ~ attention 
.. 
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ceases to straY beyond what I see to the thought s that are inspired by it, 
but comes to rest in the perception itself. MY admiration of Aurelius has 
become part of Il\Y desire to look at this particular thing, in that the 
object of ~ admiration is now exemplified in the appearance of the bust. 
But we see at once that our conditions lead not only to a connection 
with sense, in this case, but also to a general connection with imagination. 
In aesthetic appreciation we might s~ that the perception of an object is 
brought into rela.tion with a thought of the object. But we discovered 
previously t hat it is possible for the thought of absent objects to be 
brought into a direct and inseparable relation with a perception: this is one 
of the main activities of imagination. It seems a natural consequence 
therefore that an aesthetic attitude towards a present object will lead to 
the thoughts and emotions characteristic of imagination. Imagination is 
simply one way of thinking of, and attending to, a present object (by 
thinking of it, or perceiving it, in terms of something absent). In 
aesthetic appreciation, we might saY, the object serves as a focal point on 
which many different thought s and feelings are brought to bear. Our account 
of imagination enables us to see how we may avoid the empiricist fallacy of 
associationism, which one idealist has described as "the attempt to explain 
general connections of content by the chance conjunction of particular 
• ,,1 
exper1ences. For we can give meaning to the suggestion that the thoughts 
and feelings that are aroused qy art can nonetheless become part of our 
experience of it. They enter as an inalienable element into the experience 
itself ~ and transform it without diverting it from its original object. 
There is no need to have recourse to the vague idea of ' fusion ' to explain 
this fact. 
1 
It is instructive to test this conclusion against a traditionally 
B.Bosanquet, "On the Nature of Aesthetic Emotion" t in Science and 
Philosop~y, p.400 • 
r 
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problematic case. It has often been disputed whether a man who likes a 
pict ure for i t s associations appreciates it aesthetically. This problem 
is easily solved. 1 Unless the thought s to which perception of an object 
gives rise are in some way brought into relation with the ob ject, so that 
to think these thoughts is to think of the object itself, we will not be 
able to speak of an interest in the obj~ct for its own sake . Now 
imaginative thoughts are subject to the condition of appropriateness : this 
means that they will inevitably be brought into relation with the perception 
of their object. Moreover they may ultimately become ' embodied ' i n that 
perception and hence acquire a sensory dimension. The verbal expression 
of this kind of thought will not be tIt makes me think of childhood happiness ' , 
say ; but rather ' It is redolent of childhood happiness ' , or ' It gives a sense 
of childhood happiness ' , judgments whose objective and normative form show 
that the thoughts of childhood are sought in the picture ; and not by means of 
the picture. 
The enjoyment of the picture for its associations is not like this. The 
picture is used as a stimulus for a thought not of itself , but rather of the 
happ'y days of childhood - a thought that could be aroused in indefinitely 
many ways. (The picture may represent a house which reminds one of one ' s 
childhood home, say.) Here there is no longer any attempt to think only of 
what !its appropriate: one ' s thought is guided .Jby a desire that precedes the 
perception of this particular thing. The expression of the thought is 
subjective, and takes the form ' This picture makes me think of ••• ' rather 
than ' This pioture is •••• ' or 'This picture gives a sense of • •• ' . A 
comparison of the two oases immediately brings out an interesting feature • 
. Whereas in ~he first case one is attentive to every det ail , in the second 
case one is interested only in the details that feed one ' s association. 
1 This solution is by no means original. 
in Aesthetics , pp . 41-42. 
See for example L.A.Reid, A study 
r 
In the first case, therefore, the slightest mistake will spoil the effect: 
the emotion must be embodied in the whole aspect of the picture, since that 
1 is what determines one's thought. 
The sensuous element in the appreciation of literature is far less 
easy to locate. It is arguable, nonetheless, that there must be a sensuous 
element: for my interest in a work of literature is by no means an interest 
in its paraphrase: it cannot. therefore, be an interest merely in what the 
poem or novel says. But there are problems even for this relatively 
innocuous conclusion , as the next chapter will show. The difficulty is 
that our conditions for the aesthetic attitude do not imply that there is 
anyone way in which appreciation must be sensuous: they do not imply , for 
example, that the object of aesthetic interest must be the sound , look, 
taste or smell of something. Indeed , if they implied anything so strong as 
this they would be open to a powerful objection. For it seems that only the 
senses of sound and sight ~ be involved in aesthetic appreciation; hence 
it is not simply the fact of being senses that equips them for this role. 
Regel argued that the senses of taste and smell cannot embody sufficient of 
the intellect to be involved in the appreciation of art. 2 In this he was 
repeating Aquinas3 who argued that we cannot speak of beautiful tastes and 
smells, since the perception of beauty, being contemplative, is only 
associated with the more cognitive senses, namely sight and hearing. The 
stra~eness of the claret-lover's vocabulary, and of Des Esseintes ' symphony 
1 
2 
3 
For a similar problem we might consider the view - popular among the 
advocates of 'art for art ' s sake' - that representation cannot be part 
of the aims of art, since to be interested in what a work of art 
represents is to be interested in something other than the work of art 
itself. The obvious reply to this has been well made by A.C.Bradley, in 
the first of the Oxford Lectures on Poetry. 
Introduction to The Philosophy of Fine Art, tr. Bosanquet. pp.108-9. 
Summa Theologiae, la 2ae 27, 1. 
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of smells might persuade us of this point. Certainly, when the pleasures 
of the more cognitive senses approach the purely sensuous level characteristic 
of taste and smell we tend to regard them as no longer aesthetic - for 
example , we do not think of the desire for background music in a restaurant 
as an aesthetic impulse. It is extremely interesting if the important part 
of aesthetic interest - the imaginative involvement that i s its principle 
value - should be absent or attenuated in t he case of taste or smell. But 
it is difficult to give a fully satisfying explanation of wh,Y this is so. 
One explanation might be simply that the pleasures of taste and smell are 
too strong and immediate to give w~ to the more subtle pleasures of thought. 
But this is not the only thing to be said. There is a sense in which the 
impressions of sight and hear i ng are more ' structured' than those of t ast e 
and smell: we are able to discern an enormous number of features of an object 
on the basis of just one visual or auditory impression. Taste and smell, 
however, convey nothing beyond themselves: to recognise the taste of something 
is to recognise only one feature of it. Thus tastes and smells are in a 
strange w~ more evocative than sights and sounds: they convey so little in 
themselves that in the attempt to attach meaning to them one must impor t a 
reminiscence of their t otal surroundings . (cf . Proust ' s madel eine ) . 
In describing a notion of aesthetic experience that gi ves a clear and 
central place to the imagination we have in fact provided ourselves with 
a philosophical basis from which to explore the nature and value of art. 
And through allowing such a central place to imagination and thought we are 
able to develop a view of aesthetics that harmonises more nearly with the 
insights that philosophers in the Indealist tradition, from Kant to 
Collingwood, have produced. In fact the theory that seems to have emerged 
from the empiricist premises from which we started is strikingly similar to 
that of Kant , who sllmmarised his position as follows: 
(1) The beautiful pleases immediatelX •••••• (2) It pleases 
apart from all interest ••• :-(3Y The freedom of the imagination 
(consequently of our faculty in respect of its sensfbility) 
is, in estimating the beautiful , represented as in accord with 
the understanding's conformity to law ••• (4) The subjective 
principle of the estimate of the beautiful is represented as 
universal, i.e. valid for every man , but as incognizable by 
means of any concept..... 1 
(1) corresponds to two of the features we have described: enjoyment of an 
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object, and the connection with sensory experience; (2) corresponds to our 
analysis of the phrase 'for its own sake'; and (4) to the condition of 
normativity. Now it is not unnatural to regard Kant' s third condition as 
reflecting the feature of aest hetic interest that we have brought in under 
the cover of imagination. Imagination, for Kant, is a faculty that is free 
(i.e. independent of belief), and yet at the same time bound by the laws of 
understanding (i.e. rational). But to establish this point would truce us 
into the realms of Kantian scholarship: at least the analogy is there. 
Someone may ask: are these conditions all necessary, together sufficient, 
for the aesthetic attitude ? The easiest answer is: they are part of the 
concept of the aesthetic, so that we will choose to call an attitude 
aesthetic to the extent that it contains these features. We could say that 
the presence of all four is necessary and sufficient for ID1 attitude's being 
a central example of the aesthetic attitude; or alternatively, we could s~ 
that no one of the conditions is individually necessary but that together they 
are sufficient. Our language leaves us free to choose whichever formulation 
seems most useful. 
1 Critique of Judgment, pp.224-5. 
PART 11 
THE EXPERIENCE OF ART 
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CHAPrER TEN 
UNDERSTANDING ARr 
The theor,y of aesthetic judgment and experience given in previous 
chapters is empiricist in its pre-suppositions. It remains to be seen, 
therefore whether it can be applied to that realm of aesthetic interest 
which has always proved incomprehensible to the empiricist philosophy of 
mind - the appreciation of art. How can we explain the primacy of art in 
aesthetic experience ? This question must be answered by any theory that 
implies - as our theory implies - that it is only a contingent truth that 
the principle objects of aesthetic interest are works of art. The opposite 
view is certainly more attractive. It has been argued on several sides that 
it is art and art alone that is the source of all our ideas of beauty, and 
that if nature sometimes seems beautiful to us it is only because it echoes 
something that we first learn to appreciate in art. As a manifestation of 
the human spirit. art must have a significance wholly unlike that of any 
natural thing • . Indeed, we describe a landscape as beautiful only if it 
shows the kind of relationship to human endeavour that is characteristic of 
an artefact. The Highlands of Scotland have little beauty , although they 
may once have been called sublime. If we were to describe a beautiful 
landscape we might choose , for example . some valley in Provence , in which 
the harmony of terraced olive-groves and pan- tiled roofs suggests not only 
the human conquest of formless nature but also the details and the rhythms 
of a particular way of life. The landscape becomes beautiful because it 
begins .· to represent or express a human experience. 
, 
This Hegelian argument has a certain charm, and imposes on us the task 
of examining the experience of art, with a view to discovering how far it can 
be explained by our previous theory. Now the first point that seems to 
t 
193 
persuade us that we must move away from our account is that the experience 
of art, unlike the experience of natural beauty, involves understanding. A 
man may understand, or fail to understand, the Four Quartets, or Rodin' s 
Dan~, but he can scarcely understand or fail to understand the hills of 
Catalonia, even when he finds them beautiful or ugly. Understanding seems 
to be a pre-requisite to the full experience of art, and this has suggested 
to many philosophers that art is not so much an object of aesthetic 
' experience ' as an instrument of knowledge. In particular art has the power 
to represent reality and to express emotion, and it is in understanding these 
specifically artistic properties that we come to appreciate art. In the 
present chapter I shall pass over the problems of representation and of 
expre ss i on. Instead I shall try to demonstrate - through the example of 
music - that the notion of ' understanding art' is b,y no means as straight-
forward as the cognitive theory of aesthetic appre ciation seems to imply. 
How does the notion of understanding come to be applied to music? 
One suggestion is that music is like a language, and needs to be understood 
in the way that a language is understood. This view appeals to the modern 
philosopher; it disposes entirely of the idea that understanding a piece of 
music is to be analysed in terms of some experience that accompanies hearing. 
To picture understanding as an ' experience ' is to give an inchoate 
description of language. 1 The comparison of music with language leads, 
however, to no useful theory of. musical appreciation. Although music is 
like language in containing what might be called a syntax - rules for the 
combination of meaningful parts into potentially meaningful wholes - it is 
unlike language in being intrinsically 'uninterpreted'. In 1 anguage synt ax 
is subservient to semantics and can be explained in terms of semantics. 
MusiC , on the o~her hand , has no semantics: there is nothing (besides itself) 
that music means. There are meaningful pieces of music and meaningless 
1 Cf. Wittgenstein, Zettel , sections 155-176. 
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pieces, but the difference between them is not to be found in any meaning 
that the one has and the other lacks. Language is bound b,y truth, and by 
the requirements of truthful expression. Hence it must have an underlying 
semantic structure, dictating the graJ1lmatical transformations that are 
permitted in ordinary speech. In particular, language is absolutely bound 
by logicl without logic the dimension of truth and reference would fall awqy. 
But there are no rules which bind music, in the wcw that language is bound 
by those rules that make possible a semantic interpretation. What makes a 
musical phrase 'meaningful', as we sqy, is not the conformity to rule. On 
the contrary, this kind of ' meaningfulness', like the meaningfulness of a 
gesture t is not something that could ever be captured by rules. It is 
therefore not the kind of meaningfulness that derives from reference and 
predication. 
It might be suggested that music is more like pure mathematics, in that 
it can be understood as an uninterpreted system of symbols, united only by 
internal rules. But while this analogy is useful as a counter to theories 
that see ' understanding' only in semantic terms , it remains no more than an 
analogy. The central element in mathematical understanding is the ability 
to see that one formula follows from another , and this ability is quite 
unlike the ability to see that one note or chord in music "follows from" it s 
predecessor. It is an essential feature of the logical relationship of 
"follows from" (deducibil i ty) that if .9. follows from j2 then it alwa.ys 
follows fromj2, so that it is never wrong from the mathematical point of 
view, although it mqy be inappropri ate, to put down .9. af-eer j2. The parallel 
with music breaks down at this point. It Vias right to follow a G major 
chord with its dominant seventh at the opening of Eme Kleine Nachtmgsik, 
but it would certainly lhave 1'be'en wr.:Ololg to have done so at every point 
throughout the work. Someone who did not understand this - who wanted to 
hear the seventh chord of D after every G major chord - would simply not 
understand what he was hearing. Similarly, understanding a mathematical 
proof is recursive. If I see that each step follows from the preceding 
step, then I see that the conclusion follows from the premises. But I 
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can see how each separate chord in a piece of music is an apt sequence to 
the one preceding , and yet hear the whole sequence as nonsense. My 
understanding of a passage in music is not consequent on ~ understanding of 
ita parts. 
Finally, we cannot assume that understanding music is in the normal 
sense a technical accomplishment. One man may have an understanding and 
love of music while being entirely ignorant of theory, while another, well-
trained in harmony and counterpoint, may show so few preferences, and so 
little taste for music, that we would be loathe to describe him as understand-
ins what he hears. Music, for him, is like an abstract game, the p·oint of 
which is purely structural. Musical understanding essentially involves the 
ability to form preferences, and the capacity to sometimes enjoy what one 
hears. I no more understand a piece of music by being able to give a complete 
description of it than I understand a joke by being able to repeat it word for 
word, without the faintest flicker of a smile. The question that we must 
attempt to answer, therefore , is this: What is it about understanding music 
that leads us to connect understanding with the ability to form preferences 
of a cert ain kind ? 
It is iimportant to note that we cannot speak of aninals as understanding 
music. For example, we do not s~ that birds understand music, or that 
they understand the sequences that they "sing" , even though it is possible 
for a human being (Messiaen, say) to understand birdsong as music. . The 
bird ' s 'musical behaviour ' simply fails to reach the right kind of complexity. 
It is perhaps for this reason that we say that a bird can have neither melody 
nor expressiono For example, a bird cannot develop his song: he can only 
repeat it, as a musical box repeats it, with t he most accidental variations. 
Moreover, and perhaps this is the most important feature, one cannot give 
very much sense to the idea that a bird has chosen that sequence of notes 
proof is recursive. If I see that each step follows from the preceding 
step, then I see that the conclusion follows from the premises. But I 
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can see how each separate chord in a piece of music is an apt sequence to 
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little taste for music, that we would be loathe to describe him as understand-
ing what he hears. Music, for him, is like an abstract game. the point of 
which is purely structural. Musical understanding essentially involves the 
ability to form preferences, and the capacity to sometimes enjoy what one 
hears. I no more understand a piece of music by being able to give a complete 
description of it than I understand a joke by being able to repeat it word for 
word, without the faintest flicker of a smile. The question that we must 
attempt to answer, therefore , is this: What is it about understanding music 
that leads us to connect understanding with the ability to form preferences 
of a certain kind ? 
It is iimportant to note that we cannot speak of aninals as understanding 
music. For example, we do not s~ that birds understand music, or that 
they understand the sequences that they "sing " , even though it is possible 
for a human being (Messiaen, s~) to understand birdsong as music. The 
birdls ' musical behaviour' simply fails to reach the right kind of complexity. 
It is perhaps for this reason that we s~ that a bird can have neither melody 
nor expressiono For example, a bird cannot develoE his song: he can only 
repeat it, as a musical box repeats it, with the most accidental variations. 
Moreover, and perhaps this is the most important feature, one cannot give 
very much sense to the idea that a bird has chosen that sequence of notee 
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from among the alternatives available to him, simply because that sequence 
appeals to him. For the idea of choice has no application here - we 
cannot think of the bird as trying out sequences of notes to see which one 
fits: he just sings, and the notes come. If he repeats what he sings we do 
not s~ 'He must have liked the sound of that phrase', and certainly not 'I 
wonder why he liked the sound of that phrase?': we s~ , 'That' s his song', 
and nothing more. A man, on the other hand, will prefer one phrase to 
another: certain things sound right to him, others do not, and it is in 
virtue of this fact that the concept of understanding comes to be applied to 
musical enjoyment. It is one, sophisticated, expression of musical 
understanding that one should compose, and composing is not doing something 
that birds can do any d~ at the drop of a hat. A man feels that the 
development of a certain phrase is right, and this is something that a bird 
cannot feel. We do not seem to have the circumstances in which it makes 
sense to say that the bird, in continuing his song, is developing something 
already given. All that we can say is that he sings this and then that. 
He does not sing that because he has sung this (except perhaps in a purely 
causal sense). In no sense does what he has already sung provide a reason 
for what he goes on to sing. 
Musical understanding involves, then , the sense of rational development. 
Phrases and notes are felt to connect with each other in various ways. How 
are we to analyse this phenomenon? The prinCiple point to grasp, I think, 
is that the capacity to understand music in this sense is an auditory 
capacity: it is a matter of being able to hear certain things. It is not a 
matter of being acquainted with a body of principles or rules. Suppose, for 
exampl~, that I fail to understand twelve-note music: I simply do not 
understand ~ any note comes where it does. It is of no help to me to be 
told that the note must come there, say because the series has exhausted 
itself and must start again. If I have a sensitive ear I may realise that 
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Ex.1 has exhausted all of a twelve-note series except for one note - G sharp. 1 
And I may as a result learn to anticipate G sharp at this point. But this 
does not mean that I hear the sequence as ,incomplete in any w~~ nor that 
I am particularly satisfied or impressed when the sequence is c6mpleted and 
the "melodic line" proceeds as in Ex.2. Indeed this m~ sound ridiculous 
to me. Before I can grasp the sense of the passage I need to master a whole 
new idiom, and while a theoretical understanding may help me to do this it is 
neither sufficient in itself nor necessary. Many people have learned to 
appreciate twelve-note music by coming to understand the analogies between 
the tone-row theory and classical principles of musical structure. The two 
bodies of rules m~ then seem to constitute similar attempts to cast the 
boundaries of an auditory space. Within the limits imposed by the media 
analogous constraints apply, and analogous felicities m~ be achieved. 
But to understand this analogy is still not to hear twelve-note music as it 
is meant to be heard. Until the rules have been translated into auditory 
experiences that make sense in themselves they must inevitably seem arbitrar.y. 
It seems, then, that we must treat musical understanding as at least 
partly an auditory capacity. This capacity can best be studied through a 
very simple and basic example of it: the understanding of sequence and melo~. 
When I hear a piece of music I hear the notes as grouped together into 
phrases and themes. For example, I hear the opening bars of Tristan as 
composed of two juxtaposed melodic fragments, as in Ex.3, and not as the 
single Brahmsian phrase of Ex.4, even though this second phrase ~ be heard 
in the passage. There are , of course, differences of timbre which separate 
the two fragments of Ex.3, but it is not this that is the determining factor: 
one he~rs the opening bars correct~ even when played on the piano , and 
besides, there are many examples of melodies that contain different and 
1 Examples are to be found. at the end of the chapter. 
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changing timbres, as in the fragment from Parsifal in Ex.5. Here there is 
not only a change of timbre from the first phrase (A) to the second (B) 
(caused by the entry of an oboe); there is also a clear change of key from 
C minor to E minor. And yet one hears the second phrase as a natural 
continuation of the first. 
Associated with musical understanding on this very basic level are 
such phenomena as hearing a sequence of notes as a melody, or "as an 
accompaniment, hearing a melody in a sequence of chords, hearing one theme 
as a variation of another, or hearing two simultaneous melodies in a sequence 
of chords (as one hears the two melodies of Ex. 7 in the chords of Ex.6), and 
so on. In common to all these cases is the close relation of ' understanding' 
to something that we would unreflectingly call an experience. Indeed, if it 
were not for the connection with the activity of understanding music 
generally, it would be unnecessarily pedantic to speak of understanding a 
, 
sequence of notes as a melo~, rather than of hearing the sequence as a 
melody. But it must be noted immediately that when we speak of hearing in 
this context, we mean not hearing but ' hearing as ' , and there are grounds for 
saying that ' hearing as ' is not simply an experience, in the w~ that 
hearing m~ be . 
' Hearing as ' is an interesting concept from our point of view, partly 
through its close relation to ' seeing as ' , and partly through the light that 
it casts on the understanding of art in general. First of all, we find 
that we cannot analyse ' hearing as ' in terms of hearings the difference 
between a man who hears a sequence as a melody ( or as containing a melody) , 
and the man who simply hears it as a sequence of notes is not a difference in 
what the two men separately hear. They m~ each hear the same notes, and 
for the sake of argument we can imagine that they each are able to tell us 
what these notes are. The difference between hearing the sequence as a 
melody and hearing it as a jumble of disconnected notes is a difference in 
the experience. and not in its (material) object. What is this difference ? 
199 
It is not that, in the mind of one man, the notes linger so that he hears 
them conjointly with the notes that follow. To hear the melody in this w~ 
would be to hear it as a chord. 1 Nor is the difference one of memory: the 
two subjects may each remember what has gone before as they hear the new 
notes played. 
But suppose that we attempt to explain the notion of 'hearing as' in 
terms of the 'seeing as' analysed in Chapter Seven. Immediately a difference 
becomes apparent. For it is sometimes said that to see a portrait as a man, 
sqy, is to see it according to a concept: it is to 'bring a concept to bear' 
on one's visual experience. But this only begins to seem like an 
explanation of 'seeing as' because we are able to identify independently 
what the concept is according to which the picture is seen. Our possession 
of the concept 'man' can then be construed as logically prior to our ability 
to recognise the man-aspect in a picture. But it is useful to study the 
case of 'hearing as ' partly because it demonstrates the inadequacy of this 
approach to 'seeing as', and, in doing so, leads us to a further refinement 
of the theory' of aspect perception given in Chapter Seven. The case of 
hearing notes as a melody is unlike the case of seeing a group of coloured 
patches as a man , in that we do not have independent access to the concept 
of a melody. All we know of melodies is derived from our capacity to have 
this kind of experience (if ' experience' is the proper word). 
- -
Hearing a 
sequence as a melody is more like seeing a group of lines as a pattern or 
figure than it is like seeing a pattern of lines as a face. Here the 
'organisation' of experience cannot be described in terms of the application 
of some independently specifiable concept. 
Now, someone might still wish to construe the difference we are attempt-
ing to define conceptually: in terms of the concept of a melody (or, in the 
visual case, the concept of a pattern or figure). And the application of 
1 Cf. E.Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, p.30 . 
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these concepts could be supported by the application of various others - such 
as those of a continuation, a development, and answering phrase, and the rest. 
It is impol~ant to see wQy this answer is wrong. The idea of concept-
application is that of classifying. But suppose our two subject s each 
classified sequences as melodies or otherwise: rrllst we assume that their 
classifications will necessarily be different, just because one of them hears 
the melody and the other does not ? In any case , we seem to have inverted 
the natural order of things: it is as though we were trying to analyse the 
difference between the blind man and the sighted man purely in terms of 
certain conceptual capacities. If there are differences in their conceptual 
capacities (and it is not clear that there need be) , then this is because of 
certain other differences , which are in some sense prior. The case is 
exactly similar with the musical and the non-musical man. 
Despite this lack of analogy with the cases of 'seeing as ' previously 
considered, we find that hearing a melody possesses formal properties of the 
same order as those of aspect perception generally. Consider the melody in 
"-
Ex.8, from Verdi's Rigoletto. In one sense this is no more than a detched 
sequence of notes, which stand separated from their nearest neighbours by 
pauses as long as themselves . And yet one hears a process begin in the 
first note and carry through to the last - moreover one can divide the 
process into definite episodes. The second seems to answer the first, and 
so on. 
Now what is it to hear a melody begin ? It is here that the analogy 
with ' seeing as ' is most striking. Clearly it is not adequate just to think 
of a certain sequence as a melody, since I can have this thought before or 
after hearing, or failing to hear , the beginning of a melody , and it will not 
in itself affect the question whether or not I really did hear the beginning. 
Moreover, not only does hearing something as a melody have a precise 
beginning in time: it also has a precise duration. In other words, it has 
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the sort of relation to the temporal sequence that we normally think of as 
characteristic of experiences (such as sensory experiences and bodily 
sensations) • Again, the feature of variable intensity can also be 
attributed to 'hearing as'. MY experience of one melody may be more or 
less vivid than ~ experience of another, while being at the same time just 
as total, convincing and complete. In Ex.8, for example, there are two 
melodies pl~ed simultaneously, separated by the interval of a sixth. But 
it is undeniable that the experience of one is more intense than the 
experience of the other: the upper melody stands out, while the lower melo~ 
is a mere echo, with no proper life of its own. This is not simply a 
consequence of the fact that the striking melo~ is in the upper part: any 
part can acquire a vivid character , irrespective of what goes on above it 
or below - if this were not so, counterpoint would be impossible. 
But if we do s~ that 'hearing as' is an experience , then , like 'seeing 
as' , it is an experience of a peculiar kind, as is shown by the fact that 
we cannot attribute such an experience (as I have already argued) to an 
animal , however much the animal may literally hear. 'Hearing as' shares 
with 'seeing as' a formal relation to the concept of (unasserted) thought. 
For example, it is to some extent within voluntary control. I can sometimes 
stop ~self from hearing a sequence of notes as a melody; or I may 
voluntarily group notes together in contrasting or conflicting w~s. There 
are two ways of hearing the beautiful passage from the Diabelli variations 
given in Ex.9: one may hear the sequence as grouped in the manner of Ex.9, 
or else as grouped in the manner of Ex.10, and depending on how one hears it, 
the remarkable ending will sound relaxed or tense. Beethoven's symphonies 
(the Fourth in particular) abound in similar effects, and someone who could 
" 
not bring his a~ditory experience under the appropriate kind of voluntary 
control would be unable to appreciate their characteristic subtlety of mood. 
Moreover, I cannot count as hearing a melo~ in a sequence of notes if 
I can s~ nothing at any point about what has gone before (for example 
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whether the theme was progressing upwards to the note in question or down-
wards, whether it was fast or slow ~ and so on). In particular, I must be 
able to say whether or not other phrases that I am now played correspond 
to what I previously heard: otherwise there is reason to doubt that I 
heard the sequence as a melody. In other words, I must be attending to 
what I hear if I am to hear it as a melo~: ' hearing as ' , like amusement, 
is a mode of attention, and this suggests that it has the same close 
relation as amusement to the concept of thought. This again is unlike the 
normal experiences involved in hearing or seeing. It also suggests that 
one of the principle expressions of 'hearing as' will lie in what is said: 
in this respect the case is again somewhat similar to ' seeing as'. 
This intuitive connection with thought is exemplified in the rationality 
of musical understanding: my knowledge of a piece of music may influence the 
way I hear it ~ by providing reasons (and not just causes) for 11\Y hearing it 
in a certain way. To return again to Ex.8: this melody creates in me 
certain harmonic expectations - derived from the parallel sixth - and I 
hear it according to this harmonic pattern. The leap up of a sixth can 
therefore come to acquire a ' logical ' character which in other contexts it 
Vlould not have , and the decorative flourish of sixths in the final phrase 
of the melody seems entirely natural. We hear it as natural because of 
what we know. In a similar way our knowledge of a theme may enable us to 
hear it in a variation: hearing a variation involves a particular kind of 
thought-process. It is not sufficient - nor is it necessary - to remember 
the original melody while hearing its variant, nor is it sufficient to think 
of the variant as similar ( since there are many similar melodies that are 
not related in the manner of theme and variation). In hearing Q variation 
we hear the variation as the original theme: we can recognise the original 
melo~ in it. (Compare thinking someone to look like his father, and then 
suddenly being struck by the similarity, so that one sees the father in his 
son ' s features.) This process is rational in the following sense: hearing 
gU 
the new theme as a variation (hearing Ex.Ba as a variation of the third 
phrase of Ex.B, for example), is like discovering a relation between the 
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two themes. But the peculiar feature is that this relation is something 
that we hear: we do not simply ' have it in mind ' as we listen - it comes 
alive in the notes themselves. If this ' transformation ' - as it might be 
called - of thought into experience were not possible , then there could 
hardly be such a thing as the criticism of abstract music. But the 
rationality of thought is transmitted to the experiences that depend on it: 
in r eading critici$n, for example , I may have ~ attention drawn to 
similarities and relationships between themes that - sometimes b.Y an effort 
of will - I am afterwards able to hear in the themes themselves. As a 
resul t of this process my whole appreciation of a piece may be entirely 
altered. Whether or not I attempt to hear certain relations, or whether 
t hey become at all important to me, will depend largely on ~ sense of 
their significance. What is most important in music is clearly the wqr in 
which an intellectual graa p of structure and meaning can in this wqr become 
part of an auditory experience. In Hegel ' s words: "what appeals in music 
is the formal unity which the unity of consciousness transfers to the 
temporal process , and which is thus re-echoed back to our conscious life. ,, 1 
Before drawing conclusions about the nature of musical understanding, 
we should reflect a little on the previous discussion of ' seeing as'. I 
argued that seeing X as Y is in some wqr like thinking of X as Y; on the 
other hand I attempted to show that , in so far as it ,might be useful to 
conceive aspect perception as the sensory ' embodiment ' of a thought , we 
must recognise that the thought itself can never be fully s}:ecified 
independently of the ' perception ' in which it is embodied. We can now see 
that there are cases - the hearing of melodies , and the seeing of patterns -
where the element of thought has been reduced to something entirely formal. 
1 The Philosop4y of Fine Art, tr. Osmaston, vol.1, pp.333-4. 
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There is no way of achieving even a partial description of the content of 
the musical thought: we can only point once more to the experience in which 
it is 'embodied'. And yet the formal pr operties of thought remain, 
removing the experience of music from the realm of merely animal mentality. 
We have, then, taken the idea of a perceptual thought well beyond the point 
at which it could be even indicated apart from a perception. And what is 
interesting is that such thought-impregnated perceptions seem to lie at the 
heart of our understanding of art. It is beCause we can see patterns and 
figures that we can see representation in painting, and it is because we 
can hear melodies and sequences that we can hear expression in music. In 
other words , the media of painting and music are of their nature open to 
just the kind of imaginative interpretation of experience that we have 
placed at the heart of the aesthetic attitude: the possibility of aesthetic 
appreciation is intrinsic to the media themselves. 
It is worth touching on another problem relating to the general idea of 
' seeing as ' , a problem that I passed over in Chapter Seven, but which can 
now be tackled more directly. It will be asked, what is the precise 
difference between the man who hears a melody in a sequence of notes and 
the man who does not? The intuitive description of 'hearing as' that I 
have given is partly phenomenological: that is, it relies on metaphors that 
attempt to convey what the 'experience' is like without indicating how such 
an experience might be ascribed. What is the publicly observable basis for 
attributing experiences of this kind? It is reasonable to suppose that 
this basis will have some similarity to the circumstances in which we 
attribute normal perceptions (seeing, hearing $ and so on) , and also some 
similar~ty to the circumstances in which we attribute thoughts. Now the 
attribution of t~oughts requires a certain background of behaviour. I can 
only attribute mathematical thoughts to someone who is able to display a 
measure of mathematical competence. In a similar manner there must be a 
recognised background of 'musical behaviour' before we can meaningfully 
205 
attribute musical experiences to a man, and this behaviour will be in certain 
respects like the background behaviour of thought. It will involve 
preferences, choices, intentional activity, a sense of what is right and 
wrong. It is arguable that no such background is presupposed in the 
attribution of sensory experience (even though a background of ~ kind 
is required). Just as a man cannot understand a joke unless he has a sense 
of humour, or understand a proof unless he has a sense of mathematics, so he 
cannot understand a melody unless he is in s ome Wa{! musical. In other 
words, in attempting to elucidate the notion of understanding music we are 
brought back immediately to just the capacities for enjoyment and apprecia-
tion that we attempted to describe. The understanding of music involves no 
process that cannot be assimilated to our account of aesthetic experience. 
Note that certain important consequences follow from the comparison with 
'understanding jokes': for one thing, music is like humour in that there is 
more than one wa{! of being musical. The background of musical behaviour 
is culturally determined ~ and its p1a.ce in human thought and feeling is given 
by its place in, a culture as a whole. Similarly musical understanding t 
like a sense of humour, may be educated and developed; it m~ also be 
'morally' refined in certain w~s that I E1hall .. not . attempt to indicate. 
Now if we return to the original problem: what is the difference 
between the man who hears the melody and the man who does not ?, then we 
see that it m~ be very difficult to describe this difference in terms of 
what we may observe at the time. For they both hear the notes of the 
melody and they both may attend to what they hear. If, therefore, we rely 
only on the normal criteria of auditory experience we m~ be forced to Sa{! 
that their experiences are identical. The difference may lie only in the 
background of 'musical behaviour'. To insist that there must be some 
further difference at the time of hearing is to make a mistake about the 
nature of thought. The only reason why we can loca¥e 'hearing as' in time 
with any precision is because it has an element of experience that carries 
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with it the normal properties of exact occurrence and precise duration. 
But it is not sufficient for the ascription of 'hearing as ' that we should 
locate a mere experience - ' hearing as ' shares some of the properties of 
thought, and thought need not be related to the temporal sequence in the 
same exact way. The full difference between our two subjects may only come 
out later in what they say or do. But this cannot imply that the 
difference between them will not be logically adequate as a basis for 
describing their ' experience ' differently. 
I have argued t hat musical understanding involves certain capacities 
for experience that are in a sense sui generis. The discussion has 
concentrated on only one of these, but clearly there are many more: for 
example , the cap~city to understand the sense and direction of an interval. 
Built on these elementary capacities is a whole structure of rational 
enjoyment, to describe which would be a formidable task. But if some one 
were to ask what is the value of the ' experiences ' I have referred to , then 
it would be necessary to attempt a description of musical appreciation as a 
whole. What · is important f or present purposes is the conclusion that 
' understanding ' is here in part an experiential concept , and that its 
analysis does not involve any move away from the description of aesthetic 
appreciation that has already been given. 
What is true of music is true of architecture: the understanding of 
architectural forms cannot be elucidated in theoretical terms alone. We 
must experience the balance of masses in St . Peter ' s, just as Vie must see 
the rhythm of the columns in S. Spirito. If architecture can have meaning 
over and above what is implied in these experiences, then this is only 
'because ,. we have first acquired the basic capacities which these experiences 
entail. The deeper significance of buildings, like that of paintings and 
g,ymphonies, must be described in other terms: we must refer to the 
characteristics of representation, expression, imitation . and the rest. 
It is with these concepts , therefore , that our problems chiefly lie. 
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At first sight, however, it m~ seem t hat the above account of musical 
understanding can have little to do with the understanding of literature. 
Here, it might be said, what we call understanding ~ be divorced from 
the mer e ' experience · of its object. It is worth going some way towards 
meeting this objection, since it serves to show the peculiarity of the 
relation of literature to sensory experience. 
First of all, to understand a poem is not to understand what it 
literally means: Blake ' s poem 'The Sick Rose' expresses a thought that could 
be grasped by anyone with a knowledge of the language, whether or not he 
also understood it as a poem. Although one mqy not understand a poem _ ' A 
Nocturnal upon St. Lucie ' s dqy ' , for example , or tUne Saison en Enfer ' -
because one does not understand what the poem s~s , it is I think, a common-
place of criticism that there is more to literary understanding than mere 
literal comprehension. On the other hand, it is also said that to understand 
the t hought that Blake ' s poem expresses is to understand more than the literal 
(that is to s~, paraphraseable) meaning . Poetic thought is more subtle, 
and has many levels beneath the literal surface: And yet it- might be argued 
that understanding is none the less cognitive through being constrained 
beyond the merely literal significance of words. 
Ifhis theory, while persuasive, employs a notion of 'thought ' that 
obscures the problem with which I am trying to deal. In the sense in which 
one m~ understand the thought of a scientific or historical treatise the 
identity of a thought is secured not by the identity of its expression but 
by the identity of the conditions for its truth. That is, identity of what 
is said is , in the normal case , independent of the identity of expression. 
To deny the distinction between thought and expression in poetry i s J: t o deny 
that interest in poetry is merely an interest in what is said (in the 
propositions or thoughts that are expressed). Thus we find Eliot arguing 
that metapQysical poetry expresses not thought but its emotional equivalent, 
since emotion, unlike thought , can (logically) be thought of as constituted 
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by expression. But this emphasis on the ' particularity ' of an emotion 
relies, as I have argued in Chapter Six, on a mere play of words: it is 
certainly the emptiest explanation of why the poet ' s words cannot be 
paraphrased without loss of ' meaning'. All that this approach teaches us 
is that if to understand a poem is to have knowledge of the thought or 
feeling that is expressed by it, then ' thought' and ' feeling' are being 
used in such a way that neither can be considered separable from a given 
form of words. And this simply brings us back to the main problem: what 
is it to understand the particular form of words that constitutes the poem? 
We may note first of all that, just as in the case of music, the 
understanding of poetry brings with it a range of preferences: certain w~s 
of continuing a line will seem more appropriate than others, even though the 
'thought' that is expressed may in each case be the same. Moreover, these 
preferences will involve the performance of the poem: w~s of reading it. 
(This point is not affected by the fact that poetry need not be read al'oud.) 
Take the following lines from Absalom and A~qitQEhell 
Then, Israel ' s Monarch, after Heavens own heart, 
His vigorous warmth did, variously , impart 
To \'lives and Slaves: And , wide as his Connnand, 
Scatter ' d his Maker's Image through the Land. 
It will be part of nw understanding of this passage that I should wish to 
read it in a certain way , acknowledging the commas in the second line, 
pausing on the false rhyme of ' And', emphasising the first syllable of 
'Scattered' in such a way that the line seems to rush away after it to the 
end. ~ wanting to read the poem in this way is a direct consequence of my 
knowledge of what it lOOans: I feel that the sound suits the sense. Clearly, 
then, the experience of hearing the words in a certain way may be a part of 
understanding. But it would be wrong to think of the understanding of 
poetry as simply another case of the 'hearing as ' typical of musical 
appreciation. True, there have been attempts to explain the experience of 
li terature in terms of a basic apprehens ion of structure and pattern, as we 
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might explain the experience of music,1 but such attempts court absurdity 
in failing to make. clear that we appreciate poetry for what it rreans, and 
not, primarily, for its sound. To experience poetry as pure sound is not 
to understand it. Nor do we understand poetr,y in thinking of it as a 
combination of two separable elements - sound and meaning - with independent 
criteria of success. It is precisely when the two elements become 
separable in this way that poetr,y degenerates into bombast , as in certain 
works of Dylan Thomas. 
However , the ' gestalt' experiences proper to music and painting also 
find their replica in the appreciation of literature , and it is a replica 
of a particularly interesting kind. For one's ability to hear words in a 
certain way cannot be described independently of one ' s grasp of their 
meaning: the experience of language and the ' experience ' of meaning are 
inseparable. It is nonetheless true that, in hearing or reading words, 
one 'groups' them together in various ways, and this ' grouping ' is part of 
the experience of hearing or reading in the way that the perception of a 
melody is part of the experience of hearing its constituent notes. Indeed, 
the experience of ' grouping ' words together is so familiar to us that we 
borrow the vocabular,y with which we normally refer to it to describe the 
musical 'gestalt': we say that a phrase is like a sentence, or a question 
(cf. the ' Muss es sein? ' of Beethoven's Quartet in F); we spe~~ of musical 
' punctuation ' , musical ' phrases ' ; and so on. And yet our ' grouping ' of 
words is also a part of our conception of their sense: we hear as grouped 
together those words that seem to make up a meaningful totality. It is in 
this respect that poetry differs from the other arts. Our experience of 
poetry dges not arise purely out of what is given to sense, but is consequent 
on a prior understanding of the med urn of poetry as a means of discourse ) with 
1 An example of this procedure is to be found in D.W.Prall , Aesthetic 
Analysis f ch.IV. 
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a semantic dimension that cannot be thought aW83 · Thus , although the 
appreciation of poetry is , like the appreciation of all the arts, essentially 
perceptual, we see that its relation to sense is at once more subtle and more 
abstract than that of the other arts. 
At the heart of our understanding of poetic metre and diction lies, 
then, a variety of experience not wholly unlike the ' hearing as ' that 
determines musical enjoyment. And indeed we find that, at every point where 
a poem presents something that needs to be understood, understanding comes to 
rest in an ' experience ' , and not in a mere hypothesis or paraphrase. It is 
not the sense, but the impact of the line 
See, see, where Christ ' s blood streams in the firmament ! 
that requires the added syllable. And if there is a sense in which poetry 
is ' untranslateable ' it is because we inevitably hear the words as ' filled 
with their meaning ' when we attend to them aesthetically . A certain word 
sounds right in a certain place , and in aesthetic appreciation to sound 
right is to sound i rreplaceable. In Mallarme' s beautiful lines 
Que non ! par 1 'immobile et lasse pamoison., 
Suffoquant de chaleurs le matin frais s ' il lutte, 
we experience a heaviness in the word ' suffoquant ' that would vanish if we 
attempted to put ' etouffant ' in its stead. And it is this experience of 
heaviness that enters our understanding of the poem - our understanding of 
its mood. 
This is not to S83 that there is no more to understanding art than the 
ability to "perceive aright " . But the more that there is - and in the case 
of literature the levels of interpretation m~ be endless - must always come 
to rekt in an experience, in the sense that, only when knowledge can control 
one ' s experience of a work of art, does it affect the w~ in which the work 
is understood. But this leaves us with a new problem. For the further 
levels of significance which affect our understanding of art - the levels of 
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representation a.nd expression, for example, - seem to demand just the kind 
of cognitive analysis of aesthetic interest that I have in this chapter 
been combatting. Vie must , therefore , turn our attention to representation 
and expression, and attempt to describe their place in the appreciation of 
art. 
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CHAPrER ELEVEN 
REPRESENTATION 
At first sight it seems natural to account for representation and 
expression in terms of an entirely cognitive theor.y of appreciation, and 
this will be at variance with any view - such as ours- that gives precedence 
to the aesthetic experience. For representation and expression seem to be 
semantic properties - ways in which a work of art refers beyond itself to 
objects and properties with which it is not identical. To see what a work 
of art represents or expresses might therefore be like seeing what a 
sentence refers to: it might involve learning to understand the work of art 
as one symbol among many, with a function that is primarily referential. 
Understanding a work of art will be analogous to understanding a sentence: it 
will involve a grasp of certain propositions about the objects represented 
and the states of mind ex.pressed. And it is tempting to say that once this 
"-
understanding is achieved a l arge : part of the significance of a work of art 
has been graspedo If, then, so much of the significance of a work of art is 
to be given purely in terms of semantic properties , how can we argue that 
understanding and appreciating a work of art is not primarily a cognitive 
matter - that it is not, for example, like understanding the meaning of a 
sentence? 
This new form of cognitive theory must be distinguished from that which 
explained aesthetic appreciation as the ' perception ' of aesthetic· features. 
The semantic view does not confine appreciation to a knowledge of specific 
features l of it s object. What is known, according to the semantic theory , 
is not a fact about the work of art itself * although appreciation depends on 
having some knowledge of the work of art. From works of art we learn not 
about themselves but about the world to which they refer. They are systems 
213 
of symbols which transmit to us, much as a language transmit s to us , an 
awareness of the world in which we live. The semantic theory can therefore 
offer a much more intelligible picture of aesthetic appreciation than the 
theory of aesthetic perception discussed in Chapter Three. 
To treat aesthetic appreciation as a mode of cognition is of course by 
no means new. Perhaps the most famous exponent of such a view was Hegel, 
who conceived art as a mode of human knowledge contrasted to philosophical 
thought, art seeks to arrive at an order in experience through the 
achievement of art embodied concept. For Hegel, as i'or the idealists 
generally, there can be no sharp distinction between cognitive and non-
cognitive mental states. All mental life is a mode of thought, an attempt 
to impose order on the flux of experience, and knowledge is the successful 
achievement of an order that would otherwise not exist. Similar views have 
found expression in works of aesthetics in the analytical tradition: in 
Suzanne Langer's Feeling and Form, for example, and, most notably, in Nelson 
Goodman's Languages-2f Art. It is interesting that Goodman - whose views I 
shall have cause to refer to several times in this and the following 
chapter - takes over maqy of the idealist 's premises. In particular, he 
refuses to acknowledge a clear division between cognitive and non-cognitive 
states of mind. He attacks the view, which he associates with attempts to 
describe aesthetic appreciation in terms of ' empathy', that the emotions are 
essentially contrasted with thought. On the contrar,y, he affirms, emotion 
is itself a mode of oognition. 1 Thu s even if we do find arguments for 
saying that emotion has a large part to play in aesthetic appreciation this 
does not show that aesthetio appreciation is not a search for truth. For 
Goodman, as for the Idealist, the aesthetic and scientific attitudes are 
l 
contiguous members of a single spectrum, the motive of each is curiosity 
and the end awareness. 
1 
c it., p. 248 • 
It is of some interest to examine the approach to representation 
embodied in a semantic theory t since the semantic theory offers a direct 
challenge to all that has already been said. If the theory of previous 
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chapters is correct, it follows that representation is important primarily 
as a means of presenting imaginative thoughts. The purpose of representa-
tion will be to guide the imagination, so that the thoughts involved in 
aesthetic experience will be about pre-determined objects. It follows that 
'representation' could OCCUl' in a variety of different ways, according to 
the medium - through the presentation of aspects in painting, for example, 
or through direct description in works of literature. I shall refer to 
these two forms of representation as depiction and descriptionl the question 
how these two notions are to be analysed will now seem to be of only 
subsidiary interest to aesthetics. 
For the semantic theory, however, such notions are crucial; they are 
the prime instances of aesthetic concepts. It is through the study of 
representation that a defender of the semantic theory will wish to show how 
our understanding of piotures resembles our understanding of words. It 
seems but a small step to go on to describe both representation and expression 
in terms appropriate to our ordinary understanding of symbols and signs. 
Even if we must conclude that there is something special in our wlderstanding 
of art - so that works of art are only "presentational" symbols, say 1 - it 
may still be that we have discovered in the theory of symbolism the clue to 
much if not all of our understanding of the forms of art, as well as to 
much of the value and significance of art. 
The semantic theory starts from the premise that no acoount of depiction 
in terms of resemblance, or in terms of similarity of appearance, can 
possibly account for the relation between a picture and what we might call, 
1 Suzanne Langer, PhilosophY in a New Key, and Feeling and Form. 
for convenience' sake, its "object". Our knowledge of what a painting 
represents depends at least in part on our understanding of certain 
conventions, governing the portrayal of perspective, movement, light and 
shade. Such conventions cannot be explained in terms of a notion of 
identity of appearance between painting and object. Goodman,1 following 
Gombr1ch,2 has argued that the whole notion of an identity of appearance 
shows a misconception of the problem. We can only speak of identity of 
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appearance if the appearances which are to be compared are already, in some 
sense, brought under a classification. We cannot, for example, compare the 
appearance of a representation with the way something looks to the 'naked' 
eye - there is no naked eye. Any specification of the way a thing looks 
will already involve descriptions of it whose claim to denotational accuracy 
is founded no differently from the claims of a picture.) A picture cannot 
therefore be compared for accuracy with an appearance, and spoken of as a 
representation to the extent that it copies or shares that appearance. The 
only thing that has the appearance of a picture is another picture, but this 
is not what the picture represents. 
It is tempting , in view of these difficulties , to assimilate the concept 
of representation to that of reference. Plainly, it is because words refer 
that novels represent. So wqy should reference not be the core of 
representation , even in the visual arts? Such is the view of thinkers 
like Gombrich and Goodman. Representation, according to Goodman for example, 
is simply a species of denotation, and, like denotation it is, in its primary 
occurrence, fully extensional. Thus a picture of the Duke of Wellington is 
ipso facto a picture of the man who won the Battle of Waterloo. And 
whatever the difficulties that might stand in the way of explaining how 
denotation or reference arises out of extensionality, it might be argued that 
1 
2 
Languages of Art, ch.1. 
E.Gombrich, Art and Illusion, pp.297-8. 
3 Goodman,.ill. 
216 
these difficulties are no more easy to solve in the case of language than 
in the case of pictures. Once we grasp how the construction IX is a 
picture of y' can be interpreted extensionally, then the analogy between 
depiction and description becomes' very impressive. For a description denotes 
an object in virtue of its sense - that is, by attributing a character to it. 
Similarly', we might say, it is the sense of the picture that enables it to 
denote. It attributes a definite character to its object. Moreover, like 
a completed sentence, the picture goes on to tell us something about the 
object that it denotes, and it is a fai thi'ul picture to the extent that what 
it "says" is true. 
Clearly, then, we should account for the representation· of a fictional 
object as we would account for empty description. The fictional painting 
has a definite sense, but no reference. Painting an imaginary object is like 
writing a story. If we speak of adequate, correct, or telling representation 
in these cases, it can only be because the painting or the story convey 
information about the kinds of things to which their fictional objects belong. 
It would seem then- that realism in literature and realism in painting are 
related notions. 
But it is here, I think, that the analogy with language breaks down. 
If depiction is like reference, then it is arguable that there must be both 
an extensional and an in'tensional construction of the form 'X is a picture 
of ye, according to whether the picture is a portrait or an imaginary scene. 
Thus we have the construction '1.. is a picture of a Unicorn', which conveys 
no reference. If we are to explain what is important about the extensional 
context 'X is a picture of Y' , (in which this sentence entails (3.!~ = y» , 
then we shQuld be prepared to explain the supposed intensional context too. , 
We must establish the connection of sense between the two constructions. 
For if we are to take the analogy between pictures and symbols as seriously 
as the semantic theory suggests, then we should not allow that whether or not 
there is an object corresponding to what is 'shovm' in a picture has any 
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bearing on the nature of the picture as a symbol, or on its place in the 
scheme of symbols that enables it to denote. It is the property of a 
picture that is marked out Qy the intensional use of 'X is a picture of ••• ' 
that we must analyse if the semantic view of art is to have the cogency and 
value that it claims for itself. We must show that this property is a 
property which belongs to a painting as a member of a scheme of symbols, 
and that it can, as such, pl~ the part in aesthetic appreciation that 
representational properties are generally thought to play. Clearly, 
aesthetic appreciation of a picture is directed towards its representational 
properties in this (intensional) sense, and not to the further property, 
that it m~ or m~ not have, of actually denoting, or corresponding to, an 
object in the world. 
But can the semantic theory explain what it is that we know about a 
picture when we learn that it represents something , in the intensional 
sense, and can it give a place to this knowledge in a cognitive theory of 
aesthetic appreciation ? It seems not. The semantic theory is driven to 
hold that there are two senses of the word ' represent', according to whether 
it appears in an extensional or an intensional construction. But if we s~ 
this, then we find that we no longer have any account of what features of a 
picture enable it to represent (in the extensional sense) at all, and hence 
we have no account of the relation of the picture to its subject-matter. 
The assertion that this relation is the relation @~. ; of a symbol to what 
is denoted Qy it is then entirely empty. 
To see that this is so, it is convenient to examine Goodman's view. 
Goodman argues that the proposition 'X is a picture of a unicorn ' is, when 
construed intensionally, not relational. It must be construed as the 
p 
combined assertion of two propositions ' X is a picture', and 'X is of-a-
unicorn', where 'of-a-unicorn' is construed as an unbreakable one-place 
predicate. 1 But now the question arises "How do we account for the meaning 
1 
Languages of Art, cit., and reply to Wollheim, J.Phil. , 1970. 
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of t his predicate ' of-a-unicorn' ? ,. To this question Goodman gives a 
predictably nominalist answer. We learn, he says , to classify pictures as 
unicorn-pictures; that is , we learn to apply the predicate 'of- a-unicorn' to 
them, and that we do classify them in this wqy is a fact as basic and as 
little in need of explanation, as the fact that we learn to classify objects 
as 'red' or 'men', ' horses ' or 'unicorns ' . HAll that directly matters" , 
he says,1 "is that pictures are indeed sorted with varying degrees of ease 
into man-pictures, unicorn-pictures, Pickwick~pictures, winged- horse 
pictures, etc., just as pieces of furniture are sorted into desks, table s, 
chairs etc. And this fact is unaffected by the difficulty, in either 
case, of framing definitions for the several classes or eliciting a general 
principle of classification." 
But it can be immediately ob jected to this that it f ails to explain t he 
sense in which our classification of pictures is secondaEY to our classifica-
tion of the objects they portrqy. We would not know what was being said in 
applying the term 'man-picture' to a picture unless we knew what was said in 
applying the term 'man ' to an item in the world. But Goodman thinks that 
he has an answer to this: 
We can learn to apply "corncob pipe " or "staghorn" without first 
understanding, or knowing how to apply , "corn" or "cob" or 
"corncob" or "pipe" or "stag" or "horn" as separate terms. And 
we can learn, on the basis of samples , to apply "unicorn-
picture" not only without ever having seen any unicorns but 
without ever having seen or heard the word "unicorn lt before. 
Indeed, largely by learning what are unicorn-pictures and 
unicorn- descriptions do we come to understand the word "unicorn" ; 
and our ability to recognise a staghorn mqy help us to recognise 
a stag when we see one. 2 
It is doubtful, however, that this reply is able to rebut the spirit of the 
objection. For the objection could equally be phrased the other way round, 
, 
asking how it is that our knowledge of the application of 'unicorn-picture' 
1 Languages of Art, p.24. 
2 ~., pp.24-25. 
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could possibly enable us to learn the application of ' unicorn' ? The point 
is that, unless the word 'unicorn' means the same when it stands alone and 
when it st ands in the unbreakable predicate ' of-~unicorn', we have no 
explanation of how it is that we can learn the meaning of both locutions 
together. This is not a small difficulty, for we now see that we lack an 
explanation of wby we react to pictures of unicorns as we do (why they 
make us think of unicorns), and that we also lack an explanation of how we 
can extend all our ordinary language for talking of the world to talk of 
pictures without having to learn the trick afresh for every picture that we 
1 
come across. Merely to assert that the predicate 'of- a-unicorn' is 
unbreakable does not explain the fact that we use precisely this predicate 
to locate the picture's place in a scheme of symbols. What is the function 
of the word 'unicorn' here? 
It is important to see that this question is not simply a request for 
the kind of explanation of the meaning of a term that the nominalist forbids. 
We need not object to the nominalist pre-suppositions of Goodman's theory, 
even though these pre-suppositions might have encouraged the view that 
appreciating art is like understanding language. The objection could be 
phrased without arguing against nominalism. For suppose that it is true 
that there is no explanation of the fact that we apply the description ' man' 
to all men, other than the simple fact that this is how we classify. Then 
of course there will be no explanation why we call a !'(lan a man why we use 
the term 'man' to apply to just this thing. But it does not follow that 
there will be no explanation of why we include the term 'man' in a compl ' x 
predicate that denotes pictures of men. Indeed, we saw in Chapter Four that 
there cO~fd be explanations of the meaning of a word in a new application 
in terms of its previous meaning, and these explru1ations did not in any wqy 
1 Compare the difficulty encountered by theories of oratio o'b,ligua in 
explaining how it is that an understanding of ordinary speech can enable 
me to understand reported speech. See D.Davidson, "On Saying That" , in 
Davidson and Hintikka (eds.), Words and Objections. 
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presuppose the falsity of nominalism as a view about the ultimate basis of 
our classificator.y scheme. 
That there must be an answer to the question why the term 'man' can 
occur within the scope of the intensional context 'X is a picture of •••• ' 
is suggested by considering not the nature of representation but rather the 
w~ in which representation is appreciated. If a picture of a man is to 
be properly appreciated it must at least be possible to see the picture as 
a man (to see a man in the picture). Now we speruc of ' seeing a picture 
as a man' and clearly we mean to refer to a relation between this process 
and ot hers t hat we call ' seeing a man ' , 't hinking of a man' , and so on. 
It is a peculiarity of the first and third of these locutions that one 
cannot alloVl quantification into the position occupied by the term ' man ' , 
whereas one can allow this in the case of the second locution. But of 
course it would be absurd to conclude that, just because the term 'man' 
occurs in the first locution as part of what is in this sense an unbreakable 
two-place predic at e (' ••• see s. • •• as a man ' ), the term ' man ' has a different 
sense here from its normal sense. On the contrary, the term must have the 
same sense in either case, for in order to explain what it is to see 
something 2:.§ a man we must take for granted an ability to apply the ordinary 
concept of a man, and it is in terms of t his ordinary concept that our 
explanation will be couched. 
A theory of representation must therefore enable us to explain the 
connection of meaning between 'man' and ' man-picture'. But can the semantic 
theory really do this? A natural way of attempting the needed explanation 
would be to invoke the supposed parallel between paintings and verbal symbols. 
Thus we might s~ that a painting belongs to a scheme of symbols which are 
used to denote objects such as men , mountains, rivers and horses. It is by 
understanding this feature that we learn to classify paintings as pictures 
of men, and so on. Now it is unobjectionable to suggest that, if this is 
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so, a painting can have a place in the symbol scheme that is proper to being 
a man-picture without actually denoting a man . Its place in the scheme is 
fixed not by its reference but by its sense. It is therefore the 
conventions o~ the sYmbol-scheme ~the meaning-rules ) that would enable us 
to understand that a given symbol is of the kind that could denote a man. 
In other words, we explain the notion of a man-picture or unicorn-picture 
on the analogy of the' place of terms in a language ~such as 'man' and 
'unicorn') that are used referringly. But we can imagine giving ' sense' 
tO'a picture ~in the'way' we give 'sense' to words) in an indefinite number 
of ways, and the aspect of the picture will play no part in determining 
this'sense t • So the relation between representation and visual appreciation 
will now be entirely arbitrary. Explaining the notion of representation in 
this way has the consequence that representation is of no relevance to 
aesthetic interest. Moreover, if we ~plain the notion of a man-picture 
through the analogy with the place occupied by certain denoting-phrases in 
a language, then it seems extremely odd that pictures do not have a standard 
~ in communication as words do. If we speak of \'lords as denoting or 
referring to individuals this is not merely because singular terms sometimes 
occur extensionally. It is rather because the sentences in which these 
terms occur extensionally can be used to refer to individuals. In other 
words, the semantic property of reference or denotation arises out of the 
pragmatic property of a referential use. Now a picture ~ be used on 
occasion to stand for what it represents, but here its role is determined 
by quite different considerat ions from those that are active in aesthetic 
interest. It is essential to the notion of a denoting phrase in language 
that it should be possible to use it in assertions, in questions, in 
conditionals, in commands, and so onl in speech-acts where reference occurs. 
Now truth and falsity belong primarily to assertions, not to questions and 
commands. It would therefore seem that , if we are to use the analogy with 
language to show how a picture can be a true or f alse picture of what it 
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denotes, we must say that pictures can have a standard use in communication, 
and that in this use they occur in assertoric form. But it is arguable 
that we can only speak of assertion where there is at least the possibility 
of other speech-acts, such as questions and commands. We c an imagine 
pictures being used to make assertions , but the circumstances in which we 
can imagine this are also circumstances in which pictures could be used to 
ask questions or make commands. In these circumstances - which of course 
will have nothing to do with aesthetic appreciation - pictures would 
function like semaphor signals. But it is not the context of aesthetic 
interest that gives this use to pictures. We can indeed learn from a 
picture how a certain man looked, but there are normally no grounds for 
supposing that the picture is being used to assert t hat this is how he 
looked. For this to be possible, we should have to be able to tell when 
the picture is not asserting, but rather D questioning whether this was 
how he looked, commanding that he should look like this, supposing that 
this is how he looked , and so on . It is because these notions have no 
application to the part of pictorial representation which is the object of 
aesthetic interest that the semantic theory breaks down as an account of 
appreciati on. 
It might be argued that when we cannot quantify into a context, then 
we should first look for an explanation of this fact in terms of a reference 
to some mental item - intention, experience, belief or desire, - whose 
' intentional object' causes reference to fail. If' .~ is a picture of Y' 
were to mean t X is intended to resemble 1', or '.! can be seen as r', then 
' y e would occur in each case as part of a complex psychological predicate, 
and serve to identify the so-oa1led 'intentional objeot ' of a mental state. 
l 
If this were so, then we can explain the failure of reference while conserving 
the connection of meaning between the extensional and intensional construe-
t ions of '1£ is a figure of' Y' • We might compare knowledge with belief: if 
I know that .E then what I know is what I believe when I believe that .E. 
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Suppose that '! knows that .!];'. It follows from this that (] Z)(Fx) , 
although this does not follow from 'X believes that Fa ' . Yet '~t has 
. - -
not changed sense from the first context to the second. The difference 
between the two contexts can be explained immediately: the first involves 
at least two separate propositions: t~ believes that Fa ' , and 'Fa is true t • 
The second of these carries the reference to ~ that is lacking in the first. 
Similarly, someone might plausibly argue that the difference between the 
extensional and the intensional senses of "represent " amounts to no more 
than the difference between, s~ 'X can be seen as 1 andl exists ' and '~ 
can be seen as I t. The intensional sense would then be prior, the central 
component of meaning in either construction. Such a theory would of course 
encounter none of the difficul tie s that have so far been raised. 
However , there are other difficulties that this rather simple aspect 
theory is unable to overcome , and for the sake of completeness I shall 
suggest various ways in which the theory might be amended . First, the 
theory is unable to distinguish between genuine r epresent ations and other 
objects (such as clouds, shadows) in which aspects can be seen. Secondly, 
it gives no account of the place of convention and tradition in our 
understanding of what a picture represents. Finally, the theory gives no 
cri terion of realism; unlike the semantic theory, which analyses the notion 
of realism in terms of the ease with which accurate information is conveyed, 
the theory gives no grounds for distinguishing between a realistic and an 
unrealistic representation of a single object. 
The aspect-theory must allow for the fact that representing is something 
that human beings do, and an object is a representation only in so far as 
someone ,has made it to represent soroothing. Cliffs, clouds and trees , 
unlike pictures , do not typically represent what we see in them. Moreover 
it is not alw~s possible to see pictures ~ what they represent (e.g. the 
child ' s incompetent drawing of his father ) . It is because of such 
ps 
Suppose that '! knows that Fa'. It follows from this that (3 z) (Fx) , 
although this does not follow from '~ believes that Fa'. Yet 'Fa' has 
not changed sense from the first context to the second. The difference 
between the two context s can be explained immediately: the first involves 
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at least two separate propositions: '~believes that 1J:' , and 'Fa is true'. 
The second of these carries the reference to ~ that is lacking in the first. 
Similarly, someone might plausibly argue that the difference between the 
extensional and the intensional senses of "represent " amounts to no more 
than the difference between, s~ 'X can be seen as Y and I exists' and '~ 
can be seen as 1'. The intensional sense would then be prior, the central 
component of meaning in either construction. Such a theory would of course 
encounter none of the difficulties that have so t'ar been raised. 
However , there are other difficulties that this rather simple aspect 
theory is unable to overcome , and for the sake of completeness I shall 
suggest various ways in which the theory might be amended . First, the 
theory is unable to distinguish between genuine representations and other 
objects (such as clouds, shadows ) in which aspects can be seen. Secondly, 
it gives no account of the place of convention and tradition in our 
understanding of what a picture represents. Finally, the theory gives no 
criterion of realism; unlike the semantic theory, which analyses the notion 
of realism in terms of the ease with which accurate information is conveyed, 
the theory gives no grounds for distinguishing between a realistic and an 
unrealistic representation of a single object. 
The aspect-theory must allow for the fact that representing is something 
that human beings do, and an object is a representation only in so far as 
someone has made it to represent something. Cliffs , clouds and trees, 
unlike pictures , do not typically represent what we see in them. Moreover 
it is not always possible to see pictures as what they represent (e.g. the 
child's incompetent drawing of his father). It is because of such 
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considerations that the semantic theory has immediate appeal. Denoting, 
like representing, is something that human beings do; it is not judged in 
terms of how we see the final product. 
Clearly, the aspect theory must be amended to include a reference to 
the painter ' s intention: we must s~ that a painting is a painting of X 
only if it is intended to be seen as X. It would follow from this 
definition that it is the products of human activity that have representa-
tional properties; moreover what they represent is independent of how we 
can in fact see them. But there will be nothing more to pictorial 
representation (from the point of view of appreciation) than the presented 
aspect - the aspect of the painting is the true object of aesthetic interest. 
This simple emendation also enables us to overcome the second 
objection. In order to know what a painting represents it is necessar,y 
to understand the artist ' s intention, and it is clear that convention and 
tradition may well have an important part to play in revealing intention. 
Intention requires a background of pre-established expectations, together 
with a medium of action in which the intention ' s fulfilment is possible. 
The artist will therefore lean on those features of tradition and convention 
that will enable his intention to become clear, for our understanding of 
his intention will influence how we ~ his picture. It might be objected 
that if revealed intention has such an important part to play in our 
understanding of art, it is surprising that paintings are not accompanied 
by v~itten instructions which explain how they must be seen. It might 
seem odd that art i st s ' have to rely an such devices as convention and 
tradition . which are comprehensible at best only to someone with an 
established habit of looking at pictures. But there are t wo replies to 
this objection. First, many paintings do have, in the form of a title, 
some instructions as to how they should be seen. Secondly, it is necessar,y 
to remind ourselves of the complexity of the phenomenon of 'seeing as '. 
p 
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It is intrinsic to the notion of an aspect that it should be indeterminate, 
d h b ' 1 an ence am 19uOUS. If tradition and convention play a part in the 
understanding of a painting it is not because they help us to see it as, 
say, a group of women dancing at an altar (although they may help us to do 
this) • The function of the conventions and traditions that a Painting 
invokes is to draw attention to fine shades of expression and gesture, to 
relations and contrasts that it would otherv/ise be difficult to imagine in 
the configuration of coloured patches. To rely on verbal instructions to 
convey these fine shades of thought and feeling v/ould be to disrupt the 
observer's interest, to remove his attention from what is visual precisely 
at the point where he most needs to look and see. Convention and 
tradition are ways of conveying instructions to the observer without 
removing his thought from the visual aspect. As an example, we might 
refer to Manet ' s exploitation of Venetian conventions in his Olympia. By 
keeping to Titian' s formula, involving an accompanying figure, and a rich 
embellishment of drapery, Manet was able to create a visual relation 
between his model and her Venetian prototypes that reveals - as a pre-
dominantly visual impression - much of the woman's character. In Titian 
the drapery and the accompanying figure are characteristically used to 
offset the naturalness of the naked body, to bring it into relation with 
normal worldly commerce. As a result, the sexuality is mellowed , and the 
dignity of the human figure emphasised. In Manet ' s picture , on the other 
hand, the atmosphere has been shattered by one or t wo small but immensely 
suggestive touches - the cord around the neck, the vulgar sabats on the 
feet - which restore a kind of sexual unrest on a quite different level. 
The picture acquires a sad, urban, desultory sensuality, and because of this 
we see the character of the woman as viv.idly as we see her strange surround-
If this should be doubted one need only remind oneself of the fact th~t 
a life-size painting of embattled dwarfs will have the same aspect as a 
half-size painting of normal fighting men. 
ings. Manet was able to achieve this quite peculiar value by leaning on 
a tradition from which he departed with the greatest econorrw of means, so 
that our expectations are simultaneously encouraged and betrayed. 
precisely because his intention can only be seized through a visual 
impression that the result is so poignant. 1 
It is 
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The final objection is the most interesting of the three. How is it 
possible to explain the concept of realism in pictorial representation? 
It is agreed that we will find no criterion for realistic representation in 
the notion of resemblance , since a picture resembles another picture more 
closely than it resembles anything else. The most a picture can dO t it 
will be said, is resemble the look of its object. But how can we account for 
this kind of resemblance except by invoking once again the notion of an 
aspect? Thus Goodman criticises the resemblance theory of realism on the 
grounds that in referring to the realism of a depiction we can only mean to 
be referring to the ~ with which we recognise it visually as a symbol for 
its object . There is no independent criterion of what it is for two objects 
to look alike: certainly there is no criterion to be discovered in the 
science of geometrical optics, on which theories of perspective are usually 
based. 2 
But this criticism of the resemblance theory is, I think, too hasty. 
Certainly Goodman ' s alternative to it will not do; the child ' s picture of 
his father is more easily recognisable than the realistic portrait in 
chiaroscuro. Moreover it is wrong, as the earlier discussions should have 
made clear, to analyse the notion of an aspect in terms of an ilft.enti ty of 
appearance. An animal may notice an identity of appearance, but it cannot, 
1 
2 
A simi~ar and yet more daring exploitation of the same traditional 
'repertoire' occurs in Gauguin's masterpiece: 'The Spirit of the Dead 
Watches ' • 
Languages of Art, pp.10-19. 
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logically~ perceive an aspect. Of course, some pictures also look like 
what they can be seen as , and the extent to which they do this is a matter 
of degree. One duck actually looks like another 1 a decoy duck looks 
very similar, a naturalistic life-size colour photograph of a duck is also 
(from certain angles) a plausible likeness , and so on in a descending scale 
until we reach the ducks that can be discerned in the unjoined dots of a 
1 puzzle picture, or in the folds of a painted garment. -The most important 
difference between cases at either end of this spectrum is that, whereas in 
one case you have to be thinking if you are to see the aspect in the 
picture, in the other case (the case of same appearance) you do not need to 
think in order to be struck by the similarity - your natural inclination is 
to take the object before you 12! a duck, and this does not necessarily 
involve the perception of an aspect at all. 
This immediately gives us a criterion for distinguishing the case where 
A sees 1£ as :£ from the case where X looks to A as 1 looks. In the latter 
case we m~ s~ that ~ looks to A exactly as Y looks (1£ looks the same as 1 
to A) if, under normal circumstances , and going only on the basis of the way 
1£ looks , A would take ~ to be 1 (believe 1£ to be 1). In other words, 
identity of appearance involves the permanent possibility of illusion. 
This is not to say that A will actually be deceived: in many cases he will 
possess further information - such as that he is looking at a picture -
which prevents him from taking 1£ for 1. But this is no objection to our 
account of sameness of appearance. In order to make the definition clear, 
however, we should have to specify what is meant by the phrase ' going only 
on the basis of the way ~ looks ' . This Vlould involve reference to such 
facts as A's eyes being open and directed at ~, A being conscious, l causing 
i n A, by the mediation of his eyes, the belief in the existence of something 
that A would naturally take to be I, and so on. But, however this notion of 
1 Comp~re S.Freud, Leonardo. 
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'looking I be analysed, the solution to the problem of the identity of 
appearance remains .• 
Now the normal case of ' seeing as' does not involve identity of 
appearance in this sense - if i t did, then most painting would be trompe-
'Seeing as ' does not exhibit a tendency to illusion, We might 
put this point by sqying that while the central expression of a sensory 
experience is also t he expression of a perceptual belief : the central 
expression of ' seeing; as l is the expression of a thought that is. 'unasserted '. 
It might be said ~ nonetheless , that 'seeing as ' involves the perception of a 
similarity of appearance . and that we should define realism in terms of this 
'similarity ' • But I think that there are two reasons why we should resist 
such an account of realism. First, suppose that we think of the 
'similarity' of appearance as being constituted by a simil arity between the 
experience of seeing an aspect and the experience of seeing the object 
itself. Then the simil:arJty must be construed as 'irreducible', and no 
criterion of realism could be derived from it. But suppose, on the other 
"-
hand, t hat we attempt to explain the ' similarity' in terms of a greater or 
less congruence in visual features between the painting and its object (or 
some object that is identical in appearance with the object of the painting). 
In other words, we employ a purely 'material ' test of similarity of appear-
ance. We will now be unable to explain why our recognition of realism is 
immediate and depends on no piecemeal comparison between the picture and 
its object. 
In f act Vie can define re al ism more use ful,ly : if . we : ign O~e l ap gearance ' 
altogether: in this the semantic approach to representation is surely right. 
But it doe's not follow that we must also discard the notion of an aspect. A 
realistic representation ~ of I' s i'ace is not one where ~ looks like I's face, 
but one where the face I see in X is like I's face. This explains why the 
recognition of realism is immediate, for the face I see in the picture, being 
229 
an 'intentional ' object of sight, presents its features to me ' immediately'. 
Now there is a definite sense in which what is seen in a picture imposes 
conditions on the appearance of the picture. If X is seen as 1 then , if Y 
is many-featured, there must be a multiplicity of Observable' fe at ures in ~. 
I cannot see r6uiid~~ :t'ace · iin '. a square outline, nor can I see a face with 
ears in a smooth circle. Suppose that I see the following figure 
as a face. Here there are cert ain questions that do not apply: for 
example, 'What kind of ears does the face have'? What kind of hair'l Nose? 
What col our is it? and so on ' . And if I ask what shape is the face that I 
see then the answer must be ' Square' - a feature that no :face can have. 
The more questions of this sort to which there is either no answer , or else 
an answer that gives some fe ature which :faces lack, the less real istic the 
representation. 
This account of realism enabl es us to draw an interesting conclusion. 
Not every f eature of the face t hat I see in the picture is a feature of 
its appearance (i.e. a colour or a shape). Hence a realistic depiction of 
the appearance of a face might in other respects be unrealistic. It makes 
sense to say tbat, while Guido Reni's head of Christ is a realistio portrait 
of the appearance of a suffering face, the Christ of some more primitive 
master (such as Cimabue) is more realistic as a depiction of the suffering: 
it reveals more of the suffering. One can also argue that the Florentines 
were right to hail Masaccio as the discoverer of a more realistic mode of 
painting. What is realistic is after all not relative to the ease with 
which information is conveyed. 
In other words, the definition of depiction in terms of the presentation 
of an .. aspect leads naturally to an intelligible concept of pictorial realism. 
A painting represents 1 if it is intended to be seen as 1 (where 'I' stands 
proxy for a name a definite description or an indefinite description). 
The painting is a successful representation to the extent that it can be seen 
as 1, and it is realistic to the extent that it is naturally seen as an object . 
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that resembles 1. Such an account should leave us in no doubt as to how 
t he appreciation of representat ional features in painting can be part of 
aesthetic interest , as this was described in Chapter Nine . 
Note however , that we must depart from our previous account of the 
logic of aesthetic description. For in sqying that a painting represents 
1 I am referring to a genuine property of it: I am sqying that it is intended 
to be seen as 1. This is a fact about the painting that I can know whether 
or not I see it as 1. But this departure should not worry us - indeed, we 
shall discover in the discussion of expression that it is essential to 
depart from our previous account in several important w~s. Although the 
important facts about both representation and expression must be stated in 
terms of our reactions to works of art, the logic of these two notions is 
nonetheless a logic of description. It is for this reason that they lend 
themselves so readily to a cognitive theory of aesthetic interest . This 
departure from the standard logic of aesthetic judgment has no serious 
consequences for our theory of appreciation. 
So far I have said nothing about representation in forms of art other 
than painting. In what way is pictorial representation like representation 
in literature? And does it make sense to attribute representational 
properties to music? The answer to the first of these questions is clear. 
We speak of representation in literature not only because of the formal 
similarities with depiction noted by the semantic theory. but also and 
primarily, because there is a place for description in the appreciation of 
literature which is exactly similar to the place of depiction in the 
appreciation of visual art. We may summarise the similarities as follows: 
First, in understanding a piece of literature as a representation we may 
suspend our judgment of its literal truth; we appreciate it not as a means 
for conveJring information, but as a basis for the thought of imagined worlcil.s. 1 
1 This does not mean that truth is irrelevant to aesthetic int erest . On the 
contrary, without an interest in truth, it would be impossible to be 
[ cont ' dJ 
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that resembles 1. Such an account should leave us in no doubt as to how 
the appreciation of representational features in painting can be part of 
aesthetic interest, as this was described in Chapter Nine. 
Note however, that we must depart from our previous account of the 
logic of aesthetic description. For in s~ing that a painting represents 
1 I am referring to a genuine property of it: I am s~ing that it is intended 
to be seen as 1. This is a fact about the painting that I can know whet her 
or not I see it as Y. But this departure should not worry us - indeed, we 
shall discover in the discussion of expression that it is essential to 
depart from our previous account in several important w~s. Although the 
important facts about both representation and expression must be stated in 
terms of our reactions to works of art, the logic of these two notions is 
nonetheless a logic of description. It is for this reason that they lend 
themselves so readily to a cognitive theory of aesthetic interest . This 
departure from the standard logic of aesthetic judgment has no serious 
consequences for o~r theory of appreciation. 
So far I have said nothing about representation in forms of art other 
than painting. In what w~ is pictorial representation like representation 
in literature? And does it make sense to attribute representational 
propert'ies to music ? The answer to the first of these questions is clear. 
We speak of representation in literature not only because of the formal 
similarities with depiction noted by the semantic theory ~ but also , and 
primarily , because there is a place for description in the appreciation of 
literature which is exactly similar to the place of depiction in the 
appreciation of visual art. We m~ summarise the similarities as follows: 
First, in understanding a piece of literature as a representation we m~ 
suspend our judgment of its literal truth; we appreciate it not as a means 
for conveying information, but as a basis for the thought of imagined wor1<is. 1 
1 This does not mean that truth is irrelevant to aesthetic interest. On the 
contrary , without an interest in truth , it would be impos s ibl e to be 
[cont 'dJ 
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Secondly representation in literature is like representation in painting in 
that it is partly dependent on the author's intentions. Since the 
intentions are realised, if at all, in language, and since the language of 
literature is, in general, the language of the readers of literature, it 
might seem that there should be little discrepancy between the intention 
and the final result. But once again, we must remember that what is 
represented in literature is not only the gross outlines of human life, but 
also the fine details - shades of behaviour, and complexities of motive. 
The discovery of an author's intention can be an important guide in our 
thought of these el usive ' thdDg8. Thirdly, there is room for a notion of 
realism in literature: realism is the de scription of particular things as 
things in general are. 'Realism ' has also come to name, not a particular 
mode of representation but a particular choice of subject-matter: the 
objects that a 'realistic' writer describes are chosen because they ememp1ify 
a norm. But this sense of 'realism' is logically speaking, a curiosity. 
Roughly speaking, then , 'representation' has a place in literature 
comparable to its place in painting, even though it arises in a different wqy; 
what representation gives to the spectator of art is in each case the same. 
In each case representation is a property, rooted in intention, and realised 
in forms that have a degree of inter-subjecti ve regularity - a recognisabl e 
visual aspect, and the agreed structures of English syntax. In both cases 
the central core of representation is 'intensional', divorced from reference. 
This is a natural consequence of the fact that our in'~erest in art is not an 
1 [cont'd] interested in meaning, and hence impossible to be interested in 
literature at all. Cf. R.K.Ell i ott, "PoetI'"'J and Truth" , Analysis, 1964. '.: . 
The problem of truth is, unfortunately, one that I shall be unabl e to 
discuss. Clearly there is no contradiction between the views that 
aesths,tic appreciation does not consist in a desire for knowledge ! and that 
one may sorootimes come to love a poem because of the truth of what it says. 
On the other hro1d there is certainly a problem here that any complete 
discussion of aesthetic appreciation ought to be able to solve. A similar 
problem arises when we compare our interest in pictures with our interest 
in photographs. If it is wrong to treat photographs as aesthetic objects 
it is partly because it is wrong to look at what is real as though it 
were merely the representation of what is real. 
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interest in literal truth. 'fhis • intensionality' of representation can be 
observed most clearly in the theatre. What goes on when I see a play is 
very like what goes on when I see certain things happening in life. Thus 
I can point to an actor on the stage and say "fhere is King Lear'. The 
stage is like an illusion and mlf appreciation of what takes place on it, 
like row appreciation of the visual arts, is half mingled with belief. 
But it is interesting to note t hat when I point and say 'There is King 
Lear' ~ pointing gives no denotational significance to mlf words. For 
what I point to is determinate in all its properties - it is a man of middle 
age who lives in Grantchester and who sells antiques on the market. But 
this description, although it fits what I point to, does not fit King Lear. 
There are questions that can be meaningfUlly asked of what I point to that 
cannot be meaningfully asked of Lear. To some questions about King Lear 
there is, logically, no answer. For King Lear, lilee all fictions, is 
indeterminately characterised. Asking what he ate for breakfast is like 
asking what Piero ' s St. Catharine looks like from the other side. 
We have seen that what makes representation possible in both painting 
and literature is the existence of a medium in which an artist can 
effectively direct our thoughts to pre-established objects. There is no 
room for doubt that a painting has the aspect of a man, or that a sentence 
describes a certain state of affairs, and it is these facts that make 
possible the intention to convey the thought of determinate objects. Can 
we say that the medium of music bears a similar relation to the things that 
it might be held to represent? One problem is that, just as a painting 
can only be seen as something visible, so can a symphonic poem only be 
heard as something audible. The only audible feature of an object is its 
" 
sound, and this property can scarcely match the complexity of what can be 
seen in a picture or described in a narrative. In other words, even if 
there can be representation in music, it is not clear that representation 
can convey enough about its object to be r eally interesting. 
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This is not to say that music cannot imitate other properties of an 
object besides its sound: the movement of the waves, the flight of a bird , 
the pulse of anxiety , the grandeur of a gesture. But ' imitation' is not 
always representation: indeed , it is here that we are tempted to speak 
rather in terms of expression. For musical imitation is evocative rather 
than exact: it conveys the idea of a thing , as it were , rather than the 
thing itself. And hence we speak of music as expressing the movement of 
the sea, or the inexorability of fate and not as representing these things. 
It is to the question what it means to descriae music in this way that we 
now must turn. 
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CHAPI'ER TWELVE 
EXPRESSIO 
There have been many attempts to analyse the aesthetic concept of 
expression, which has always proved recalcitrant. The difficulty arises, 
I think, from a conflict between two important features of the concept. 
On the one hand expression in art must be related to the common activities 
of expression - to the public display of thought and feeling. On the other 
hand, aesthetic expression is always a value: a work that has expression 
cannot be a total fpilure. These two features seem to constrain the 
analysis of the concept in two separate directions, and I shall attempt to 
show how t hey might be reconciled. 
The second feature - the connection with value - leads in the direction 
of an 'at'fective [ theory of expression. If to 'recognise' expression is 
already to respond in some w~ to an object, then it becomes impossible to 
regard expression with indifference. This was the principle argument for 
Sant~anals famous theory of expression in terms of 'fused' associations: 
If expression were constituted by the external relation of 
object with object everything would be expressive equally, 
indeterminately: expression depends upon the union of two 
terms , one of which must be furnished qy the imagination: 
I could regard expression with indi:t':t'erence, it will not be 
a beauty until 1 suffuse the symbols themselves with the 
emotions they arouse and find joy and sweetness in the very 
words I hear. 1 
Santayana 1s theory - while it rests on an unexplained idea of 'fusion! -
gives an account of emotion terms not unlike the one LI have been defending. 
But can it really cover the more complex cases of expression, cases where 
the judgment that an object expresses sadness cannot be replaced without 
loss of meaning by the judgment that it is sad? In fact Santayana's 
1 The Sense of Beauty, p.197. 
theory is unable to explain w~ we use the word 'express' to convey the 
relation, judged to be so important, between a work of art and a state 
of mind. 
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In defence of the a:t'fecUve theory it might be objected that we are not 
constrained to use the word 'express 9 in this w~. The term 'expression' 
does not impose itself in the description of art. If this is so then 
clearly a mistake is made by those theories that regard expression as the 
principle value of art, while insisting nonetheless that expression is here 
the ordinary phenomenon that we meet with every d~. Indeed it is often 
the case that instead of s~ing that a song expresses melancholy we might 
have said that it captures, is redolent of , possesses or even evokes 
melancholy. What we wish to say about a song in calling it melancholy can 
often be said just as well in some other w~, by using terms that in other 
contexts do not have the same meaning as the terms that they here replace. 
~t may be , then , that the idiom of !expression
' 
is, properly speaking, a 
rather precarious one. 
An interesting feature of the aesthetic use of the term 'express I, in 
this respect, is that it is generally replaceable by the term 'expressive'. 
~n art there is no expression without expressiveness; a work of art is an 
expression of grief only if it is expressive of grief. This imples that 
the aesthetic concept of expression cannot be identified with the non-
aesthetic concept of natural expression (or evincing). A gesture is a 
natural expression of some feeling if it is a symptom of that feeling, and 
a s,ymptom need not be expressive. ' Expressiveness' has to do with impact: 
an expressive gesture is a revealing or eloquent gesture. Expression 
becomes expressiveness only when it is in some sense successful, and the 
concept of success has no clear application to the notion of a symptom. 
On the other hand it does have ready application to language, where a man 
can be more or less successful in conveying what he means. To the extent 
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that his choice of words is successful it is apt to be called expressive of 
its subject - cf. 'He spoke very expressively of the King's predicament'. 
This might suggest that it is to language that we should turn for a full 
analysis of the concept of expression in art. 
Unfortunately, as 1 shall argue in more detail later , the analogy with 
language remains no more than an analogy. Language is expressive through 
the conventions that give it reference: it is expressive because it 
expresses thoughts. But a work of art is not expressive in this way, 
For one thing it is often very difficult to identify what is expressed in 
a work of art. Lndeed, it may be unimportant to know what is expressed, 
even though it is always important to grasp the expressiveness of a work 
of art. This has lead to the view that expression in art is essentially 
intransitive; 'expression' means 'expressiveness', and an expressive work 
of art no more needs to express something definite than a passage marked 
expressivo i n an instrumental ,score. 1 On the other hand, the whole purpose 
of linguistic expression is thwarted if the hearer is unable to discover 
what is being expressed. ( hich is not to say that language cannot also 
be expressive in the manner of a work of art - indeed it can, since poetry 
is possible.) 
But while natural and linguistic expression provide inadequate models 
for artistic expression, there are other activities that are more closely 
related. It has been argued that ievincing ' and 'expressing l are quite 
different things, and that if we sometimes use the same word to cover both 
activities this should not blind us to the fact t hat there are crucial 
differences between them. 2 Expression is intentional. When one expresses 
1 
2 
This view has been well defended in E.Hanslick, On the Beautiful in Music, 
and E.Gurney, The Power of Sound, pp.313ff. The view is also echoed in 
the writings of several more recent philosophers - see, for example, U.K. 
Bowsma, "The Expression Theory of Art", in W.Elton (ed.), Aesthetics and 
Language, and A.Tormey, The Concept of Expression, p.108. 
William P.Alston," Ex:pressing f; in M.BlaCk (ed.), Philosopb.y in America. 
one's feeling one does not only do something because of the feeling, one 
also puts the feeling into what one does. 1 As a result there is a 
definite intention that lies behind expressive activity. 
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Now this might lead us to suppose that expression in art is after all 
explicable in terms of some non-aesthetic paradigm. For expression, like 
representation, is an aesthetic feature that belongs only to wor ks of art; 
hence i t is not unna-cural to regard it as de I'ined, l ike r epr esent ation , J.!l 
terms of an intention. Our interest in expressive works of ar t is 
continuous with our interest in certain things that people do under the 
stress ot' emotion. To understand expression in art we must first understand 
the intention that underlies expression in life. But i f we approach t he 
concept of expression in this way then we find that we are ot't'ered no real 
alternative to the 'affective' theory. For we are led back once again to 
the concept of expressiveness: a concept which may be ana~sed without 
absurdity in a way that the af:t'ective theory demands. Normally if I do 
something to express mw feeling then mw intention is to produce something 
expressive of mw feeling: this is so, whether or not 1 also express mw 
emotion to someone. I might express my grief by building a monument or 
writing an elegy, and the monument or elegy arises out of my intention to 
produce something expressive of mw emotion. Similarly, I may express ~ 
love to X by doing something expressive of ~ love, in order that X m~ come 
to see what I feel. I will do something expressive because this will be the 
best way of conveying to X the strength and seriousness of ~ feelings. 
In other words , we are led back once again to the possibly affective 
notion of texpressiveness'. If this is so , then we are able to heal the 
apparent fracture between the two features of artistic expression mentioned 
earlier. For when I say that a funerary monument expresses grief I m~ 
1 On this point, see R.Wollheim , "Expression li , in The Human Agent. 
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mean one of two things (a) it was intended to be expressive of a man's 
grief, (b) it succeeds in being expressive of grief. The first of these 
is descriptive, while the second is (perhaps) affective: and yet the 
connection of sense between them is entirely straightforward. Moreover, 
feature (b) is clearly a mark of success, and has more than an analogy with 
expression in art. It is also a feature that is logically independent of 
(a) , and can therefore be attributed to the monument, whether or not the 
monument was ever intended to be expressive, and whe ther or not the grief 
it purports to express was real. The passer-b,y can notice the expressive-
ness, even though he may have no reason to take the monument as a real 
expression of grief. The same is true of works of art. 
But how are we to analyse the idea of expressiveness ? Being 
expressive is related to being evocative - I cannot find an object expressive 
unless it 'reminds' me of something. But the precise character of this 
reminiscence is difficult to determine. Expressiveness may be loosely 
defined as the power t o remind us, call up for us , evoke, or 'symbolise 9 
(in: a loose sense that must not be confounded with any semantic idea) objects, 
such as emotions and states of mind. I t lies, therefore, at the inter-
section of a complex network of feelings and thoughts, and it will be 
impossible to describe the recognition of expression in any simple or 
unitary way. Perhaps the only convincing indication of what it is to 
recognise expression is through examples:we can point to what a man says, 
thinks and does when something - a poem, say - strikes him as expressive. 
There is no need to suppose that, when this happens, he should also know what 
the poem expresses: he may be overwhelmed by a sense of the expressiveness 
of the po~m, even when he cannot put its feeling into words. 
the lines 
o body swayed to music, 0 brightening glance, 
How can we know the dancer from the dance':' 
For example, 
suggest a powerful and extremely precise emotion, but it is quite beyond row 
239 
powers to put it into other words. Indeed, I have no desire to do so. 
The knowledge of a description of the feeling is no part of the enjoyment 
of these lines - unlike the knowledge by acquaintance of the feeling itself. 
fI' hus we arrive swiftly at the expressionist's conclusion. There may be 
no place in the 'recognition' of expression in art for the knowledge that 
some particular feeling is expressed. But this conclusion is divested 
of its usual air of paradox. It t'ollows immediately from the fact that 
our interest in expressiveness and our interest in the description of what 
is expressed are two different things. The recognition of expressiveness 
belongs to 'knowledge by acquaintanoe', and cannot, therefore, be replaced 
by description. 
This does not imply that expressiveness is alw~s the same phenomenon, 
or that it exists in detaohment from the expression of particular states of 
mind. liodin's hands, Br ancusi's birds, and Bernini's fountains are all 
expressive, but in very different w~s. On the other hand, the sense of 
their affinity with oertain states of mind m~ be so strong that no other 
way of referring to these states will seem equally effective·. Someone with 
suffioient culture and experienoe will grasp from these works something that 
he will be unable to put 1nto words. Their value resides partly in the 
faot that one can learn from them what an experienoe or state of mind is 
like, even when no words can oonvey this knowledge in their stead. 
It is ot'ten t rue, nonetheless, that I can analyse the eff ect of a work 
of art, and thus diagnose the origin of its expressive nature. And I can 
do this even when I am unable to say precisely what the work expresses. 
'l alee the following lines: 
And sometimes like a gleaner thou dost keep 
Ste~ t~ laden head across a brook: 
I do not know exactly what these lines express, but I can easily indicate 
how they come to be expressive. For example, the break that oomes before 
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the word 'steady', imposed by the metre, vividly brings to mind the 
precarious movement that is being described. Other works of art ar e yet 
more amenable to the description of expressive content. Une can go a 
long w~ towards describing the state of mind that is expressed by Pope in 
The Rape of the Lock, and towards analysing its basis in the language of the 
poem. And the same goes for the songs of Mahler , the symphonies of 
Tchaikovsky, the paintings of Gaugin or the bronzes of Donatello. On the 
other hand the very suggestion that we could s~ what is expressed by the 
l:ille s 
Dans l'interminable 
Ennui de la pleine, 
La neige incertaine 
Luit comme du sable ••• 
is absurd: in understanding such a poem we come to see that its atmosphere 
is indescribable. 
Here we might raise an interesting question about the identity of 
expression. Normally, there is no problem as to when two gestures express 
the same thingo MW gesture and yours both express anger: in this sense 
they have i dentity of expression. Expressi on is constituted by the 
relation to a state of mind, and two gestures coincide in expression to the 
extent that the states of mind to which they are related are identical. 
But when our interest is transferred from the state of mind expressed to the 
expressive quality of the gesture itself, we discover a problem. For how 
are we to decide when two gestures have the same expressive quality '( We 
might wish to sqy on occasion that two poems express the same thing , or that 
the accompaniment ot' a song expresses the same thing as the words , and in 
such cases we mean to invoke a notion of the identity of expressive quality. 
, 
But clearly we must resist the temptation to s~ that what happens in the 
case of a successful setting is that the poem expresses a certain feeling, and 
the music expresses a certain feeling, and that the f eeling is in each case 
the same. For what is our criterion of ident ity ? 1f there is a criterion 
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it is one that makes sense only in the context of attributing 'expressive-
ness I to a work of art, and not one that bears a resemblance to our normal 
criteria for the identity of feelings. And properly speaking, since 
expressiveness is an affective notion, the 'identity' of expressiveness is 
not determined by the application of an external standard. The identity 
is the identity of an experience - the experience of 'recognising expression' -
and for this no criterion (in our own case) is required. 
1 This is brought out by an example, used by both Wittgenstein and Sartre. 
Wittgenstein refers to the case of an actor imitating Lloyd George. It is 
possible to say, observing the actor, ''llhis is .Lloyd George!', even though 
the similarity with Lloyd George is extremely slight. The actor has done 
something that reminds me of 1loyd George: his performance has conveyed a 
particular impression. We have, as Wittgenstein puts it, 'equality' of 
expression, between the actor and Lloyd George. Similarly , Sartre argues, 
we cannot explain the ability of the art iste FranCfonay to capture Ivlaurice 
Chevalier simply by mentioning analogies between her facial expression and 
gestures and those of Uhevalier - there are none which would not permit us 
to assert an 'identity of expression' between Chevalier and almost anyone. 
Nonetheless we notice the relation immediately, and on no basis. What 
makes our assertion of identity intelligible is the possession by Fran90nay 
of a certain 'nature expressive' which is to be explained, Sartre argues, in 
terms of taft'ectivite' or the power to awaken an affective reaction. 
This problem about the identity of expressiveness can be taken as 
;eurther confirmation of the a:t'fective theory of expression. For it expl ains 
more convinCingly than the expresstonist's argument from the 'particularity' 
2 
of feelings w~ there should be a 'heresy of paraphrase'. f paraphrase is 
1 
2 
L. ittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations etc., p.32, and J.~.Sartre, 
L1imaginaire, pp·55-63. 
Cleanth Brooks, The Well Wrought Urn , ch.11. 
242 
a search for identity of expressiveness, then paraphrase cannot be determined 
by any external rules - such as rules of' meaning. F'or what is sought is an 
identity of experience, and this cannot be secured in any such simple wqy. 
l'his is only the sketch of a theory, and it is unlikely that it could be 
extended without considerable modification to cover all the uses of the 
term 'expression' in aesthetics. But it suf'i'ices, I think, to show that 
the concept of expression need present no special difficulty to our theory 
of aesthetic experience. An object is expressive if it is associated with, 
corresponds to, evokes or suggests a state of mind. How this 'correspondence' 
arises in any given case is not properly a philosophisal, but rather a 
critical question, to be answered by individual analysis. 1 But such a 
theory will fail if it can be shown tha-t there is some independent property 
of the work of art, that determines our description of it as an expression. 
It is precisely this that the semantic theory tries to show. The semantic 
theory attempts to 'objectifyt the symbolic quality of the work of art, by 
showing that it arises as all symbolism arises, through a cognitive relation 
between the work of art and a state of mind. 
There is one wqy of formulating the semantic theory that rapidly becomes 
empty, in just the way that expressionism is empty. For example, we might 
2 
argue with Mrs Langer that works of art stand in a symbolic relation to the 
feelings that they express, but that this relation is not to be explained in 
terms of any rule of reference. I'orks of' art are "presentational" symbols, 
whose relation to their objects is purely morphological. The symbol and its 
Object are related through possessing the same 'logical torm'. It follows 
that what the symbol expresses cannot be re-stated in words; words do not 
1 Wollheim, "Expression", cit. 
2 PhilosopyY ln a New Key, passim. 
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present the 'logical form' of individuals; they only summarise the properties 
and relations that individuals possess. But explained in this way, the 
relation between a work of art and a feeling cannot be described as a 
semantic relation. Our ordinary understanding of the relations between 
words and things cannot be extended to the understanding of artistic 
expression. For one thing we are no longer able to explain wQy we say that 
a work of art expresses a feeling, and not that the feeling expresses a work 
of arta for the relation of 'expression', explained in Mrs Langer's way, is 
clearly symmatr~cal. In this it is of course wholly different from any 
normal semantic relation. 
We might suspect that Mrs Langer's theor,y becomes trivial through its 
over-simple solution to what must be the most powerful objection to any 
semantic theory of expression: Wha.t is a work of art supposed t 0 ~ a.bout 
the state of mind that it expresses, and how is the state of mind identified? 
We find that Mrs Langer ' s theor,y rules these questions illegitimate. The 
kind of symbolism peculiar to art is not to be explained on the model of 
'reference and predication'. Artistic symbolism is sui generis, involving 
not statement or comparison but rather 'presentation t, the revelation of an 
individual thing. 
This theor,y is, like expressionism, a direct descendant of the Kantian 
view that aesthetic experience is free from concepts. In aesthetic 
experience objects are neither compared nor described but rather 'given' in 
their entirety. Croce likewise argued in defence of his cognitive theor,y 
of aesthetic appreciation that art and the appreciation of art are forms of 
non-conceptual knowledge. Reduced to its barest terms the distinction 
between art and science lies in the fact that the first involves intuition, 
or the knowledge of particulars, while the second involves conception, or 
the knowledge of universals. Croce famously argued that the work of art 
as a whole presents an intuition, even when it contains parts - as in a novel -
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which taken alone would have purely conceptual import. 1 In effect Croce 
tried to unite in a single formula two separate aspects of the Hegelian 
view of art: the view that art and the appreciation of art are forms of 
knowledge, and the view that art is a sensuous and not an intellectual 
medium. Croce connects these views in such a wqy as to derive the 
important consequence that what art sqys, and what it gives knowledge of, 
cannot be said or known in another wqy, since this would contradict the 
assumption that the object of art is not a conception but an intuition. 
It is a small step from this kind of expressionism to Mrs Langer ' s 
version of the semantic theorya the conclusions are the same, and the 
reaso~s for them equally difficult to interpret. In fact, even with 
semantic theories that are both more subtle and more genuinely explanatory 
than Mrs Langer's, the same conclusions are yielded, and the same 
inadequacies of explanation arise. This should lead us to suspect that, 
however refined the semantic theory might become, it is ultimately as empty 
a theory of aesthetic appreciation as the doctrine of 'presentational 
symbols'. I shall attempt to illustrate this conjecture through a brief 
consideration of Goodman's views . 2 
Goodman analyses the relation between a work of art and what it expresses 
in terms of the common notion of reference, thus avoiding many of the 
difficulties that stem from Mrs Langer's recourse to 'presentation'. He 
argues that expression is a species of exemplification, and that an object 
exemplifies a property if it both possesses the property and refers to it, 
in the wqy a tailor's sample exemplifies the pattern of a particular cloth. 
Expression is distinguished from other kinds of exemplification by the fact 
that in expr~ssion the property exemplified is possessed metaphorically and 
1 
2 
See, for example, Breviario di Estetica, pp.26-31. The argument is also 
implicit in Hegel. See, Introduction to the Philosophy of Fine Art, tr. 
Bosanquet, p.133. 
Languages of Art, oh.2. 
I 
I 
I 
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not literally. In other words expression consists in the reference to an 
attribute that is ' metaphorically possessed'. Goodman feels at liberty to 
use the terms ' attribute' apd 'predicate' interchangeably, on nominalist 
grounds. Equally true to the premise of nominalism is his refusal to give 
an explanation (other than ,genetic) of how a predicate is metaphorically 
applied. There is no room for tne suggestion that understanding a metaphor 
might involve very different capacities from those involved in understanding 
a literal truths the question has already been partly begged against a non-
cognitive analysis of aesthetic appreciation. But it is not necessary to 
argue this point again. Nor need we argue against Goodman's view qy pointing 
out that not every quality that a work of art is said to express is also 
attributed to it metaphorically (tgrief' is but one example). The fault 
might lie, after all, in our ordinary sparingness with metaphor. It is 
true that Goodman ' s analysis needs to be amended slightly if it is not to be 
open to certain counter-examples. Clearly it is not sufficient for 
expression that a poem should be both sad and refer to sadness, since the 
reference could arise in an, irrelevant way-. (Sadness might simply be 
mentioned in one of the lines.) Goodmants discussion includes several 
suggestions as to how this kind of difficulty might be overcome. All we 
need say, I think, is that the poem must refer to sadness in ~irtue of being 
(metaphorically) sad. 
Now Goodman denies that his theory enables us to tell what any given 
work expressess no philosophical analysis framed in nominalist terms could 
give us this power. It follows that we cannot compare Goodman's theory with 
our prior intuitions about expression and see it vindicated. Besides, it 
seems that these intuitions are extremely vague. Every judgment that has been 
made about expression has also been hotly contested, and set beside this 
instability in critical language most philosophical theories of expression 
have a detached and paradoxical air. We do not know how to apply them to 
works of art; nor do we know what follows if they are true. This very lack of 
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an established body of intuitions renders Goodman's analysis, in terms of 
n.ecessary conditions, rather curious. The theory presents an 'analysans' 
wi thout identifying its t analysandumt • I!' the arguments given earlier 
about the recognition of expression are correct, then it is difficult to 
assess what is shown by the 1'act (if it is a fact) that some works of art 
possess the property of referring to an attribute that they also ,metaphorical-
1y possess. 
The burden of Goodmants analysis must lie in the condition of reference: 
it is this feature that ultimately explains the symbolic relation between a 
work of art and whatever is expressed qy it. It is in terms of reference 
tha~ the relation of 'correspondence t is analysed. 
amount to '{ 
What does this feature 
For Goodman, the various forms of art are, like natural languages, 
gymbol schemes. They s,ymbo1ise objects and properties, the one by 
representation or description, the other qy expression or exemplification. 
Representation involves denotation, which is both less immediate and more 
literal than exemPlification, but the core of both expression and 
representation is the property of reference, which can exist in these and 
many other forms. Reference recurs in other symbol schemes, and could be 
understood from the study of any of these. S,ymool schemes are differentiated 
partly in terms of certain formal properties, some semantic (derived from 
what Goodman calls the 'field of reference' of the scheme), others syntactic 
(belonging to the structure of the scheme itself). If certain of these 
properties are present and others absent, then it is possible to develop a 
notation for the scheme; otherwise not. Not all these formal properties 
need be shar~d by any two schemes of symoo1s. (Thus natural languages, 
unlike pictures, are syntactically d1f'ferentiated, or articulate, an.d unlike 
musical scores are ~mantically undifferentiated, or dense). 
Now suppose we were to ask, what is the content of s~ing that the 
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separate art-forms constitute symbol schemes '/ What do they symbolise, and 
what kinds of thing do they enable us to s~ about what they symbolise ? 
A first reaction to these questions might be to construe them as unproblematic 
or else once again to rule them illegitimate, as Mrs Langer does. The art-
forms are symbol schemes in that they share certain roughly formal properties 
with other symbol schemes, and in that they have a tfield of reference' with 
which they can be correlated. There is no content to the notion of a symbol 
scheme that can be given independently of these features. If it is asked 
~ is symbolised by works of art then the answer is objects ana properties 
(or, in nOminalist language, individuals and predicates)a these exhaust the 
field of reference of art as of most schemes of symbols. If it is now 
asked what works of art ~ about these objects, then it will be replied 
that an answer is neither necessar,y nor possible. To understand an utter-
ance in the "language" of music is simply to understand the references that 
are made b.Y the individual utterance, in accordance with the conventions and 
practises of music. There is no need to refer to what the music ~ in 
order to explain how we understand it. In any case the music s~s nothing 
that could be put into words: there is no reason why the translatability 
that characterises natural languages should show itself in other symbol 
schemes. We cannot speak of a musical utterance as tequivalent' to a piece 
of English; the notion of equivalence is itself tied to linguistic utterances, 
and marks a relation between sentences alone. To suppose that a musical 
utterance could be understood by being translated into a verbal utterance 
is to suppose that the former belongs to a symbol scheme to which it does not 
in fact belong. To understand a musical utterance is not to know of some 
ut,terance in another symbol scheme which somehow says the same thing; there 
is no reason for saying that such another utterance could be found. In any 
case, suppose one does find this further utterance: how aoes one understand 
11? Not, surely, oy knowing yet another utterance in the same - or another-
symbol scheme: to insist that understanding must always proceed in this w~ 
........ --
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is to generate an infinite regress. Understan~ing a musical utterance must 
be considered as a purely musical ability, much as understanding a sentence 
is purely verbal. 
I give this argument since it seems to do some justice to the extreme 
radicalism of Goodman's approach and to his ~etermined rejection of all 
'ultimate explanations'. But this radicalism also has its drawbacks, and 
while on one level it seems to render the analysis impregnable, on another 
level it opens it to serious criticism. It is not an irrelevant fact that 
natural languages can be translated • It is of their essence. For 
. 
translation is a possibility as soon as there is an interpretation, and all 
natural languages are inherently interpreted. In other words 'reference' in 
a natural language seems immediately to open the pOSsiDility of translation. 
For reference to particulars cannot occur without at least the possioility of 
predication, and hence without"' the possibility of assigning truth-values. 
(1 rely on the usual Fregean arguments t'or a connection between reference 
and truth.) Truth introduces the idea of logical equivalence, and hence of 
translateability. Now we are supposed to assume that this translateability 
is not a feature of the symbol scheme of music even though reference occurs 
in that scheme. It immediately becomes doubtful that we can explain what is 
meant by 'reference' in terms of a linguistic practise. But, if this is so, 
the term 'reference' as employe~ by Goodman becomes as obscure and unhelpful 
as Mrs Langerts 'presentation'. As in the theory of representation, Goodman 
rest's his analysis on a supposedly seIll8.ntic property which must nonetheless 
be divorced from almost all the normal activities in which reference occurs: 
assertion, denial, questioning and command. The work of art picks out an 
object (in this case a feeling), but predicates nothing of it. The work of 
art has no truth-value; to say therefore that understanding the work of art 
is cognitive is to say very little. It is to say only that it involves 
attention to an object, and hence more than the simple stimulation of feeling 
or sense. If we can speak of the work as having a relation of reference to 
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that whioh it expresses it is not SO muoh like the reference that ooours in 
' This is green', but more like that whioh ooours in ;Look at thisl ' . To obey 
suoh an order, and to understand the referenoe it oontains, does not involve 
~ determinate judgment about the objeot that is referred to. 
This seems to suggest that a semantio theory of art does not really say 
anything about appreoiation that oould not be said in less misleading terms. 
It does not have tne implioation that understanding art is oognitive in the 
w~ that understanding a language is oognitive, nor does it have the 
implioation that the work of art is a symbol in the way that words are 
symbols. Artistio symbolism is entirely sui generis, it does not express 
knowledge of universalsJ instead, it oonveys a sense of indiVidual existenoe. 
It is for this reason that works of art oannot be translated. Art is not 
oonceptual, but rather 'immediate' or 'intuitive'. The apparatus of the 
semantio theories does no more than. preserve in more daunting form the 
oentral tenets of Crooean expressionism. But it is impossible to explain 
the terms of the semantio theory in a way that will oast any light on the 
Crooean dootrine. On the oontrary, the dootrine remains asobsoure as ever, 
despite the superifioial persuasiveness of the terms in whioh it is now 
expressed. To saY that a work of art 'presents i or 'refers to' a oertain 
feeling, where 'referenoe' is detaohed from truth, and where no rules of 
reference oan be given, is to saY no more than that the work in some way 
(but in no partioular way) oalls some feeling to mind. And this we need not 
deny. To go on to argue that appreciation is cognitive is at best misleading, 
and to call a work of art a symbol is t o use the word ' symbol' in an 
attenuated sense. Being a symbol no longer impliesbbeing used to symbolise. 
If the red shirt is a symbol of oommunism and the blaok shirt a symbol of 
fasoism this is beoause people have used the colours of their shirts to 
declare their politioal allegiances. To wear a red shirt, in the right 
oircumstanoes, and to say ' 1 am a oommunist' are equivalent aots, even though 
one may be appropriate and effeotive where the other is not. The fasoist 
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who attends a communist demonstration in a red shirt is guilty of dissimula-
tion: he is telling a lie in his mode of dress. Anyone who thought that a 
work of art symbolised feeling in a similar way would find the activities of 
aesthetic judgment and appreciation impossible to explain. Symbolism in 
art is a matter of suggestion rather than reference. 
In arguing that appreciation is not primarily cognitive I have intended 
to maintain that the aesthetic attitude is not one of discovery, and its end-
point not the knowledge of facts, whether about the work of art or about the 
world to which i't 'refers'. No cognitive theory of aesthetic experience 
oanexplain w~ one should desire to listen to a symphony again, any more 
than one should wish to re-read a scientific treatise, or repeat a successful 
1 
experiment. Although judgment is a necessary pre-condition of-aesthetio 
experienoe - as the reading of aQY novel will make clear - it is not the 
experience itself. An attitude of discovery, while it is essential to, is 
not suffioient for aesthetic appreciation, and the effects of art cannot be 
summed up in terms of propositions that we learn or come to believe through 
studying it. But if this is so, it may be wondered in what, after all, the 
value of art consists. This is one of a group of questions that I wish 
finally to consider. 
1 I owe this point to Mr. R.K. Elliott. 
CHAPI'ER THIRTEEN 
CONCLUSION 
I have discussed the basis of aesthetics in the philosophy of mind, 
and it will perhaps be wondered how the argument bears on the theory and 
practise of criticism. In particular, I have offered no solution to the 
critic's most vexing problemsl the problem of objectivity and the problem 
of value. Any detailed treatment of such issues would require arguments 
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at least as complicated as those I have already given, but I shall conclude 
with a few suggestions. 
First, then, the question of objectivity. Even if we leave 
evaluation aside, we find that our account of aesthetic description presents 
an awkward problem. For the meaning of aesthetic descriptions has been 
explained without reference to their just ificat ionl nothing has been said 
that will provide rules for the applioation of t aesthetic· terms. It must 
not be assumed, ~owever, that the use of aesthetic descriptions is entirely 
arbitrary, or 'subjective', any more than the description of an aspect is 
arbitrary or subjective. A figure with several mutually exclusive aspects 
m~ be seen in several mutually exclusive ways; but aspect-descriptions are 
not for this reason sUbjective. In a similar w~ it cannot be held that 
the possibility of rival interpretations of a work of art demonstrates the 
subjectivity of Criticism. It is perhaps possible to see athello as either 
noble or self-indulgent, and these rival interpretations give rise to quite 
different experiences of 'the play. 
reason subjective. 
But neither interpretation is for that 
It might be thought that, in arguing that aesthetic descriptions need 
not have truth-conditions, I have in effect made it impossible to describe 
them as ·objective'. But this is not so. Objectivity and Truth belong 
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to different categories. Take the parallel case of moral judgment. Suppose 
it is true that moral judgments express attitudes and not beliefs - the 
condition for their acceptance involves a decision or a desire. It follows 
that there is a sense in which moral judgments do not have truth-conditions -
their truth does not consist in their 'correspondence' with a state of 
affairs. But it by no means follows that moral judgments are not objective. 
It m~ still be possible to support them with reasons 'valid for all men', 
reasons that one must accept on pain of being irrational. It ~ be true 
that, in the absence of truth-conditions, there can be no such thing as a 
conclusive reason for a judgment (since 'conclusiveness' derives from 
deducibility, which is a relation subordinate to truth-value) . 
reasons might nevertheless be objective. 1 
But practical 
But how do we secure the objectivity of a critical judgment? To what 
~ we appeal? The theor,r of aesthetic perception argues that the 
objectivity of an aesthetic judgment is founded no difi'erently from the 
objectivity of judgments ascribing secondary qualities - in the 'agreement 
in judgments' of adult observers. 2 But such an approach is at best 
indecisive. For although it is clearly true that most judgments about 
aspects are objective - in that it is a necessary truth that a man with 
normal sensory capaCities and normal abilities as a language-user will agree 
with others about the aspects of the things he sees - it is by no means 
certain that this appeal to agreement can support the objectivity of all 
aesthetic judgments. Certainly, at least some aesthetic features are, like 
aspects, dependent for their recognition on a visual or auditory experience, 
but in aesthetic juagement we no longer findtne same kind of spontaneous 
agreement. The particular experience of seeing an aspect is pre-determined 
1 
2 
Thus Kant believed that moral judgments are imperatives, founded on 
reasons ·,-va:l1d. for all men: practical, not theoretical, reasons. 
Such a view is defended by Sibley in "Objectivity and Aesthetics" , A.S.S.V., 
1968. 
by the first-order features of its object in a way that aesthetic experience 
is not. We can therefore no longer make a direct appeal to agreement in 
order to establish the objectivity of aesthetic description. The recognition 
of an aesthetic feature, unlike the recognition of an aspect, is not the 
prerogative of the 'standard observer'. Even if there were de facto 
agreement in aesthetic judgment, this would still not establish objectivity. 
For a man can be reasoned out of a critical interpretation in a w~ that he 
cannot as a rule be reasoned out of the perception of an aspect, and in a 
way that he can never be reasoned out of the perception of a secondary 
quality. We say that one must "see for oneself" in aesthetic judgment, but 
it must be remembered that this process of quasi-perception is founded on a 
complex 'understanding', without which it can hardly be said to exist. A 
man does not 'see' that a work of art is sincere, sad or sentimental if he 
does not understand :. it. It does not need understanding to see that a 
picture is red, or even to see that it has ~he aspect of a horse. It is 
because this understanding can take many forms, and can be altered and 
corrected by reasoning, that we cannot use 'agreement in judgments' as a 
criterion of objectivity. 
If there is objectivity in aesthetic description, then, it must be 
discovered at a far deeper level than that of mere surface agreement. We 
must investigate the roots of reasoning in aesthetios - in particular, we 
must attempt to aiscover whether anything like objectivity can be attributed 
to the reasons oft'ered in favour of an experience or response. Those 
philosophers who think of practical reasons as all relative to desires will 
of course reject the o"bjectivity ot' aesthetics. But such a view of' practical 
reason is grotesquely narrow: there is, after all, such a thing as the 
.' 
justification of a desire itself, and hence of an emotion, and hence of a 
response, and hence of an aesthetic judgment. The question is, whether 
objectivity can De obtained here, where it is both clearly believed in, and 
obviously required. We can rest content with the knowledge that this is not 
a question for aesthetios alone, nor is it a question for whioh only the 
empiriOist laoks an answer. 
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But we oan now see that the questions of objeotivity and of value are 
olosely oonneoted. For to attribute a value is to justify a preferenoe; 
evaluation rests on preoisely ~he kind of reasoning that is involved in the 
support of aesthetio desoriptionsl reasoning about the appropriateness of a 
oertain state of mind. If any light is to be oast, therefore, on the 
problems of objectivity and of value, it i s this particular form of reasoning -
reasoning in terms of what is appropriate - that must be examined. Aesthetics 
is unlike ethics, in that tne concepts of right and wrong here give w~ to the 
more subtle ideas of the appropriate and the normal. Little attention has 
been paid to these concepts b.Y philosophers, and yet it is clear that, not 
only do they have an important role to Pl~ in the practise of criticism; they 
also account for some of the value and signifioanoe of art. For art allows 
the sense of what is appropriate to enter our thinking and determine what we 
feel. In this sense, the !Oeature of art that gives it a value ~s also the 
feature that is invoked in aesthetic evaluation. The two quest10nss 'How 
are works of art evaluated?' and 'What do we value in art ?' converge. In 
other wordS, to approaoh the problem of value through the idea of the 
appropriate is to give an intelligible place to art in human experience as a 
whole; it is to explain how the things that we value in a1':t - sinoerity, truth, 
depth of feeling, - are precisely the things that we value in life. 
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